United States v. Moore, 975 F.3d 84

Jonathan T. Moore was convicted in 2009 of being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) and possession with intent to distribute >5 grams of crack (21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)); he admitted the gun and 5.8 g of crack were his.
The PSR classified Moore as a career offender (partly based on N.Y. Penal Law § 220.31), yielding an offense level of 34 (reduced to 31) and criminal-history category VI, producing a Guidelines range of 188–235 months; the court sentenced him to 188 months.
The Fair Sentencing Act (2010) increased crack thresholds (e.g., 5 g → 28 g) but was not retroactive at enactment; the First Step Act (2018) permits discretionary reductions for qualifying pre‑2010 crack offenses by applying Sections 2–3 "as if" they were in effect.
In 2019 Moore moved under the First Step Act, arguing that applying the Fair Sentencing Act would lower his career-offender base offense level (statutory maximum reduced), producing a revised Guidelines range of 151–188 months and asking reduction to 151 months.
The district court denied relief, citing Moore’s extensive criminal history and multiple post‑sentence prison infractions; the court misstated timing of one infraction (said within 4 years when it occurred 7 years earlier). Moore appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a district court considering a First Step Act § 404(b) motion must recalculate the Guidelines range to account for post‑sentencing intervening case law (e.g., Townsend) or other changes beyond the Fair Sentencing Act.	Moore: First Step Act requires courts to "impose a reduced sentence," so the court must recalc Guidelines de novo and apply intervening precedent (Townsend) that would defeat the career‑offender enhancement.	Government: First Step Act only directs courts to consider the sentence "as if" Sections 2–3 of the Fair Sentencing Act applied; it does not authorize plenary resentencing or re‑litigation of unrelated Guidelines issues.	Court: Affirmed Government. First Step Act does not require plenary resentencing or de novo Guidelines recalculation; courts need only adjust Guidelines to reflect changes that flow from Sections 2–3 of the Fair Sentencing Act.
Whether the district court’s minor factual misstatement about the timing of one prison infraction (4 yrs vs. 7 yrs) requires remand.	Moore: The misstatement was factual error affecting the discretionary denial and thus requires remand.	Government: The error was minor; the infraction itself and other recent serious infractions support the denial, so Moore’s substantial rights were not affected.	Court: Affirmed Government. The timing mistake was not material to the court’s reasoning and did not affect substantial rights—no remand required.

United States v. Holloway, 956 F.3d 660 (2d Cir.) (First Step Act motions governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B))
United States v. Johnson, 961 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2020) (covered‑offense inquiry depends on statute of conviction, and First Step Act relief is discretionary)
United States v. Townsend, 897 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2018) (interpretation that N.Y. Penal Law § 220.31 is not a qualifying controlled‑substance predicate for § 4B1.2)
Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (Fair Sentencing Act background on nonretroactivity at enactment)
Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (district courts retain discretion to vary from advisory Guidelines)
United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414 (5th Cir.) (First Step Act does not permit plenary resentencing)
United States v. Kelley, 962 F.3d 470 (9th Cir.) (district courts in First Step Act proceedings should consider only Fair Sentencing Act changes)
United States v. Denson, 963 F.3d 1080 (11th Cir.) (similar holding limiting recalculation to Fair Sentencing Act effects)
United States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667 (4th Cir.) (contrasting view that some retroactive Guidelines corrections must be made)
United States v. Boulding, 960 F.3d 774 (6th Cir.) (another circuit decision addressing scope of Guidelines recalculation)