United States v. Purcell
967 F.3d 159
2d Cir.2020Background
- From 2012–2017 Lavellous Purcell ran a nationwide commercial sex enterprise, recruiting women via Facebook, Backpage, Tinder and other platforms, arranging hotels and trips, and exercising control over workers.
- New York County DA obtained three warrants (Aug 2016, Nov 2016, Sept 2017) for Purcell’s Facebook account; Facebook produced records in response; federal prosecutors later obtained an Aug 2018 federal warrant.
- Purcell was indicted in SDNY and convicted after trial of five counts: Count One (enticement, 18 U.S.C. §2422(a)), Count Two (transporting for prostitution, §2421(a)), Count Three (use of interstate commerce to promote unlawful activity, §1952), Count Four (conspiracy §371), and Count Five (sex trafficking by force, fraud, coercion, §1591).
- Pretrial, Purcell moved to suppress Facebook evidence arguing the state warrants were insufficiently particular; the district court denied the motion as to the Nov 2016 and Sept 2017 warrants (August 2016 was not relied on).
- At trial the government used Facebook posts and private messages, hotel receipts, Backpage ads, and witness testimony (including Marie Ann Wood) to prove trafficking, transport, and coercion; defense cross-examined Wood about her police interview, after which a police officer (Royer) testified about that interview.
- On appeal Purcell challenged suppression (warrant particularity/good faith), sufficiency of evidence (Counts One, Two, Five), and admission of Royer’s testimony; the Second Circuit affirmed convictions except reversed Count One for lack of venue and remanded for dismissal and resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity/suppression of Facebook evidence (Nov 2016 & Sept 2017 warrants) | Warrants were functionally adequate and, if defective, officers reasonably relied on them in good faith | Warrants were insufficiently particular and overbroad (digital general warrants); suppression required | Denial of suppression affirmed: even assuming facial defects, Leon good-faith exception applies because officers’ reliance was objectively reasonable and exclusion would not meaningfully deter misconduct |
| Sufficiency — Count One (enticement; venue in SDNY) | Venue proper because essential conduct (enticement and travel) could be tied to SDNY (calls, travel routes, interstate activity) | Government failed to prove by preponderance that enticement or victim travel occurred in SDNY for any named victim | Reversed Count One: evidence of venue in SDNY was speculative as to each victim; conviction vacated and count dismissed |
| Sufficiency — Count Two (transporting Vasquez) | Documentary evidence (Facebook messages, hotel bookings, Backpage ads) shows Purcell coordinated/arranged Vasquez’s movements and accommodations—thus he "transported" her | No direct proof who paid/booked travel or that Purcell physically moved Vasquez | Affirmed: jury could infer Purcell arranged and coordinated travel/accommodations (analogous to Mi Sun Cho) sufficient to show ‘‘transport’’ under §2421(a) |
| Sufficiency — Count Five (coercion of Wood; §1591) | Purcell’s pattern of control (seizing phone, taking money, restrictive rules, branding, intimations of violence) created coercion both subjectively and objectively | No explicit force or threats while Wood was with Purcell; insufficent evidence of coercion | Affirmed: cumulative conduct supported a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Wood was coerced (statute’s subjective–objective coercion standard satisfied) |
| Admission of Officer Royer’s testimony about Wood’s police interview (pretrial promise, hearsay, Confrontation) | Testimony admissible to rehabilitate Wood under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii); Wood testified so confrontation satisfied | Government breached pretrial promise not to introduce the interview, testimony was hearsay and violated Confrontation Clause | No plain error: pretrial agreement ambiguous and defense opened the door; Royer’s testimony admissible non-hearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(ii); no Confrontation problem because declarant (Wood) testified and was cross-examined |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (U.S. 1984) (establishes good-faith exception to exclusionary rule)
- Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (U.S. 2009) (suppression justified only when deterrence benefits outweigh costs)
- Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (U.S. 2006) (exclusionary rule is not first resort)
- Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (U.S. 2004) (particularity required in warrant itself, not only in affidavits)
- Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (U.S. 1987) (purpose of particularity requirement; limits general searches)
- United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016) (limits on retention/seizure of digital data; good-faith reliance on warrants)
- United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2017) (broad digital warrants can be valid if particularity criteria met)
- United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2013) (three-part particularity test for warrants)
- United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1992) (warrant invalid where it authorizes search for evidence of unspecified broad criminal activity)
- United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2010) (exclusionary rule may not apply where officers reasonably relied on defective warrant)
- United States v. Mi Sun Cho, 713 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 2013) (arranging work/accommodations can constitute "transport" under §2421)
- United States v. Thompson, 896 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2018) (venue may lie where enticer acted and where travel objective occurred)
- United States v. Rivera, 799 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2015) (coercion standard: hybrid subjective–objective analysis)
- United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 2010) (defendant’s modus operandi knowledge relevant to coercion)
- United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2001) (harmless-error standard for erroneously admitted evidence)