United States v. Raphael Patton
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 1964
7th Cir.2013Background
- Patton was stopped by Peoria police for open-container offenses in a high-crime area at about 1:30 a.m. and was subjected to a patdown for weapons.
- Officer Winkle observed Patton backing away from the group and looking around nervously, which the officer interpreted as evasive behavior.
- Winkle, based on experience, believed Patton’s behavior could indicate possession of a weapon or a high-bond warrant, justifying a protective pat-down.
- The pat-down revealed a loaded nine-millimeter Ruger pistol in Patton’s waistband, which led to charges of felon in possession of a firearm.
- The district court denied suppression, concluding the frisk was supported by reasonable suspicion; Patton pleaded guilty while preserving his appeal of the suppression ruling.
- The Seventh Circuit reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error but applies de novo review to the legal question of reasonable suspicion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the pat-down justified by reasonable suspicion? | Patton argues no reasonable suspicion existed. | Patton claims the officer lacked articulable facts to fear for safety. | Yes; the pat-down was supported by reasonable suspicion. |
| Which circustances support reasonable suspicion (time, place, behavior, area)? | Patton contends circumstances were insufficient. | Winkle’s experience and pattern of evasive behavior justified caution. | Time, location, and Patton’s evasive demeanor contributed to reasonable suspicion. |
| Did Patton’s evasive movement alone sustain reasonable suspicion? | Evasiveness was not enough without more. | Evasive movement, combined with others’ behavior and context, suffices. | Evasive backing away supported reasonable suspicion when viewed with context. |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (establishes stop-and-frisk standard based on reasonable suspicion)
- Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (U.S. 2000) (nervous, evasive behavior in a high-crime area supports suspicion)
- Oglesby, 597 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2010) (evasiveness can justify suspicion of weapon possession)
- Barnett, 505 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 2007) (objective, not officer's subjective belief, governs reasonable suspicion)
- Snow, 656 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. 2011) (reinforces deference to district court factual findings and totality of circumstances)
- Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1989) (reasonable suspicion requires more than a hunch; must be identifiable facts)
- Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (U.S. 1972) (late-hour stops heighten safety concerns)
- United States v. Brown, 188 F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 1999) (nervousness and eye contact as factors in suspicion)
- United States v. Evans, 994 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1993) (nervousness as a factor in determining reasonableness)