United States v. Oracio Corrales-Vazquez, 931 F.3d 944

Defendant Corrales-Vazquez, a Mexican national without authorization, crossed into the U.S. about 20 miles east of the Tecate port of entry and was apprehended hours later ~4 miles north of the border.
He was charged under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(2) for "elud[ing] examination or inspection by immigration officers." He was not charged under § 1325(a)(1).
At a bench trial the district court convicted, reasoning that crossing without submitting to inspection satisfied § 1325(a)(2).
On appeal the main question was statutory: whether § 1325(a)(2) criminalizes an alien’s crossing anywhere without inspection or is limited to conduct at a designated port of entry open for inspection.
The Ninth Circuit majority reversed, holding § 1325(a)(2) applies only to conduct at a designated port of entry that is open for inspection; it therefore reversed Corrales’s conviction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Scope of § 1325(a)(2): where "elude examination or inspection" can occur	Corrales: must occur at a port of entry (i.e., where inspections take place); otherwise §1325(a)(1) would be superfluous	Government: any crossing without inspection anywhere amounts to eluding inspection under §1325(a)(2)	Held: §1325(a)(2) is limited to conduct at a designated port of entry open for inspection; government failed to prove that here, so conviction reversed
Interpretation of the verb "elude"	Corrales: "elude" implies escaping from a risk of inspection (narrow meaning)	Government: "elude" can mean simply to avoid inspection (broad meaning)	Held: "elude" better fits the narrower sense (escape from risk of inspection), supporting port-of-entry limitation
Canon-based construction / anti‑surplusage	Corrales: reading §1325(a)(2) broadly would render §1325(a)(1) redundant	Government: statutory context permits overlap; §1325(a)(2) need not include "enter"	Held: canons (anti‑surplusage, general/specific, disjunctive "or") favor reading (1) and (2) as distinct offenses
Precedent and legislative history support	Corrales: historical usage and Canadian model show "elude" intended for ports of entry; Rincon‑Jimenez not controlling	Government: prior cases and statutory text do not require port limitation	Held: legislative history and precedent are consistent with limiting §1325(a)(2) to ports of entry; Rincon‑Jimenez did not decide this question

United States v. Aldana, 878 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2017) (discusses inspections at ports of entry)
Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017) (anti‑surplusage canon and separate crimes interpretation)
Rincon‑Jimenez v. United States, 595 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1979) (limitations period; inspections viewed as a fixed point at time of entry)
Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014) (disjunctive "or" and giving effect to each clause)
Whitfield v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 785 (2015) (presumption that unchanged statutory phrase retains original meaning)
United States v. Oscar, 496 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1974) (contextual discussion of "elude" as implying escape or evasion)