United States v. Pendleton
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7439
3rd Cir.2011Background
- Pendleton, a previously convicted sex offender, was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) for traveling in interstate/foreign commerce after his sex-offense convictions and knowingly failing to register under SORNA.
- Pendleton had historic Delaware registration status issues, including a 2005 Delaware move and use of the Wilmington address on various documents.
- Delaware authorities later found Pendleton never registered in Delaware despite representations and actions suggesting residency there.
- At JFK on arrival from Germany, Pendleton claimed Wilmington as his residence and provided related address information; subsequent investigation showed he did not actually reside in Delaware at all times.
- The district court concluded Pendleton resided in Delaware under SORNA’s residence requirement based on the Wilmington address and Pendleton’s statements; Pendleton was convicted under § 2250(a) and sentenced accordingly.
- Pendleton appeals, challenging sufficiency of evidence on residence, due process/fair notice, and the constitutionality of SORNA under the Commerce Clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the evidence proves Pendleton resided in Delaware under SORNA. | Pendleton | Pendleton | Evidence sufficient to support residence finding. |
| Whether SORNA’s Delaware registration requirement violated due process by fair notice. | Pendleton | Pendleton | No fair notice violation; federal duty independent of Delaware law. |
| Whether §16913 and the §2250 regime constitutionally regulate interstate commerce under Lopez/McCulloch. | Pendleton | Pendleton | §16913 and §2250 constitutionally enacted under Commerce/Necessary and Proper Clause. |
| Whether Pendleton’s challenges to SORNA implicate Ex Post Facto concerns and broader Commerce Clause limits. | Pendleton | Pendleton | Ex Post Facto and broader challenges rejected (implied by analysis of Commerce Clause). |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151 (3d Cir.2010) (upheld SORNA under Commerce Clause; discussed §16913 vs. §2250 relationship)
- Guzman v. United States, 591 F.3d 83 (2d Cir.2010) (complementary relationship of §16913 and §2250; tracking offenders across states)
- United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709 (8th Cir.2009) (SORNA reasonably tracks offenders moving across states; §16913 proper)
- United States v. Vasquez, 611 F.3d 325 (7th Cir.2010) (upholds commerce-clause basis for SORNA)
- United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir.2009) (§16913 reasonably adapted to commerce power; intrastate activity monitored for interstate movement)
- United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254 (5th Cir.2009) (§16913 and §2250 complement; enforcement aids tracking offenders across jurisdictions)
- Raich v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (illustrates federal-state-law divergence and broad commerce power)
- United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (sets Lopez categories informing commerce-clause analysis for federal regulation)