656 F.Supp.3d 772
N.D. Ill.2023Background
- Defendant Edward Price has six prior felony convictions (three narcotics-related; three for failing to comply with sex-offender registration stemming from a juvenile adjudication).
- On Jan. 3, 2021 Chicago police found a loaded firearm in Price's sweatshirt pocket; a federal grand jury indicted him under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
- Price moved to dismiss (Dec. 22, 2022), arguing § 922(g)(1) is facially and as-applied unconstitutional under Bruen because the government cannot show a historical tradition of disarming nonviolent felons.
- Numerous similar post-Bruen challenges have been filed nationally; most district courts (and several circuits) have upheld § 922(g)(1) as constitutional.
- The court concluded that felons are not "law-abiding" persons within the Second Amendment’s plain text, so the analytical inquiry under Bruen’s historical-tradition step is unnecessary and denied the motion to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 922(g)(1) is facially and as-applied unconstitutional post-Bruen | Price: Bruen requires the government to show historical tradition; it cannot do so for nonviolent felons | Gov: Convicted felons are not "law-abiding" and thus fall outside the Amendment’s text; longstanding felon-dispossession laws are presumptively lawful | Denied: Felons are excluded from the Amendment’s textual protection; § 922(g)(1) constitutional on its face and as-applied to Price |
| Whether courts must reach Bruen’s historical-tradition test here | Price: Court must apply step-two and find historical analogues lacking | Gov: No need to reach history because the Amendment’s text excludes felons | Held: No need to apply historical-tradition step once the text excludes felons |
| Whether individualized dangerousness assessments are required before disarming felons | Price: Statutory ban should be assessed with individualized inquiries | Gov: Precedent rejects a highly individualized approach; executive process is better suited | Held: Court rejects individualized requirement, following Seventh Circuit precedent |
Key Cases Cited
- New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) (articulates the text-and-history framework for Second Amendment challenges)
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizes an individual right to bear arms but notes longstanding prohibitions, including felon dispossession)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (applies Heller to the states and reiterates that longstanding regulations, including felon bans, are not cast into doubt)
- Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019) (upholds § 922(g)(1) as presumptively lawful; rejects individualized dangerousness requirement)
- United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (supports categorical limits on firearm possession for certain classes of persons)
- Range v. Att'y Gen., 53 F.4th 262 (3d Cir. 2022) (post-Bruen decision upholding § 922(g)(1))
- United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding § 922(g)(1) categorical ban)
