United States v. Navarro, 54 F.4th 268

In 1998 Navarro pleaded guilty in Colorado to attempted sexual assault of a minor and completed a three-year sentence; he moved to Texas (reported variously as 2013–2015) and never registered as a sex offender.
In 2019 federal marshals located Navarro in Texas; he was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) for failing to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) and pleaded guilty with a one‑page factual statement.
At sentencing the district court and PSR treated Navarro as a SORNA tier II offender (25‑year registration) and imposed 21 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release.
Navarro completed that sentence, later violated supervised release, and received an 11‑month revocation term; he continued to challenge his § 2250(a) conviction on appeal.
The government conceded Navarro had no duty to register under Texas law and moved to vacate; the Fifth Circuit held SORNA (not state law) defines the federal duty but concluded Navarro’s Colorado conviction did not qualify him as tier II under the categorical approach, so his SORNA duty expired in 2016.
The court vacated the § 2250(a) conviction as plainly erroneous and remanded to terminate the revocation sentence and for any consistent proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 2250(a) requires proof of a state‑law registration duty	Initially argued both SORNA and Texas law required registration; later conceded no Texas duty but maintained SORNA duty suffices	Navarro argued lack of state duty means no § 2250(a) violation	Held: Federal SORNA defines the registration duty; state law does not control (state law relevant only if registration is impossible)
Whether Navarro’s Colorado conviction made him a SORNA tier II offender (25‑year duty)	Colorado statute is comparable to federal crimes (eg. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241/2243), so tier II applies	Colorado statute sweeps more broadly than the listed federal offenses; categorical approach yields tier I	Held: Using the categorical approach, Colorado statute is broader; Navarro is tier I and his SORNA duty expired in 2016
Whether the insufficient factual basis for the guilty plea is plain error warranting vacatur	Government moved to vacate; acknowledged concession re: state law but argued other grounds might sustain conviction	Navarro argued plea lacked legal sufficiency because he had no SORNA duty in 2019	Held: Error was plain, affected substantial rights, and reversal was required; conviction vacated and case remanded

United States v. Trejo, 610 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2010) (guilty plea must be supported by factual basis sufficient as a matter of law)
United States v. Shepherd, 880 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2018) (addressed ineffective assistance tied to state‑law registration; did not resolve SORNA/state‑law supremacy)
United States v. Escalante, 933 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2019) (applies categorical approach to compare state offense with SORNA tiers)
United States v. Montgomery, 966 F.3d 335 (5th Cir. 2020) (mis‑tiering under SORNA can be plain error that increases punishment)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (categorical‑approach framework; state statute invalid as predicate if it "sweeps more broadly")
Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438 (2010) (§2250(a) requires the defendant be required to register under SORNA)
United States v. Walker, 931 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2019) (Colorado statute not comparable to SORNA tier II; persuasive authority)
Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090 (2021) (clarifies modern plain‑error review factors)