United States v. Osman Reyes
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14068
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- In 2015 Osman Rutilio Reyes pleaded guilty in Illinois to aggravated battery under 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/12-3.05(f)(1) (aggravated battery involving use of a deadly weapon) and was later convicted in federal court for illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326).
- The district court applied a 16-level Sentencing Guidelines enhancement under USSG §2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), treating Reyes’s Illinois aggravated-battery conviction as a qualifying "crime of violence."
- This Court’s earlier precedent, United States v. Velasco, 465 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2006), had held that an Illinois aggravated-battery conviction based on a deadly weapon categorically qualified as a crime of violence.
- After Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), the court must decide whether the Illinois aggravated-battery statute is “divisible” (elements) or lists alternative means (indivisible), which controls whether the modified categorical approach may be used.
- The central factual/record point: Reyes was charged and pleaded guilty specifically to § 5/12-3.05(f)(1) (use of a deadly weapon), and his indictment referenced that specific subsection (machete alleged).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Reyes) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Illinois § 5/12-3.05 is divisible (elements) or lists alternative means | The aggravated-battery statute is indivisible/overbroad; it lists many ways to commit the offense so jury unanimity on a particular means is not required | The statute contains distinct offenses/subsections that operate as elements for separate aggravated-battery crimes | The court held the statute is divisible: different subsections (including §5/12-3.05(f)(1)) describe discrete offenses requiring distinct proofs |
| Whether §5/12-3.05(f)(1) (use of a deadly weapon) is a separate offense that necessarily involves force for Guidelines purposes | Even if subsection (f) is divisible, subsection (f)(1) is indivisible with other (f) paragraphs and cannot be narrowed | Subsection (f)(1) is a discrete offense requiring proof of use of a deadly weapon, which categorically involves the use of force | The court held §5/12-3.05(f)(1) is a discrete offense requiring proof of a deadly weapon, and such a conviction is categorically a crime of violence under the Guidelines |
| Whether Mathis abrogated Velasco and altered the result | Mathis requires treating the statute as indivisible here, which would undermine Velasco and preclude the enhancement | Velasco remains good law when applied using Mathis’s methodology; state law and the conviction record support divisibility | The court concluded Mathis did not abrogate Velasco in this context; Velasco’s result stands and the sentencing enhancement was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (U.S. 2016) (establishes elements-vs-means divisibility inquiry and limits use of the modified categorical approach)
- United States v. Velasco, 465 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2006) (held Illinois aggravated battery based on deadly weapon necessarily involved force for Guidelines)
- People v. Cherry, 63 N.E.3d 871 (Ill. 2016) (Illinois Supreme Court analysis treating aggravated-battery variants as distinct formulations and explaining proof required for deadly-weapon variant)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (U.S. 2013) (limits use of charging documents; guides when courts may consult conviction records)
- United States v. Sanchez-Sanchez, 779 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 2015) (recognizes that aggravated battery involving a deadly weapon categorically qualifies as a crime of violence)