United States v. Omar Argueta-Rosales
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6628
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Argueta-Rosales crossed from Mexico into the U.S. on Nov 29, 2013 near San Ysidro, after a period of methamphetamine abuse and perceived threats.
- He claimed delusional state and sought protective custody; border agents confronted him and he was arrested for attempted illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. §1326.
- District court applied a legal standard requiring only knowledge of entry and lack of permission, not the specific intent to enter free from official restraint.
- Evidence included a psychologist’s finding of substance-induced psychosis and competing expert testimony on his mental state at crossing.
- Conviction and probation-violation conviction were entered; on appeal, this panel vacated and remanded for new trial consistent with the correct standard.
- The majority reaffirms Lombera-Valdovinos as controlling for the specific-intent element; Judge Bybee concurs in judgment but dissents on broader doctrinal grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Lombera-Valdovinos govern the specific-intent standard here? | Argueta argued Lombera-Valdovinos requires intent to reenter free from official restraint, not mere knowledge. | The Government argued Lombera-Valdovinos is distinguishable and not controlling where there is evidence of intent to enter free from restraint. | Yes, Lombera-Valdovinos controls; conviction vacated and remanded. |
| Was the district court’s error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt? | The government asserts harmless error due to other evidence of intent. | Argueta contends the error was not harmless given mixed evidence and delusional state. | Harmless error not shown; error reversed and remand ordered. |
| Is the government required to prove only the intent to enter free from official restraint, not sole purpose? | Argueta’s intent could be to seek protection; may still meet statutory intent under Lombera-Valdovinos. | Gov’t contends sole purpose need not be restraint-free entry. | Government must prove specific intent to enter free from official restraint; not necessarily sole purpose. |
| Should Lombera-Valdovinos be reconsidered or reaffirmed in light of IIRIRA and related cases? | No fundamental change; Lombera-Valdovinos should stand. | Judge Bybee urges reconsideration of official-restraint doctrine post-IIRIRA. | Majority reaffirmed Lombera-Valdovinos; Bybee concurred in judgment but dissented on broader doctrinal grounds. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lombera-Valdovinos, 429 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2005) (official restraint requires intent to reenter free from restraint; covers broader officials)
- Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000) (illegal reentry is a specific-intent crime)
- Oscar, 496 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1974) (entry for criminal purposes requires freedom from official restraint; not mere physical presence)
- Pacheco-Medina, 212 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2000) (expanded application of official restraint; mixing border surveillance with restraint)
- Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (distinction between exclusion and deportation affects rights and processes)
- United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905) (entry fiction and official restraint origins in immigration law)
- Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925) (entry fiction and custody concepts in immigration context)