United States v. Paul R. Bloom
661 F. App'x 1001
| 11th Cir. | 2016Background
- Paul Bloom pled guilty to producing child pornography (18 U.S.C. § 2251) and receiving child pornography (18 U.S.C. § 2252A); statutory ranges: Count One 15–30 years, Count Two 5–20 years.
- Law enforcement recovered >850 videos and ~2,000 images from Bloom’s devices and a video he produced showing sexual manipulation of a nine‑year‑old he babysat. A child‑sized sex doll and cartoons normalizing child sexual abuse were also seized.
- PSR calculated a combined Guidelines range of 262–327 months (total offense level 39, CHC I); district court adopted the PSR.
- At sentencing the court viewed part of the produced video, found the victim was likely awake, cited cartoons and the sex doll as indicia of ongoing dangerousness, and compared the conduct to aggravated sexual abuse punishable by a 30‑year mandatory minimum in federal jurisdiction.
- The district court imposed 360 months (33 months above the guideline high end); Bloom objected and appealed, arguing (1) the court relied on an unsupported factual finding (victim was awake) and (2) the court relied on an improper factor or gave improper weight to factors, producing a substantively unreasonable sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Bloom's Argument | Government/District Court Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court’s factual finding that the victim was awake during the sexual touching was supported by the record | The video does not show the victim was awake; the court’s “common sense” inference was speculation | The court viewed the video and drew a reasonable inference from what it observed; appellant failed to include the video in the appellate record | Finding affirmed — appellant failed to ensure the video was in the record for review, so the court will not reverse the factual finding |
| Whether referencing the 30‑year federal mandatory minimum for aggravated sexual abuse (18 U.S.C. § 2241(c)) was an improper factor | The court improperly relied on a statutory minimum tied to different jurisdiction and offense | The court permissibly compared the underlying conduct to conduct criminalized under § 2241(c) to assess seriousness and avoid disparity; it was relevant § 3553(a) consideration | Not improper — comparing conduct to similar federal offense was permissible and not reversible error |
| Whether the upward variance (33 months above Guidelines) was substantively unreasonable | The sentence was greater than necessary; mitigating factors (isolated incident, claimed asleep victim, lack of distribution) warranted a lower sentence near statutory minimum | The court balanced § 3553(a) factors (nature/seriousness, number/length of images, production of abuse, cartoons, sex doll, public protection) and found a severe sentence necessary | Substantively reasonable — the variance was supported by the totality of aggravating factors and affirmed |
| Whether procedural error occurred by relying on clearly erroneous facts or failing to explain the variance | The factual finding and weight given to certain evidence were clearly erroneous and unexplained | The court gave adequate explanation for variance and relied on evidence in the record; appellant bore burden to produce missing video for review | No reversible procedural error — burden on appellant to include necessary record and court adequately explained its reasoning |
Key Cases Cited
- Irey v. United States, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (abuse‑of‑discretion and review of lengthy sentences in child sex cases)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (procedural and substantive review framework for sentencing)
- Creel v. United States, 783 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2015) (clear‑error review of district court factual findings)
- Ellisor v. United States, 522 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2008) (substantial‑evidence requirement for sentencing facts)
- Pensacola Motor Sales Inc. v. E. Shore Toyota, 684 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012) (appellant’s duty to ensure a complete appellate record)
- Sarras v. United States, 575 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009) (recognition of extreme seriousness of child sex crimes and affirmation of lengthy sentences)
- Johnson v. United States, 451 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2006) (upholding lengthy sentences for production/possession/distribution of child pornography)