United States v. Rafael Aldana
878 F.3d 877
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Rafael Aldana and Julio Cesar Suarez were convicted under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) for attempting to enter the U.S. away from designated immigration entry points.
- Aldana was found ~400 yards north of the border and ~2 miles from the Otay Mesa Port of Entry; Suarez was found about two miles east of Otay Mesa.
- Both admitted Mexican citizenship and lack of lawful entry documents; each had bench trials and were convicted (Aldana: time served; Suarez: four months).
- On appeal they argued the government failed to prove they entered at a place other than one "designated by immigration officers," because 8 C.F.R. § 100.4(a) lists "Otay Mesa" as a port of entry and they contend that refers to the entire geographic area, not a specific facility.
- The panel reviewed statutory and regulatory history (INA, prior INS regs, 8 C.F.R. § 235.1) and examined how "port of entry" has been used to mean a physical facility where immigration officers accept applications.
- The court concluded appellants did not enter at a facility where immigration officials could accept applications and therefore upheld the convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a "place designated by immigration officers" in §1325(a)(1) can mean an entire geographic area listed in 8 C.F.R. §100.4(a) rather than a specific staffed facility | Aldana/Suarez: §100.4(a)'s listing of "Otay Mesa" designates the whole geographic area as a port of entry, so entering anywhere in that area is not a violation | Government: "Port of entry" refers to a physical facility staffed by immigration officers where an alien must apply under §235.1(a); geographic listing does not change that meaning | The phrase refers to immigration facilities at designated ports of entry (places where officers accept applications); geographic-area reading rejected; convictions affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Roach, 792 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2015) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence review)
- United States v. Duran, 189 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1999) (evidence viewed in light most favorable to prosecution)
- United States v. LKAV, 712 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 2013) (courts avoid absurd or irrational regulatory interpretations)
- United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932 (2011) (collateral consequences preserve review despite release)