United States v. Nathaniel Ozier
796 F.3d 597
| 6th Cir. | 2015Background
- Defendant Nathaniel Ozier pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)) and was sentenced to 168 months.
- The PSR treated Ozier as a "career offender" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on at least two prior Tennessee aggravated burglary convictions (Tenn. Code § 39-14-403), classifying them as "burglary of a dwelling" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2).
- Without the career‑offender designation, Ozier's Guidelines range would have been substantially lower (77–96 months vs. 151–188 months as a career offender).
- Ozier challenged the enhancement, arguing (1) Descamps prohibits using Shepard materials because Tennessee's aggravated burglary statute is indivisible (i.e., broader than the generic burglary of a dwelling), and (2) the Guidelines' residual clause is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson.
- The government responded that Tennessee's statute is divisible, the plea colloquies (Shepard documents) show Ozier pleaded to burglarizing dwellings, and alternatively the convictions fit the Guidelines' residual clause.
- The district court applied the modified categorical approach, found the prior pleas established burglary of dwellings, treated Ozier as a career offender, and imposed the 168‑month sentence; the Sixth Circuit affirms.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tenn. aggravated burglary statute is divisible under Descamps, permitting Shepard inquiry | N/A (government sought divisibility) | § 39-14-401 is a definitional "means" provision, so the statute is indivisible and Shepard documents cannot be used | Statute is divisible; Shepard documents may be consulted under the modified categorical approach |
| Whether Ozier's aggravated burglary convictions qualify as "burglary of a dwelling" (a Guideline "crime of violence") | Government: plea colloquies show convictions were for burglarizing "residences/homes/apartment," matching generic dwelling | Ozier: statute criminalizes broader categories (outbuildings, vehicles) and so cannot categorically qualify | Plea colloquies show convictions were for dwellings; convictions qualify as crimes of violence |
| Whether the Guidelines' residual clause is void post‑Johnson, invalidating the career‑offender enhancement | N/A (government relied on alternative bases) | Johnson renders the Guidelines' residual clause unconstitutionally vague | Court declined to decide Johnson's effect because enhancement is supportable without the residual clause; affirmed based on dwelling burglary findings |
Key Cases Cited
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (explains categorical vs. modified categorical approach and divisibility)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limits documents sentencing courts may consult to determine which statutory alternative formed the conviction)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (formative authority on using limited records to identify elements of prior convictions)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (held ACCA residual clause void for vagueness)
- United States v. McFalls, 592 F.3d 707 (6th Cir. 2010) (defines generic "burglary of a dwelling" as intrusion on a place of habitation)
- United States v. Prater, 766 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2014) (applies categorical/divisibility analysis to burglary statutes)
