United States v. Orrego Goez, 656 F.Supp.3d 1370

Movant Francisco Javier Orrego Goez pled guilty to possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug‑trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), admitting he possessed the gun while attempting to sell five ounces of cocaine to an undercover agent. Counts for drug distribution were dismissed per the plea agreement.
He was sentenced to the statutory mandatory minimum of 60 months on April 5, 2022.
Orrego Goez filed a pro se § 2255 motion arguing § 924(c) is unconstitutional as applied to drug offenses under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (he contended no relevant eighteenth‑century historical analogue exists).
The Government did not need to file a response because the Court found the claim was plainly meritless under Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings.
The court held Bruen’s history‑and‑tradition framework does not protect use of firearms to further criminal enterprises; the Second Amendment applies to law‑abiding citizens and historical practice supports disarming those engaged in crime, so § 924(c) is constitutional as applied.
The court denied the § 2255 motion, declined to hold an evidentiary hearing, and denied a certificate of appealability.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 924(c) as applied to possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking violates the Second Amendment post‑Bruen	Bruen replaced prior two‑step tests; no 18th‑century historical analogue regulates firearm possession tied to drug crimes, so the statute is unconstitutional as applied	Second Amendment protects law‑abiding citizens only; those who use firearms to further crimes are outside the Amendment’s protection and historical tradition supports disarming criminal actors	Denied. Court ruled § 924(c) is consistent with historical tradition and constitutional as applied; Orrego Goez’s § 2255 claim fails on the merits
Whether procedural default is excused because Bruen was a novel change in law	Bruen’s abrogation of the two‑step framework is novel and could excuse failure to raise the claim on direct appeal	Even if novelty could excuse default, the claim fails on the merits so default analysis is unnecessary	Court declined to resolve default because the claim fails on the merits

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) (adopted history‑and‑tradition test for evaluating modern firearm regulations)
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms for lawful self‑defense)
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993) (Congress enacted § 924(c) aware that guns and drugs are a dangerous combination)
Frady v. United States, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal; procedural default principles)
Binderup v. Attorney General, 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (discussion of historical practice of disarming those who commit serious crimes)
United States v. Jimenez‑Shilon, 34 F.4th 1042 (11th Cir. 2022) (persons who use firearms to further criminal enterprises are outside Second Amendment protection)
United States v. Bryant, 711 F.3d 364 (2d Cir. 2013) (Second Amendment does not protect unlawful possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime)