954 F.3d 1251
9th Cir.2020Background
- In August 2011 Dominguez and an accomplice committed an armed Hobbs Act robbery of a Garda Cash Logistics warehouse, stealing over $900,000 and firearms.
- In 2012 Dominguez recruited Kevin Jensen to attempt an armed robbery of a Garda armored car; Jensen became an FBI informant.
- On August 6, 2012 Dominguez armed himself, donned dark clothing/body armor, drove toward the targeted armored-car facility, and turned back about a block away after encountering a staged law‑enforcement presence.
- Dominguez was indicted on multiple counts including 2011 Hobbs Act robbery, 2012 attempted Hobbs Act robbery, two § 924(c) firearm-in-furtherance counts, conspiracy, and money‑laundering; a jury convicted on Counts One–Ten.
- The court affirmed most convictions but reversed the § 1957 money‑laundering conviction (Count Four) for lack of proof that the transaction went through a financial institution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for attempted Hobbs Act robbery (Count Nine) | Government: Dominguez manifested specific intent and took substantial steps — armed, clothed, packed weapons, drove to target and only aborted when alerted to police. | Dominguez: He turned around voluntarily about a block away; defense counsel effectively conceded guilt at trial. | Affirmed — evidence sufficient; counsel's admissions undercut reversal. |
| Prosecutor's closing misstated law on “substantial step” | Government: instruction framed hypothetical (change of heart) to explain substantial-step element. | Dominguez: That explanation merged intent and substantial-step elements and was improper. | No plain error — even if erroneous, no prejudice in light of counsel’s admissions and strong evidence. |
| Whether Hobbs Act robbery and attempted Hobbs Act robbery are "crimes of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) | Government: Hobbs Act robbery is an elements‑clause crime of violence; an attempt is also a crime of violence because attempt requires intent to commit all elements and a substantial step. | Dominguez: Residual clause invalid; attempt need not include actual/attempted/threatened use of physical force so cannot categorically be a crime of violence. | Majority: Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence; attempted Hobbs Act robbery is also a crime of violence. (Judge Nguyen concurred in part and dissented re: attempt.) |
| Money‑laundering conviction (Count Four, § 1957) | Government: Cash purchase of motorcycle with robbery proceeds supports § 1957 conviction. | Dominguez: § 1957 requires a monetary transaction “by, through, or to a financial institution”; no evidence of such. | Reversed — government failed to prove involvement of a financial institution. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Mendez, 992 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1993) (holds Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause)
- United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (invalidates the § 924(c) residual clause and frames elements‑clause standard)
- Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (defines "physical force" as force capable of causing pain or injury)
- United States v. Ingram, 947 F.3d 1021 (7th Cir. 2020) (holds attempted Hobbs Act robbery is a § 924(c) crime of violence)
- United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d 335 (11th Cir. 2018) (same conclusion on attempted Hobbs Act robbery)
- United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (articulates sufficiency‑of‑evidence standard for reviewing jury convictions)
- United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2019) (rejects distinction between threats to tangible and intangible property in Hobbs Act analysis)
- Gonzales v. Duenas‑Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (categorical‑approach principle: require realistic probability a statute reaches nongeneric conduct)