Stеphen Moráis pleaded guilty to two counts of receiving child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2). The district court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 97 months’ imprisonment and a lifetime of supervised release. The court also imposed a $15,000 fine. On appeal, Moráis challenges his term of imprisonment, the imposition of a fine, and two special conditions of his supervised releasе. *892 We affirm Morais’s sentence, the fíne, and one of the special conditions, but remand with instructions that the district court modify its written judgment to conform to its oral pronouncement of the other special condition of supervised release.
I.
In May 2009, a child abuse hotline received a report of suspicious behavior by Moráis involving two sisters, three-year-old H.R. and six-year-old R.W. According to the report, R.W. and her brother, D.A., saw Moráis take a photograph of H.R. with her pants removed. In subsequent interviews, R.W. and D.A. stated that Moráis, who was acquainted with the children’s family through church, used his cell phone to photograph H.R. at a park.
Law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at Morais’s residence and seized, among other things, two cell phones, six computer thumb drives, and four laptop computers. Forensic examination of the computers and thumb drives revealed 8,200 images of child pornography, which Moráis had acquired between January 1998 and May 2009. The examination of Morais’s laptop computer also revealed sixteen images of H.R. with her genital area exposed. Moráis admitted that he used his cell phone to photograph H.R. whilе her genitals were exposed, and he admitted downloading numerous images of nude children from the Internet and possessing them on his computers and digital storage devices.
A grand jury charged Moráis with five counts of receiving child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2), and one count of possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Moráis pleaded guilty to two counts of receiving child pornоgraphy.
The district court calculated an advisory guideline range of 97 to 121 months’ imprisonment and a fine of $15,000 to $150,000, based on a total offense level of 30 and criminal history category I. The government suggested a sentence within the advisory guideline range, while Moráis sought the statutory minimum sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment on each count. He argued that the statutory minimum term was appropriate due tо the “relatively tame” nature of the child pornography that he collected, and due to his diagnosis of autism. In support of the latter argument, Moráis offered the testimony of Dr. James Stone, a neuropsychologist. Dr. Stone testified that Moráis suffers from “mind blindness,” which makes it difficult for him to “perceive, predict, and react appropriately to another person’s thoughts, emotions, et cеtera, to be able to put yourself in another person’s shoes, essentially.” The expert testified that Moráis has difficulty with social interaction, that autistic individuals tend to collect things, and that Moráis does not understand the “social basis” for the prohibition on child pornography. Dr. Stone also opined that Morais’s autism placed him at risk of being victimized or manipulated in prison.
The district court sentеnced Moráis to 97 months’ imprisonment on each count and imposed a $15,000 fine. The court also imposed a lifetime term of supervised release with several special conditions, two of which are relevant here. Special condition one provides that Moráis shall, in certain circumstances, “submit to any means utilized by the probation office to track his whereabouts or loсation at any time.” Special condition four restricts Morais’s access to the Internet.
II.
A.
Moráis argues that the district court imposed a substantively unreason
*893
able sentence. Citing his autism and the nature of the child pornography he possessed, Moráis argues that the district court’s sentence is greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). We review thе substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard,
Gall v. United States,
The sentence imposed was not unreasonable. A district court has substantial discretion in determining how to weigh the § 3553(a) factors. The court here considered and rejected Morais’s argument that the nature of his child pornography warranted a downward departure or variance. The court explained that it was “difficult to engage in any exercise of differentiation that one is more bad than the other,” and that such a distinction failed to provide adequate deterrence, promote respect for the law, or reflect the seriousness of the offense. Moráis argues that the district court did not “specifically address” his arguments regarding the impact of his autism diagnosis. But whether the court adequately explained the sentence is a matter of procedural soundness, not substantive reasonableness, and in any event, “not every reasonable argument advanced by a defendant requires a specific rejoinder by the judge.”
United States v. Gray,
B.
Moráis next challenges the district court’s imposition of a fine of $15,000. The court directed that during his term of incarceration, Moráis must pay at least $25 quarterly or ten percent of his prison earnings, whichever is greater. The court ordered that after release, Moráis must pay monthly installments of at least ten percent of his monthly household income, and in no case less than $200 per month. Moráis objected at sentencing on the ground that he would be unable tо pay a fine, because he lacked sufficient assets or prospects for employment. On appeal, Moráis argues that the district court failed to address the relevant statutory or guideline factors, and erred in finding that he would be able to pay the fine. We review the district court’s imposition of a fine and its determination of the amount of the fine for clear error.
United States v. Allmon,
The district court has statutory authority to impose a fine, 18 U.S.C. § 3571, and the sentencing guidelines recommend imposition of a fine in all cases, unless the defendant establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay a fine. USSG § 5E1.2(a). In determining whether to impose a fine and the amount of any fine, the court must consider a number of factors under the governing statutes and the applicable sen
*894
tencing guideline.
See
18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3572(a); USSG § 5E1.2(d). The district court need not provide detailed findings on each of the factors, but the court must consider at least “the factors relevant to the particular case before it.”
United States v. Berndt,
The record at sentencing showed that Moráis holds college degrees in math and physics. Although he had no assets and credit card debt of approximately $40,000 at the time of sentencing, Moráis reported several instances of prior employment. He worked as a weapons mechanic in the United States Air Force from 1977 to 1981, and served in the Army Reserves from 1981 through 2006. The latter service included tours in Iraq and Kosovo. Before his deployment tо Iraq in 2005, Moráis worked part time as a math tutor at the University of Arkansas and part time at McDonald’s restaurant, and he worked as a cashier at Wal-Mart in 2007 and 2008. At sentencing, Moráis testified that he had “answered a lot of [his] math questions” during his incarceration, and had discovered something that “could actually be used as a product.” He explained that his discovery “can bring [him] a lot of money, possibly,” and hе could “do that anywhere,” including in prison. Moráis also stated that he had a potential job opportunity as an engineering consultant.
The district court overruled Morais’s objection to imposition of a fine. The court remarked: “I recall ... [Moráis] telling me he believes he has realistic ... aspirations of earning perhaps a million dollars. He may or may not be able to earn that, but I think the finе is realistic and so I’ll overrule that objection.”
We see no clear error in the district court’s conclusion that Moráis could pay the minimum fine recommended by the sentencing guidelines through payments of $200 per month over his term of supervised release. The court’s discussion of the relevant factors was cryptic, but the court did address the key issue: “the defendant’s income, earning capаcity, and financial resources.” 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a)(1). As the court observed, Moráis himself projected an ability to earn money during and after incarceration, and the court was entitled to consider his college education and prior employment in determining that payment of the fine was “realistic.” We are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was committed.
See United States v. Wright,
C.
Moráis next argues that the district court’s written judgment must be modified because it conflicts with the court’s oral pronouncement of special condition one. In pronouncing sentence, the district court stated: “If and when deemed necessary,
due to an inability to keep track of the defendant’s whereabouts during supervised release,
the defendant shall submit to any means utilized by the probation officer to track his whereabouts or location at any time.” S. Tr. 158 (emphasis added). The written judgment, however, provides that, “[a]s need be,
should the defendant fail to comply with sex offender registration,
he shall submit to any means utilized by the probation office to track his whereabouts or location at any time.” R. Doc. 35, at 4 (emphasis added). The parties agree that the two statements conflict, because еach establishes a different condition precedent for the use of tracking de
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vices. Moráis evidently views the oral pronouncement as narrower, because it allows the use of tracking devices only when the probation office demonstrates “an inability to keep track of his whereabouts,” whereas the written judgment allows tracking upon Morais’s failure to comply with sex offender registration, even when the probation office nonetheless is able to keep track of him. The government apparently sees the oral pronouncement as broader: there may be cases in which the probation office cannot track Morais’s whereabouts even when he has complied with sex offender registration. As we do not disagree with the parties thаt the oral pronouncement and written judgment conflict, the oral sentence controls.
United States v. Foster,
D.
Finally, Moráis challenges special condition four of his supervised release. This condition provides that Moráis “shall not have access to an internet-connected computer or other device with internet capabilities or access the internet from any location without prior approval by the probation office and for a justified, reason.” Moráis objected to the condition at sentencing, arguing that “less restrictive limits” should be used. On appeal, he argues that the condition is not reasonably related to the pertinent § 3553(a) sentencing factors and involves a greater deprivation of his liberty than is reasonably necessary. He also argues that the district court failed to make individualized findings regarding the need for the restriction. We review the district court’s imposition of special conditions for abuse of discretion.
Durham,
“A district court has broad discretion to impose special conditions of supervised release, so long as each condition complies with the requirements set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).”
United States v. Springston,
Moráis asserts that the district court failed to conduct an individualized inquiry into the need for special condition four and instead imposed it “based on a classification of individuals [that Moráis] now falls within — sex offender.” Our cases call for the district court to “conduct an inquiry on an individualized basis,” and say that the court “may not impose special conditions categorically on all individuals convicted of certain offenses.”
United States v. Kelly,
Given Morais’s use of the Internet to obtain thousands of images of сhild pornography, a condition limiting his Internet access is reasonably related to the statutory purposes of deterrence and protecting the public.
See United States v. Mark,
Moráis relies on
United States v. Crume,
Despite some broad language in these prior decisions, we decline to construe
Wiedower
and
Crume
as establishing a
per se
rule that a district court may never impose a prior-approval Internet use restriction based on a defendant’s receipt and possession of child pornography.
See Mark,
Morais’s conduct is more egregious than anything described in
Crume
or
Wiedower:
he collected 8,200 images of child pornography over more than a decade. PSR ¶ 23. The images were in large part downloaded from the Internet, and they-depicted children ranging in age from 3 to 13 years.
Id.
¶¶ 20, 23. The district court found that the offense involved mate
*897
rial that portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence.
Id.
¶ 33; S. Tr. 135. There was also reason for the court to be concerned about incorrigibility. Morais’s own expert, Dr. Stone, testified that Moráis was diagnosed with autism and a- compulsive nature, and that without successful treatmеnt, Moráis was likely to repeat the same conduct. S. Tr. 95-97. The Eleventh Circuit thought a restriction on Internet use without prior approval was sufficiently narrow for a defendant who possessed over 4,000 images of child pornography,
United States v. Zinn,
The special condition at issue here is not a complete ban on use of the Internet. With prior approval of the probation office, Moráis may access the Internet for legitimate purposes of research, communication, and commerce. Given the importance of the Internet as a resource, we expect that the probation office will not arbitrarily refuse such apprоval when it is reasonably requested and when appropriate safeguards are available. But we conclude that the condition requiring prior approval does not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to protect the public and to deter criminal activity in light of the record in this case.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed with respect to the term of imprisonment, the fine, and special condition four of supervised release. We remand with instructions to amend the written judgment to conform to the district court’s oral pronouncement of special condition one.
Notes
The government argued at sentencing that Moráis produced child pornography when he used a cell phone to photograph a three-year-old girl with her genital area exposed, but the district court was not convinced. S. Tr. 132-33.