United States v. Paulino Morales-Alonso
878 F.3d 1311
| 11th Cir. | 2018Background
- Defendant Paulino Morales-Alonso was convicted in Georgia (2012) of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) (assault with a brick) and later deported; he was subsequently convicted (2016) of illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
- At sentencing the PSR applied a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) because the prior Georgia aggravated assault was treated as a "crime of violence."
- Defendant objected, arguing his § 16-5-21(a)(2) conviction does not qualify as a § 2L1.2 crime of violence; the district court applied the enhancement but varied downward and sentenced him to 63 months.
- The Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo whether Georgia aggravated assault under subsection (a)(2) matches "generic aggravated assault" for the enumerated-offenses clause of the § 2L1.2 commentary.
- The court applied the categorical/modified categorical approach: Palomino Garcia defined generic aggravated assault as (1) a criminal assault and (2) accompanied by either intent to cause serious bodily injury or use of a deadly weapon.
- The Eleventh Circuit concluded the Georgia statute is divisible by aggravator, Shepard documents showed conviction under (a)(2) (deadly weapon or object causing or likely to cause serious bodily injury), and Georgia law treats the subsection’s "object, device, or instrument" language as a form of "deadly weapon." The enhancement was affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Georgia aggravated assault (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2)) is a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) | Government: The Georgia offense fits the § 2L1.2 enumerated-offenses clause ("aggravated assault") and thus triggers the enhancement. | Morales-Alonso: (a)(2) is overbroad because it can encompass non-weapon conduct (e.g., innocuous objects that happen to cause injury) and therefore does not categorically match generic aggravated assault. | The conviction qualifies under the enumerated-offenses clause: (a)(2) requires a deadly weapon or object used as a deadly weapon and thus substantially matches generic aggravated assault; enhancement affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Palomino Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2010) (defines generic aggravated assault for § 2L1.2 as assault plus either intent to cause serious bodily injury or use of a deadly weapon)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach for comparing state offense to generic federal definition)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (divisibility and use of the modified categorical approach)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (limited use of Shepard documents for divisible statutes)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (requirement of a realistic probability, not theoretical possibility, that a state would apply its statute to non-qualifying conduct)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (federal courts are bound by state supreme court interpretations of state-law elements)