United States v. Nazerzadeh, 73 F.4th 341

Nima Nazerzadeh pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution and one count of possession of child pornography; he received concurrent 60‑month prison terms and a life term of supervised release.
He was released in August 2010, completed sex‑offender treatment, maintained a clean record, and complied with registration requirements.
In March 2022 he moved to terminate his federal sex‑offender registration obligation under 34 U.S.C. § 20915(b), which allows a Tier I registrant with 10 years of a clean record to reduce the registration period.
The government opposed, arguing his convictions fall under 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)(B)(iii) (production or distribution of child pornography), which makes him a Tier II offender, and Tier II registrants are not eligible for § 20915(b) reductions.
The district court granted termination without explanation; the government appealed solely on the statutory‑interpretation question whether § 20911(3)(A)–(C) is read disjunctively (each clause independently sufficient) or conjunctively (clause (A) required plus (B) or (C)).
The Fifth Circuit held the provision is disjunctive, that (3)(B)(iii) independently makes Nazerzadeh a Tier II offender, that Tier II registration lasts 25 years, and that § 20915(b) provides no reduction for Tier II offenders — reversing the district court.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)(A)–(C) is disjunctive or conjunctive, and thus whether distribution of child pornography under (3)(B)(iii) makes Nazerzadeh a Tier II offender	Statute is disjunctive; each of (A), (B), or (C) independently suffices; (3)(B)(iii) places him in Tier II so no § 20915(b) reduction	Statute is conjunctive; (3)(A) is required and must be coupled with (B) or (C); (3)(B)(iii) alone does not make him Tier II, so he is Tier I and eligible for reduction	Court held the text is disjunctive; (3)(A), (B), and (C) are independently sufficient; (3)(B)(iii) classifies him as Tier II; no § 20915(b) reduction; reversed district court

Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134 (2018) (Supreme Court guidance that "or" is ordinarily disjunctive)
United States v. Navarro, 54 F.4th 268 (5th Cir. 2022) (interpreting SORNA tier provisions consistent with disjunctive reading)
United States v. Palomares, 52 F.4th 640 (5th Cir. 2022) (textual punctuation principles relevant to statutory lists)
United States v. Coleman, [citation="681 F. App'x 413"] (5th Cir. 2017) (treating tier‑definition subsections disjunctively in practice)
United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 2003) (adopted a conjunctive reading of a different statute; discussed and distinguished)
United States v. Granberry, 916 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejected Hodge's conjunctive approach for analogous statutory language)
United States v. Gonzalez‑Medina, 757 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2014) (discussing SORNA's broad protective purpose and congressional intent to cast a wide net)
United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting SORNA's inclusive reach regarding offenses against children)