United States v. Nelson
990 F.3d 947
| 5th Cir. | 2021Background
- At ~9:55 PM near the Laredo‑North immigration checkpoint (29 miles from the border), BPAs scanned Vernon Nelson’s tractor‑trailer with VACIS; images suggested bundle‑shaped objects and an unexpected trailer seal.
- Construction prevented directing Nelson to secondary inspection at the checkpoint; agents followed and conducted a roving‑patrol stop about six miles north of the checkpoint.
- On stop, Nelson produced a bill of lading claiming five pallets of cereal; agents observed inconsistencies and asked Nelson to step out. He was not handcuffed or arrested.
- While awaiting a canine unit (5–10 minutes), Agent Stauffiger asked brief, non‑accusatory questions for about two minutes; the canine later alerted and a search revealed ~72 kg marijuana.
- Nelson moved to suppress the stop‑derived evidence and his statements (arguing lack of reasonable suspicion for the stop and that questioning was custodial without Miranda); the district court denied suppression and Nelson pleaded guilty reserving the right to appeal the suppression denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Nelson) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether agents had reasonable suspicion to make a roving‑patrol stop | Stop lacked reasonable suspicion—consent to initial scan and other Brignoni‑Ponce factors do not support a stop | Totality of circumstances (29 mi from border, VACIS images of bundles, anomalous seal, agent’s experience) gave reasonable suspicion | Affirmed: stop supported by reasonable suspicion |
| Whether Nelson was in custody requiring Miranda warnings for brief roadside questioning | Two‑minute questioning while not free to leave was custodial interrogation -> statements inadmissible without Miranda | Short, public, non‑accusatory questioning; no physical restraint or arrest; reasonable person would feel free to leave once checks cleared | Affirmed: not custodial; Miranda not required |
| Whether Border Patrol may conduct roving stops for non‑immigration offenses | BPAs lack authority to stop for non‑immigration crimes | BPAs may make roving stops based on reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity (Brignoni‑Ponce framework) | Foreclosed by precedent; BPAs have authority for such roving stops |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Brignoni‑Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (establishes factors for border/roving‑patrol stops)
- Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (Miranda principles on custodial interrogation)
- United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (totality‑of‑circumstances test for reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Perkins, 352 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 2003) (recognizing BPAs may make roving stops for non‑immigration offenses)
- United States v. Casteneda, 951 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1992) (roving‑patrol stop justification)
- United States v. Zapata‑Ibarra, 212 F.3d 877 (5th Cir. 2000) (agent experience as a factor in reasonable suspicion analysis)
- United States v. Freeman, 914 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2019) (caution on weighing proximity to border when travel originates from a densely populated border city)
- United States v. Nichols, 142 F.3d 857 (5th Cir. 1998) (weight given to atypical vehicle appearance in reasonable suspicion analysis)