United States v. Omar Arreguin
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 23506
9th Cir.2013Background
- DEA agents conducted a knock-and-talk at Arreguin’s home; present were Arreguin, his wife, their infant, and houseguest Elias Valencia Jr., who answered the door.
- Agents knew little about who lived in the house or the house layout; they did not ask Valencia for ID or inquire about his authority to allow entry.
- After Valencia consented to let agents "come in and look around," agents entered; officers followed Arreguin toward a master suite and performed a warrantless, cursory sweep of interior rooms.
- In the master bathroom an agent observed a shoebox containing a white powder; the agent then entered a second door from the master suite into a garage and observed large amounts of cash in plain view.
- Arreguin was later isolated, given a consent-to-search form (after agents told him cooperation could help and they would not refer his wife to immigration), he signed, and led agents to reveal methamphetamine in a car compartment.
- Arreguin moved to suppress the shoebox, powder, Gucci bag, cash, and subsequent evidence; the district court denied suppression, Arreguin appealed, this Court reversed in part and remanded, district court again denied suppression, and Arreguin appealed anew.
Issues
| Issue | Arreguin's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Valencia had apparent authority to consent to search of master bedroom/bathroom | Valencia lacked actual or apparent authority; agents had insufficient facts to reasonably believe Valencia could consent to those specific areas | Valencia’s consent to “look around” and occupants’ silence justified search | Court: Not reasonable; agents lacked information tying Valencia to those private areas; consent invalid for master suite |
| Whether Valencia had apparent authority to consent to search through second door (into garage) | Same: no reasonable basis to believe Valencia had authority to allow access beyond master suite door | Agents’ observations (Valencia answered door, Arreguin’s movements, silence) supported broader search | Court: Not reasonable; facts pointed to Arreguin’s control of these areas, so entry into area beyond second door was unlawful |
| Whether any exception (protective sweep or plain view) validates seizures | Evidence seized after unlawful entry must be suppressed | Protective sweep or plain view doctrines validate seizures | Court: Protective-sweep argument waived; plain view inapplicable because initial entry was unlawful; suppression required |
Key Cases Cited
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (Fourth Amendment protects home against warrantless entries)
- Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (apparent-authority inquiry is objective; judged by facts known to officer at the moment)
- United States v. Dearing, 9 F.3d 1428 (apparent authority requires authority over specific areas searched)
- United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163 (third-party consent does not extend to areas not under that party’s control)
- United States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761 (government bears burden to prove third party’s authority to consent)
- United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684 (appellate review principles; clear-error standard for facts)
- LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947 (warrantless searches of homes are presumptively unreasonable)
- United States v. Redlightning, 624 F.3d 1090 (fruits of a Fourth Amendment violation remain tainted unless primary taint is purged)