United States v. Mujera Lung'aho, 72 F.4th 845

After George Floyd’s death, Mujera Lung’aho and others attacked police property; he allegedly threw Molotov cocktails at three police cars.
Lung’aho was indicted on 13 federal counts, including three arson counts under 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1) (maliciously damaging or destroying federally connected property by fire or explosive).
The government charged three § 924(c) counts for possession of a destructive device in connection with a “crime of violence,” treating each arson count as the predicate crime of violence.
The district court dismissed the § 924(c) destructive-device counts; the government brought an interlocutory appeal. Review is de novo.
The dispositive legal question: whether arson under § 844(f)(1) necessarily includes the § 924(c)(3)(A) “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another” (the elements/force clause) under the categorical approach.
The court analyzed the statute’s mental-state term “maliciously,” imputed its common-law meaning (a willful disregard of a likelihood of harm), compared it to recklessness and knowledge, and concluded malice does not satisfy the force clause.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether arson under 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1) is a "crime of violence" for § 924(c)(3)(A) purposes	Arson requires at least knowledge that damage will occur, so it satisfies the force/elements clause	Arson can be committed recklessly (or at most malice), so it does not require the intentional use of physical force and thus is not a crime of violence	Arson under § 844(f)(1) is not a "crime of violence"; malice (willful disregard of a likelihood of harm) falls short of the targeting/intent/knowledge required by the force clause per Borden and Justice Thomas’s concurrence

Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021) (plurality and concurrence analyzed force clause; held clause excludes crimes that can be committed recklessly)
Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016) (explains categorical approach and element-by-element comparison)
Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. 686 (2016) (discusses meaning of "use of physical force" in related contexts)
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (struck down the statute's residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (characterized 18 U.S.C. § 844 as an arson statute)
United States v. Sweet, 985 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1993) (used common-law meaning to define "maliciously")
United States v. Hoxworth, 11 F.4th 693 (8th Cir. 2021) (summarized Borden's rule that crimes commitable recklessly are excluded)
Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000) (endorses imputing common-law meanings to undefined statutory terms)