United States v. Natal
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3246
2d Cir.2017Background
- Early morning March 9, 2011 fire in New Haven killed three Roberson family members; Hector Natal was charged with arson resulting in death and related offenses; his father Hector Morales was charged as an accessory after the fact and with obstruction-related counts including repainting his van.
- Natal and Morales tried jointly; jury convicted both on all counts; Morales sentenced to 174 months; Natal received concurrent lengthy sentences including life for arson counts.
- Government introduced cell-phone records and lay testimony (a Sprint employee and two officers) about how cell towers operate to place a third-party landlord, Shamash, in Queens at the time of the fire.
- Morales was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1519 for repainting his van to conceal evidence; he also was convicted on three accessory-after-the-fact counts (one tied to each victim) used in Guidelines calculations.
- On appeal the Second Circuit addressed (1) whether cell-tower operation testimony requires an expert, (2) effect of Yates v. United States on Morales’s § 1519 conviction, and (3) whether Morales’s three accessory-after-the-fact convictions must be grouped under the Sentencing Guidelines.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility: testimony on how cell towers operate | Gov: testimony by Sprint employee and agents was proper lay testimony and records admissible as business records | Natal/Morales: testimony required expert under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and disclosure under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16; continuance denied was abusive | Testimony about how cell towers operate is expert testimony (Rule 702); admitting lay testimony was error but harmless given record strength; 16/continuance errors also harmless |
| § 1519 conviction for repainting van (destruction/concealment of evidence) | Gov: repainting was intended to impede investigation and thus covered by § 1519 | Morales: after Yates § 1519 covers only objects used to record/preserve information, so van not covered | Conviction vacated; remand to district court to vacate Count Eleven and to resentence de novo per Powers |
| Grouping of accessory-after-the-fact counts for Guidelines | Gov: accessory counts need not be grouped; multiple-count analysis appropriate | Morales: three accessory-after-the-fact counts arise from same harm (interference with administration of justice) and should be grouped under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 | Counts must be grouped under § 3D1.2; district court directed to group them at resentencing |
| Harmlessness and overall prejudice from evidentiary and disclosure errors | Gov: any errors were harmless given overwhelming evidence (confessions, eyewitnesses, obstruction conduct) | Defs: errors impacted ability to rebut alternative-suspect theory and denied fair trial | Court: errors harmless; convictions (except § 1519 count) and judgment affirmed; remand only for vacatur of § 1519 count and de novo resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Hill, 818 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2016) (cell-site analysis requires expert testimony on tower operation)
- United States v. Yeley-Davis, 632 F.3d 673 (10th Cir. 2011) (agent testimony about tower operation constituted expert testimony)
- Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (§ 1519 covers only objects that can record or preserve information)
- United States v. Powers, 842 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2016) (when a conviction is vacated on appeal, de novo resentencing is required)
- United States v. Rowland, 826 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2016) (standard for reviewing evidentiary rulings and harmless-error analysis)
- United States v. Cuti, 720 F.3d 453 (2d Cir. 2013) (limits on lay opinion testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 701)