United States v. Morais, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5242

Morais pleaded guilty to two counts of receiving child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2).
District court sentenced him to 97 months’ imprisonment on each count, concurrent, plus a $15,000 fine and lifetime supervised release with conditions.
Evidence showed 8,200 images of child pornography collected over years; some images depicted H.R. with genitals exposed.
Morais offered an autism diagnosis with expert testimony; the district court considered but did not accept a downward variance or departure.
Two special conditions are at issue: tracking of whereabouts (special condition one) and internet access restriction (special condition four).
On appeal Morais challenged the sentence, the $15,000 fine, and the two special conditions; the court affirmed in part and remanded to align written judgment with oral pronouncement on condition one.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the sentence is substantively reasonable	Morais argues autism and nature of images warrant lower sentence.	Morais contends the district court failed to account for his autism and offense nature in § 3553(a).	Sentence within advisory range; not substantively unreasonable.
Whether the fine amount and ability to pay were properly determined	Morais cannot pay the $15,000 given assets and earnings.	Court should consider ability to pay; Morais could earn and pay the fine.	Court did not clearly err; minimum $200/mo via future earnings was feasible.
Whether the written judgment conflicted with the oral pronouncement on special condition one	Oral sentence allowed tracking devices only when needed due to tracking inability; written judgment tied to sex-offender registration.	Disagreement about scope of tracking, but not about intent.	Oral pronouncement controls; remand to conform written judgment to oral condition.
Whether special condition four (internet access restriction) is permissible	Condition is too broad and not individualized here.	Condition reasonably related to deterrence and protection; individualized basis shown by record.	Restriction permissible; not greater than necessary; not per se invalid despite Crume/Wiedower concerns.

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (U.S. 2007) (substantive reasonableness review under an abuse-of-discretion standard)
United States v. Ruelas-Mendez, 556 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 2009) (presumes within-guideline-range sentences are reasonable)
United States v. Gray, 533 F.3d 942 (8th Cir. 2008) (procedural sufficiency of explanation; not every argument requires a specific rejoinder)
United States v. Foster, 514 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 2008) (oral pronouncement controls when there is conflict with written judgment)
United States v. Berndt, 86 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1996) (district court must consider ability to pay when imposing fines)
United States v. Springston, 650 F.3d 1153 (8th Cir. 2011) (broad discretion to impose special conditions that comply with § 3583(d))
United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728 (8th Cir. 2005) (per se ban on internet use generally disfavored; context matters)
United States v. Wiedower, 634 F.3d 490 (8th Cir. 2011) (broader computer-use bans require careful tailoring; individualization preferred)
United States v. Mark, 425 F.3d 505 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholds tailored restrictions; acknowledges potential for narrow restrictions)
United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 2003) (internet-use restrictions can be narrowly tailored with prior approval)
United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting the difficulty of completely banning internet use and need for tailoring)