United States v. Morales, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15140

Christian Morales pled nolo contendere in Rhode Island (Dec. 2006) to two counts of first-degree child molestation for sexual penetration of a 13-year-old when Morales was 18; state sentence: 30 years with all but 7 years suspended.
Morales was later indicted federally (2010) for failing to register under SORNA, 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a); he pled guilty in federal court.
The probation officer and district court treated Morales’s Rhode Island conviction as a SORNA Tier III predicate, which increased his Guidelines base offense level from the Tier II level (14) to the Tier III level (16), raising his guideline range from 46–57 to 57–71 months.
The district court imposed a 65-month prison term (mid-range) and lifetime supervised release; the court emphasized public safety and Morales’s conduct during the unregistered period.
On appeal (plain-error review), the First Circuit considered whether the Rhode Island statute (penalizing sexual penetration with a person 14 or under) is “comparable to or more severe than” any Tier III SORNA offense and whether the Tier III classification was plain error affecting sentencing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Rhode Island conviction is "comparable to or more severe than" a SORNA Tier III offense	Gov't: the RI statute criminalizes actual sexual penetration and thus is at least as severe as Tier III offenses (arguing age difference is inconsequential)	Morales: comparison must be categorical and the RI statute is broader because it covers conduct against victims older than the Tier III age cutoff (14 vs. federal 12), so it is not comparable to Tier III	Court: Categorical approach applies; because Tier III draws a critical line at victims under 12, the RI statute (covering victims 14 or under without other aggravating elements) is not comparable to any Tier III offense — error to classify Morales as Tier III
Whether the misclassification was plain error and prejudicial to sentencing	Gov't: classification was not plainly obvious error; reasonable doubt exists	Morales: error was plain after Descamps and Jones; misclassification affected Guidelines range and thus prejudiced prison term	Court: Error was plain and affected substantial rights as to the prison term (remand for resentencing). No plain-error prejudice found as to lifetime supervised release; district court may but need not revisit supervised release on remand

Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (categorical approach controls comparison of predicate offenses under sentencing statutes)
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (use of categorical method to avoid factual mini-trials at sentencing)
United States v. Jones, 748 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2014) (applied categorical approach in SORNA context)
Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725 (plain-error review doctrine)
Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (distinguishing statutes that require factual inquiry)
United States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 2011) (discussing prejudice from treating a prior conviction as a predicate)
United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2005) (reasonable probability a different sentence would have been imposed when error affects guidelines)