406 F.Supp.3d 835
S.D. Cal.2019Background
- Defendant Jose Luis Nunez-Soberanis charged in a Second Superseding Information with attempted unlawful entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1).
- Defendant moved to dismiss the information on three grounds: violation of the non-delegation doctrine, impermissible vagueness (Due Process Clause), and failure to allege required elements of § 1325(a)(1).
- The Government responded that Congress set the substantive rule (entry only at designated ports) while the Executive implements practical details (locations/hours) and that the charging document tracks the statute.
- After briefing, the court addressed whether ports of entry designation is an impermissible delegation, whether §1325(a)(1) is facially vague, and whether the indictment must allege the defendant knew he was an alien (invoking Rehaif).
- The court denied the motion to dismiss in full: it held the statute does not impermissibly delegate legislative power, is not unconstitutionally vague on its face, and Rehaif does not require the Government to allege the defendant knew he was an alien for attempted unlawful entry.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Non-delegation | Congress may set general rule; implementation details handled by Executive | §1325(a) impermissibly delegates by allowing "immigration officers" to designate lawful times/places without intelligible principle | Denied — delegation here is implementation of location/hours, not expansion of criminal conduct; Secretary (not line agents) designates ports; analogous to Gundy |
| Vagueness (Due Process) | Statute is clear as applied to attempted entry; designations governed by regs | §1325(a)(1) allows arbitrary enforcement because any immigration officer could designate places/times on a whim | Denied — statute read in context (regulations, APA, requirement of staffed facilities) is valid in vast majority of applications; hypothetical vagueness insufficient for facial attack |
| Failure to plead mens rea (knowledge of alienage) | Charging document must allege defendant knew he was an alien per Rehaif | Rehaif inapplicable: it concerned a statute where status (unlawfully in the U.S.) was the crucial element making otherwise innocent conduct criminal | Denied — defendant's alienage is not the crucial element that converts innocent conduct into crime here; attempted unlawful entry is unlawful regardless of status and Rehaif's reasoning does not apply |
| Sufficiency of Information (other elements) | Some elements initially omitted in superseding info | Government filed Second Superseding Information curing two of three alleged defects | Denied as to remaining Rehaif-based claim; other defects cured by later charging document |
Key Cases Cited
- Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (upholding delegation to Attorney General to implement registration timing; supports permissible implementation delegations)
- Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (recognizing Congress may delegate substantial discretion to Executive to implement laws)
- Kozminski v. United States, 487 U.S. 931 (1988) (Congress cannot delegate core legislative task of defining criminal conduct)
- Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991) (delegation to Attorney General to schedule substances permissible where Congress supplied limiting factors)
- Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) (holding Government must prove defendant knew his status when status is the element that makes conduct unlawful)
- Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (framework for vagueness challenges: notice and risk of arbitrary enforcement)
- Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (statute valid overall precludes hypothetical vagueness challenges)
- United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (presumption that Congress intends scienter for elements criminalizing innocent conduct)
- United States v. Corrales-Vasquez, 931 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2019) (ports of entry requirement in context of §1325 cases)
- United States v. Aldana, 878 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2017) (ports of entry require staffed facilities; guidance on what constitutes a port of entry)
- United States v. Jackson, 72 F.3d 1370 (9th Cir. 1995) (charging document must allege implied necessary elements not in statutory language)