United States v. Quinzon
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14160
9th Cir.2011Background
- Quinzon was convicted of possession of child pornography and sentenced to 84 months with 30 years of supervised release.
- As a condition of supervised release, the district court imposed monitoring software/hardware on Quinzon's computer-related devices.
- Quinzon had waived appeal of certain conditions if the term of supervised release was 10 years or less; this case exceeds that and waives do not apply.
- The plea agreement referenced possible supervised-release conditions but not the detailed monitoring framework eventually imposed.
- The sentencing hearing addressed objections to the monitoring condition, including the potential use of filtering software as a less intrusive alternative.
- The court did not specify exact monitoring technologies, instead delegating to the Probation Office to implement and tailor monitoring.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was Quinzon entitled to notice before imposing the monitoring condition? | Wise requires notice for non-guideline conditions; notice given at hearing. | Notice should have been explicit beforehand; lack of advance disclosure unfair. | Adequate notice given; hearing disclosed consideration of the condition and allowed objections. |
| Is the computer monitoring condition reasonably tailored under § 3583(d)? | Monitoring related to Internet use for prevention of recidivism; within § 3583(d). | Broad, potentially intrusive, and ambiguous about scope beyond Internet activity. | Condition reasonably tailored to Internet-related activity and monitored by probation; not overbroad. |
| Does the term 'monitoring' render the condition too vague to assess deprivation of liberty? | Monitoring is standard practice and sufficiently defined by scope (Internet-related). | Broad term could cover intrusive methods; requires more specificity. | Not overbroad; broad term acceptable when limited by Internet-related scope and other conditions. |
| Must the district court specify monitoring hardware/software details up front? | Future technology may evolve; delegation to probation appropriate. | Need precise technologies to ensure tailoring and legality. | Court may delegate details to probation; condition must remain reasonably tailored as technology evolves. |
| May parties request modification of the monitoring condition as technology evolves? | Judicial modification authority under § 3583(e) permits adjustment. | Modification may be necessary if monitoring becomes too intrusive. | Modification is available; district court may revisit to ensure continued tailoring and appropriateness. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Wise, 391 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2004) (notice required for uncontemplated supervised-release conditions)
- United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2004) (monitoring technology varies; tailoring needed)
- United States v. Sales, 476 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 2007) (broad monitoring terms require clarification; remand for specificity)
- United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 2003) (approved broad device monitoring; scope matters)
- United States v. Goddard, 537 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008) (limits on requiring prior approval for software changes; tailoring noted)
- Esparza v. United States, 552 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam; acknowledges prior related decisions)
- United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2005) (district courts may delegate to probation for program selection)
- United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2004) (technology evolution supports modification of conditions)