United States v. Randall Cornette
932 F.3d 204
| 4th Cir. | 2019Background
- Randall Cornette pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm; PSR listed four prior state convictions that led the district court to apply the ACCA and impose a 220‑month sentence.
- After a prior remand for an inadequate explanation of sentence, Cornette was resentenced to the same term; the record did not specify whether the ACCA enhancement rested on the enumerated clause or the now‑void residual clause.
- Cornette filed successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 relief after Johnson v. United States (residual clause void) and Welch (Johnson retroactive) arguing he no longer had three ACCA predicates.
- The district court denied relief on the merits, finding the 1976 Georgia burglary qualified as generic burglary and the North Carolina drug convictions qualified as serious drug offenses.
- The Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo and concluded the plea appeal waiver did not bar Cornette’s Johnson‑based challenge, then analyzed (1) whether Georgia burglary (1976) is divisible and categorically matches ACCA generic burglary and (2) whether Cornette’s 1984 NC drug convictions qualify as serious drug offenses.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Cornette) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the appeal waiver bars Johnson/Welch challenge | Waiver does not bar because sentence was imposed pursuant to a now‑unconstitutional statutory provision, so district court lacked authority | Waiver bars collateral attack of sentence terms in plea agreement | Waiver does not bar review where sentence was imposed under a provision later held substantively unconstitutional and retroactive (Johnson + Welch) |
| Whether 1976 Georgia burglary is divisible or indivisible for categorical analysis | Georgia statute is indivisible (alternative means), so apply categorical approach | Statute is divisible because it lists alternative location types and indictments identify type | Statute is indivisible; apply categorical approach |
| Whether 1976 Georgia burglary is a "violent felony" under ACCA enumerated clause | Georgia law as of 1976 (Hayes) covered entry into any vehicle, broader than generic burglary | Argues later Georgia decisions or indictments show conformity to generic burglary | Not a violent felony: at time of conviction Georgia law criminalized more conduct than generic ACCA burglary, so conviction does not qualify |
| Whether 1984 NC controlled‑substance convictions are "serious drug offenses" under ACCA | Under Simmons/Newbold, defendant could not have received maximum 10‑yr term absent judicial findings of aggravating factors; record lacks such findings | Government argued the convictions qualified as serious drug offenses | Not serious drug offenses: judgments show presumptive range and no recorded aggravating findings, so do not count as ACCA predicates |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (Struck ACCA residual clause as void for vagueness)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (Held Johnson substantive and retroactive on collateral review)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (Divisibility inquiry; elements v. means analysis)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (Limited documents permissible under the modified categorical approach)
- Stitt v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 399 (Definition of generic burglary for ACCA purposes)
- United States v. Newbold, 791 F.3d 455 (4th Cir.) (Applying Simmons to Fair Sentencing Act records to assess serious drug offense)
- Simmons v. United States, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. en banc) (Framework for whether state sentences qualify as ACCA serious drug offenses)