United States v. Parse
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9492
2d Cir.2015Background
- David Parse, an investment-banker/broker, was convicted at a multi-defendant, three-month tax-shelter trial of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. §1341) and obstruction of the tax laws (26 U.S.C. §7212(a)); sentenced to prison, supervised release, forfeiture and over $115M restitution.
- Juror No. 1 (Catherine M. Conrad) sat on the jury after voir dire in which she gave numerous sworn answers that the district court later found to be deliberate falsehoods (residence, education, profession, criminal/disciplinary history).
- After verdict, Conrad sent a laudatory letter to prosecutors and defendants discovered public records showing she had been suspended from the bar and had criminal history; an evidentiary hearing followed.
- The district court found Conrad was a "pathological liar" who lied to secure a seat and was actually, impliedly, and inferably biased; it granted new trials to three codefendants but denied Parse’s new-trial motion, finding Parse’s counsel had known or should have known of the juror issues and thus waived the claim.
- On appeal the Second Circuit rejected Parse’s sufficiency-of-evidence challenges but held the district court erred in denying a new trial: (1) the court’s finding that Parse’s attorneys had actual knowledge was clearly erroneous, and (2) the court misapplied waiver doctrine by treating lack of reasonable diligence as an effective waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury; the court ordered a new trial under plain‑error review.
Issues
| Issue | Parse's Argument | Government/Respondent's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Parse was entitled to a new trial for juror nondisclosure/bias | Conrad lied in voir dire and was actually biased; new trial required | District court: Parse waived claim because his counsel knew or should have discovered Conrad’s identity and failed to alert the court | Reversed: new trial required — seating of biased, perjuring juror was plain error affecting substantial rights |
| Whether Parse’s counsel’s pre-verdict knowledge (or lack of diligence) waived Parse’s claim | Waiver requires actual, knowing relinquishment; Parse personally lacked knowledge, and counsel did not actually know juror was the suspended attorney | Court below treated counsel’s suspicion and failure to investigate as waiver to prevent "sandbagging" | Appellate court: district court erred—finding of actual knowledge was clearly erroneous and treating mere lack of diligence as waiver was legal error; nonetheless reversal warranted under plain‑error doctrine |
| Sufficiency of the evidence for mail fraud and obstruction convictions | Government failed to prove Parse had the requisite specific intent/knowledge of illegality | Government pointed to expert opinion letters, Parse’s training/role, client testimony that losses were expected, and other evidence of intent | Affirmed as to sufficiency: evidence permitted a reasonable jury to infer knowledge and intent |
| Whether jury instructions (statute‑of‑limitations and good‑faith) were erroneous | Parse argued certain instructions allowed conviction based on remote acts by others or failed to adequately explain good‑faith defense | Government argued instructions, read as whole, were adequate; any clarifications can be made at retrial | Court found instructions largely adequate but suggested clarifications at retrial to avoid ambiguity |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984) (two‑part test for juror nondisclosure: dishonest answer to material voir dire question and that truthful answer would have provided valid basis for a challenge for cause)
- Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (distinguishes waiver from forfeiture; appellate plain‑error review framework)
- United States v. Colombo, 869 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1989) (juror lies on voir dire that secure juror’s seat indicate impermissible partiality and warrant relief)
- United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing McDonough two‑part test and standards for juror bias)
- Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (classic definition of waiver as intentional relinquishment of a known right)
- Martinez‑Salazar v. United States, 528 U.S. 304 (2000) (error in seating any juror who should have been dismissed for cause requires reversal)
- Dominguez Benitez v. United States, 542 U.S. 74 (2004) (plain‑error review: reasonable probability that error affected outcome required to show prejudice)