United States v. Nagarwala, 2:17-cr-20274

Indictment alleges Jumana Nagarwala performed female genital mutilation (FGM) on minors at a Livonia, Michigan clinic; mothers from Minnesota brought their daughters and waited in the clinic lobby.
Counts 1–6 (charges under 18 U.S.C. § 116) were previously dismissed as unconstitutional; only Counts 7 (conspiracy to travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), (e)) and 8 remained.
Count 7 alleges an agreement that persons would travel from Minnesota to Michigan to engage in illicit sexual conduct with MV‑1 and MV‑2; Nagarwala is charged with the conspiracy though she did not travel.
Government’s theory: the Minnesota mothers traveled intending that FGM be performed on their daughters (thus they “engaged in” illicit sexual conduct) and Nagarwala agreed to perform it.
Nagarwala moved to dismiss Count 7, arguing § 2423(b) requires the traveler personally to intend to engage in the illicit sexual conduct and the government cannot aggregate different persons’ conduct to satisfy that element.
The court granted the motion, holding the indictment fails to allege that any person traveled with the requisite intent to personally engage in illicit sexual conduct (a necessary element of § 2423(b)), so Count 7 does not state an offense.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the indictment sufficiently alleges a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423(b) and (e) where travel and the illicit sexual act were allegedly divided among different participants	The mothers traveled interstate intending that FGM occur on their daughters (thus they "engaged in" illicit sexual conduct); Nagarwala conspired with them, so the conspiracy can be charged against Nagarwala	§ 2423(b) requires the traveler to personally travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct; the government may not combine one person’s travel with another’s intent to satisfy the statute	Dismissed Count 7: indictment fails because no alleged person both traveled and had the requisite intent to personally engage in illicit sexual conduct; conspiracy cannot aggregate those elements across different actors

Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (indictment must contain elements of offense and sufficient factual particularity)
United States v. Landham, 251 F.3d 1072 (standards for resolving motions attacking indictments)
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (courts do not assess grand jury evidence sufficiency on indictment challenge)
United States v. Powell, 823 F.2d 996 (grand jury and indictment principles)
United States v. DeCarlo, 434 F.3d 447 (elements of § 2423(b))
Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423 (conspiracy mens rea requires intent that a conspirator commit each element of the substantive offense)
United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (criminal statutes construed strictly; ambiguities resolved by lenity)