United States v. Ojudun, 915 F.3d 875

Background

In January 2017 Summit, NJ police stopped a BMW with New York plates after observing suspicious conduct by the car and a passenger (Cesaro) near a bank; Ojudun was a rear-seat passenger and Gray was the driver.
Officers removed Cesaro after a scuffle, obtained Cesaro's ID and other items, and secured Gray’s consent to search the car; officers found checks and materials linked to identity theft and counterfeit checks on the seat where Ojudun had been sitting, and cash on Ojudun’s person. All three occupants were arrested.
At police headquarters, Detective Medina videotaped an interview of Gray in which Gray admitted some involvement (including seeing Ojudun give a check to Cesaro) but also minimized his own role; Gray later asserted his Fifth Amendment right and was unavailable to testify at the revocation hearing.
The district court denied Ojudun’s motion to suppress, finding reasonable suspicion for the stop and that Gray had apparent authority to consent to the search; the court admitted Gray’s videotaped postarrest statements under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).
The district court revoked Ojudun’s supervised release (for forgery, theft by deception, leaving jurisdiction without permission, and associating with a known felon) and imposed 30 months’ imprisonment plus two years’ supervised release.
On appeal the Second Circuit affirmed the Fourth Amendment rulings but concluded the court erred in admitting Gray’s statements wholesale under Rule 804(b)(3) and failed to perform required particularized and corroboration analyses; the judgment was vacated and remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the car	Stop was supported by accumulation of suspicious facts near the bank	Stop violated Fourth Amendment; insufficient articulable facts	Affirmed: totality of circumstances gave reasonable suspicion to stop
Whether Gray had apparent authority to consent to vehicle search	Gray, as driver, had apparent authority; officers reasonably relied on that	Owner (Ojudun’s girlfriend) did not consent; Gray lacked authority	Affirmed: Gray reasonably appeared to have authority; consent valid
Admissibility of Gray’s postarrest statements under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)	Gray’s admissions were against his penal interest and thus admissible despite unavailability	Many statements shifted blame to others; some incriminated only Ojudun and not Gray, so not admissible under Rule 804(b)(3)	Reversed as to hearsay ruling: court erred by treating entire interview as one statement, failing to analyze each assertion and corroboration; statements that incriminate only Ojudun are excluded under 804(b)(3)
Whether remaining inadmissible out-of-court statements could be used under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C) or harmless error	Government argued any error was harmless and other admissible proof sufficed; or that Rule 32.1 balancing could allow admission	Ojudun argued error was prejudicial; court failed to balance defendant’s confrontation right under Rule 32.1	Remanded: district court must particularize admissible 804(b)(3) statements, assess corroboration, and, for others, perform Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) balancing; error not deemed harmless on record

Key Cases Cited

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (established standard for investigative stops)
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (vehicular stops and reasonable suspicion principles)
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (apparent authority to consent to search)
Matlock v. United States, 415 U.S. 164 (consent by one with common authority)
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (limits on treating a confession as a single statement for Rule 804(b)(3))
Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (suspicion about codefendant statements)
United States v. Wexler, 522 F.3d 194 (statements that incriminate only the defendant are not within Rule 804(b)(3))
United States v. Medunjanin, 752 F.3d 576 (standard of review for suppression rulings)
United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (abuse-of-discretion review for evidentiary rulings)
United States v. Carthen, 681 F.3d 94 (Rule 32.1 balancing for confrontation at revocation hearings)
United States v. Aspinall, 389 F.3d 332 (limited confrontation rights in supervised-release revocation proceedings)