United States v. Mohammad Hassan
742 F.3d 104
| 4th Cir. | 2014Background
- In 2009 a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of North Carolina charged eight men, including appellants Mohammad Omar Aly Hassan, Ziyad Yaghi, and Hysen Sherifi, with terrorism-related conspiracies (material support §2339A; overseas murder/kidnap/maim §956; conspiracy to kill federal uniformed personnel §1117; related firearm counts). Three were tried jointly and convicted; sentences ranged from 15 years to 45 years.
- Core factual proof at trial: travel to the Middle East seeking jihad, weapons purchases and training, fundraising, recruitment efforts, internet/social‑media postings endorsing violent jihad, and testimony from cooperating coconspirators and FBI informants; the government also used FISA-obtained materials and audio/video evidence.
- The district court admitted expert testimony from Evan Kohlmann (radical Islamist/extremism context) after a Daubert hearing, admitted social‑media and video evidence (with business‑records certifications), and conducted in camera review of FISA materials, ruling them admissible.
- Appellants raised pretrial and trial objections: First Amendment defenses and requested jury instructions, Daubert/Rule 702 and Rule 403 objections to Kohlmann, hearsay and authentication challenges to social media and videos, challenges to FISA-derived evidence, and repeated motions for acquittal on sufficiency grounds.
- The district court applied and explained enhancements at sentencing (notably U.S.S.G. §3A1.4 terrorism enhancement and hate‑crime/other adjustments), reached individualized findings of intent, and imposed lengthy aggregate sentences; the Fourth Circuit affirmed on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| First Amendment protection for extremist speech / jury instructions | Appellants: convictions rest on protected advocacy/speech; requested instructions protecting non‑imminent advocacy were necessary. | Government: convictions rested on agreements and overt acts, not mere advocacy; First Amendment does not bar proving intent by use of speech as evidence. | Court: Affirmed — speech could be used as evidence of agreement/intent; requested instructions were either covered by charge or inapplicable; no reversible error. |
| Expert testimony (Kohlmann) admissibility under Daubert/Rule 702 and Rule 403 | Appellants: Kohlmann’s methods unreliable, testimony irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. | Government: Kohlmann is qualified; his contextual testimony aids jurors’ understanding of extremist terminology, networks, radicalization. | Court: No abuse of discretion — district court performed Daubert gatekeeping, limited scope, and balanced Rule 403 concerns; testimony admissible. |
| Use and disclosure of FISA-derived evidence / probable cause for FISA orders | Yaghi: FISA orders lacked probable cause to treat him as an agent of a foreign power; sought disclosure and suppression. | Government: complied with FISA procedures; AG affidavit warranted in camera review; materials establish probable cause. | Court: After independent in camera review, probable cause existed and further disclosure was not required; FISA evidence admissible. |
| Sufficiency of the evidence for conspiracy convictions | Appellants: evidence was scattered, largely speech, and insufficient to prove agreement or overt acts (for §956). | Government: circumstantial and direct evidence (travel, training, recruitment, payments, weapons, online advocacy, coconspirator testimony) established agreement, intent, and overt acts. | Court: De novo review sustained convictions — evidence (direct and circumstantial) was substantial and permitted jurors to find guilt beyond reasonable doubt. |
| Sentencing — terrorism enhancement (§3A1.4) specific intent | Appellants: court clearly erred; enhancement requires specific intent to influence/affect government and that intent was not proven. | Government: individualized factual findings (travels, recruitment, training, target planning, propaganda) show intent to intimidate/coerce/retaliate. | Court: No clear error — district court resolved factual disputes, identified supporting record evidence, applied enhancement; sentences upheld. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (general rule that content‑based speech restrictions are disfavored, but certain categories unprotected)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (trial court gatekeeping standards for expert testimony)
- Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (material‑support statute does not reach "pure" advocacy but covers coordinated/material support)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (Daubert principles apply to all expert testimony)
- United States v. Chandia, 514 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 2008) (discussing proof required for terrorism‑enhancement intent and need for factual findings at sentencing)
- United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008) (approving contextual expert testimony about radical Islam to aid jury)
- United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (conspiracy law principles; circumstantial evidence and inferences for agreement)