31 F.4th 1274
10th Cir.2022Background
- Defendants (Rajesh and Diann Ramcharan, Ken Harvell, Galima Murry, and cooperator Angelica Guevara) were prosecuted for marriage- and immigration-related fraud after a multi-year scheme to obtain green cards through sham marriages and false immigration filings.
- Evidence included documentary records (leases, bank records, benefit claims), witness testimony (neighbors, Guevara’s confession and recorded call), and investigative interviews showing inconsistent statements and living arrangements inconsistent with bona fide marriages.
- District court conducted voir dire with a juror questionnaire that asked about immigration experience and bias against immigrants; defense requested direct questions about racial/ethnic prejudice (including reference to a presidential remark), which the court denied but excused several jurors for cause for immigration-related bias.
- At trial the government introduced testimony that a pastor (Harvell) had "done this before," which defendants objected to under Rules 404(b) and 403; the court admitted the testimony as intrinsic and gave a limiting instruction.
- Juries convicted Rajesh, Diann, and Murry on all counts; Harvell was convicted on some counts and acquitted on others. Defendants appealed on voir dire scope, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, exclusion of certain defense evidence, judicial notice, and sufficiency of the evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Voir dire — race/ethnic bias questions | Gov’t: court’s general immigration questions and individual follow-ups sufficiently protected impartiality; no presumption of juror bias | Rajesh/Diann/Murry: court should ask direct race-prejudice questions to uncover explicit/implicit bias | Court: affirmed — no abuse of discretion; Rosales‑Lopez standard not triggered because no special circumstances and immigration-focused questions removed biased venire members |
| Admission of Guevara’s statement that Harvell "had done this before" | Gov’t: statement is intrinsic background and admissible to show effect on listener | Harvell/Diann: statement is impermissible other‑acts evidence and unduly prejudicial | Court: affirmed — intrinsic/contextual, Rule 404(b) inapplicable; probative value outweighed prejudice; limiting instruction adequate |
| Jury Instruction No. 21 (intent inference) | Gov’t: instruction guides inference of intent; burden preserved by instructions as a whole | Diann: instruction risked lowering or shifting burden to defendant | Court: affirmed — no reversible error because overall instructions made government’s burden clear |
| RFRA/First Amendment instruction (Harvell) | Gov’t: instruction misstated law; statutes at issue are generally applicable and not shown to substantially burden religion | Harvell: jurors should consider whether religious practice justified conduct | Court: affirmed — Harvell failed to make prima facie RFRA showing; instruction properly denied |
| Exclusion of lay/character evidence about Harvell’s Huntington’s disease and religious character | Gov’t: medical/diagnostic evidence requires expert notice under Rule 12.2(b) and Rule 702; religious character irrelevant | Harvell: brother and others could testify about mental decline and religious trustfulness | Court: affirmed — limited lay testimony about functioning near weddings allowed; medical diagnosis excluded and religious‑character evidence irrelevant |
| Judicial notice that "recruiter" is an MOS (Murry) | Murry: Army manual shows "recruiter" became an MOS; court should notice it | Gov’t: collateral impeachment only; not central to case | Court: affirmed — court properly declined judicial notice; matter collateral and not outcome-determinative |
| Sufficiency of evidence — Murry (false statements and conspiracy) | Gov’t: Pinkerton liability, aiding/abetting, and evidence of benefit-seeking supported convictions | Murry: lacked intent to obtain immigration benefits for all charged subjects; alleged multiple conspiracies | Court: affirmed — evidence supported intent/participation; single conspiracy reasonable; Pinkerton/aiding theories support convictions |
| Sufficiency of evidence — Harvell (false statements and conspiracy) | Gov’t: accomplice/Pinkerton liability and witness testimony connected Harvell to scheme | Harvell: no direct role in filings or leases; challenged impeachment and materiality | Court: affirmed on preserved claims; acquittal motions preserved only for specific counts, and jury had sufficient evidence for convictions reviewed |
Key Cases Cited
- Pena‑Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (jury impartiality and importance of voir dire)
- Rosales‑Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981) (no presumption of juror bias; voir dire required only when reasonable possibility of racial prejudice exists)
- Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (co‑conspirator liability for reasonably foreseeable acts in furtherance of conspiracy)
- Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (no "exculpatory‑no" exception under §1001)
- United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2011) (Rule 404(b) intrinsic‑act analysis)
- United States v. Goodman, 633 F.3d 963 (10th Cir. 2011) (limits and discretion for lay testimony about mental state)