United States v. Paul Parnell
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6629
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Paul E. Parnell was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for unlawful firearm possession; the government sought an ACCA enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) based in part on a 1990 Massachusetts armed robbery conviction.
- ACCA’s force clause defines a violent felony to include offenses with as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force (interpreted in Johnson to mean "violent force — force capable of causing physical pain or injury").
- Massachusetts armed robbery (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 17) requires (1) robbery and (2) possession of a dangerous weapon; robbery can be satisfied by either "force and violence" (actual force) or "assault and putting in fear" (constructive force).
- Massachusetts caselaw holds the degree of force for robbery is immaterial so long as the victim is made aware (e.g., purse-snatching without touching the victim suffices); a weapon need not be used, displayed, or known to the victim for armed robbery.
- The district court treated Parnell as an armed career criminal; Parnell challenged that his prior armed robbery (and an ABDW conviction) do not qualify as ACCA violent felonies.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed Parnell’s conviction but vacated his ACCA-enhanced sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding the Massachusetts armed robbery conviction does not satisfy ACCA’s force clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Massachusetts armed robbery has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force under ACCA’s force clause | Government: armed robbery qualifies because it involves force and the presence of a weapon indicates willingness to use violent force | Parnell: MA robbery reaches minimal, nonviolent conduct (e.g., purse-snatching) and weapon need not be used or known, so it lacks the violent-force element | Held: MA armed robbery does not have the required element of violent physical force and thus is not an ACCA force-clause predicate |
| Whether a defendant’s uncommunicated willingness to use force or mere possession of a weapon satisfies the force clause | Government: willingness to inflict injury or possession of a weapon shows potential for violent force | Parnell: willingness or mere possession is not the same as actual, attempted, or threatened use of force | Held: Uncommunicated willingness or mere possession does not satisfy the force clause; only actual/attempted/threatened use of violent force qualifies |
| Whether the modified categorical approach or ACCA residual clause apply to validate the enhancement | Government did not argue the modified categorical approach or residual clause here | Parnell: enhancement cannot rest on those grounds | Held: The modified categorical approach and residual clause are inapplicable; residual clause is invalid under Johnson (2015) as conceded by government |
| Whether the ABDW (assault and battery by dangerous weapon) conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate | Parnell: ABDW may be predicated on reckless conduct and thus lacks intentional violent-force element | Government: district court treated ABDW as predicate | Held: ABDW does not qualify because ACCA’s force clause requires intentional use of force; district court erred in relying on ABDW |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (defines "physical force" as "violent force — that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury")
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (establishes categorical approach for ACCA predicate analysis)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (authorizes modified categorical approach only for divisible statutes)
- United States v. Werle, 815 F.3d 614 (9th Cir.) (mere possession of a weapon does not establish use or threat of force under ACCA)
- United States v. Dominguez-Maroyoqui, 748 F.3d 918 (9th Cir.) (examples of nonviolent conduct that do not qualify as violent force)
- United States v. Castro-Vazquez, 802 F.3d 28 (1st Cir.) (Puerto Rico robbery requiring slightest force does not meet Johnson’s violent-force requirement)