United States v. Otto D. Taylor, 982 F.3d 1295

Otto Taylor pleaded guilty in 2003 to a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances that charged at least 5 kilograms of powder cocaine and at least 50 grams of crack cocaine.
At sentencing the district court found large quantities of both drugs and sentenced Taylor to life; on remand from this court (Booker error) Taylor was resentenced to 360 months.
The Fair Sentencing Act (2010) raised the crack-quantity thresholds that trigger heightened statutory penalties, but it was not retroactive.
The First Step Act § 404 (2018) permits district courts to reduce sentences retroactively for certain pre‑2010 crack-cocaine offenses—those that are "covered offenses," defined as violations whose statutory penalties were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act.
The district court denied Taylor’s § 404 motion, reasoning his conspiracy also involved ≥5 kg powder cocaine, which still triggers the same 10‑to‑life statutory range, so his offense was not a "covered offense."
The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that a multidrug offense that includes a crack-cocaine quantity element modified by the Fair Sentencing Act is a "covered offense," though relief remains discretionary.

Issue	Taylor's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether a multidrug offense that includes both a crack-cocaine quantity element and another drug-quantity element can be a "covered offense" under § 404 of the First Step Act	Taylor: Yes — his conspiracy expressly included a crack-quantity element that the Fair Sentencing Act modified, so his offense is covered	Gov: No — because the powder-cocaine element still triggers the same 10‑to‑life statutory range, the offense’s statutory penalties were not "modified" as a whole	Held: Yes — an offense’s "statutory penalties" include penalties triggered by each drug-quantity element; because the crack element was affected by the Fair Sentencing Act, the offense is a covered offense
Whether § 404 authorizes a plenary/de novo resentencing or broad resentencing based on changes beyond §§ 2–3 of the Fair Sentencing Act	Taylor: Entitled to a full resentencing hearing and consideration of intervening legal developments	Gov: § 404 does not authorize de novo resentencing; relief is limited to applying §§ 2–3 "as if" they were in effect	Held: Not authorized — the First Step Act does not permit plenary resentencing; courts may reduce sentences only "as if" §§ 2–3 were in effect, relief is discretionary, and no hearing is required

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (establishes that facts increasing statutory penalties must be treated as elements)
Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (single conspiracy is one offense for sentencing)
Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (explains operation and timing of Fair Sentencing Act)
Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (mandatory Guidelines error and resentencing principles)
United States v. Curbelo, 726 F.3d 1260 (drug-quantity findings can function as elements for sentencing)
United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2020) (interpretation of "covered offense" under First Step Act)
United States v. Denson, 963 F.3d 1080 (First Step Act does not authorize plenary resentencing)