605 F.Supp.3d 63
D.D.C.2022Background
- Garret Miller was charged in Count Three of a Second Superseding Indictment with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) for conduct on January 6, 2021.
- On March 7, 2022 the Court granted Miller’s motion to dismiss Count Three, rejecting the government’s broad interpretation of § 1512(c)(2).
- The government moved for reconsideration, arguing the Court’s interpretation was incorrect and, alternatively, that the Indictment provided adequate notice under the Court’s interpretation.
- The Indictment’s Count Three largely parrots the statutory language and names the certification of the Electoral College as the official proceeding but alleges no specific action tied to a document, record, or other object.
- The Court denied reconsideration and held the indictment insufficient: a valid indictment must plead essential facts (the species of conduct), and parroting a broad statute without factual particulars failed to inform Miller of the actus reus; a bill of particulars cannot cure a defective indictment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Court should reconsider its prior statutory interpretation of § 1512(c)(2) | Gov: Prior decision erred; other D.D.C. decisions support broader reading; lenity argument was not fully briefed | Miller: Prior ruling correct; statute ambiguous so rule of lenity applies | Reconsideration denied; Court stands by its earlier, narrower interpretation and finds ambiguity sufficient to implicate lenity |
| Whether the Indictment is legally sufficient under Rule 7(c)(1) under the Court’s interpretation | Gov: Count Three echoes the statute and states time/place (Jan 6, 2021; certification) so it gives adequate notice | Miller: Count lacks essential factual allegations—no specific actus reus or nexus to a document/record/object | Held insufficient: Count Three fails to allege the essential species of conduct required under the Court’s interpretation; parroting statute is inadequate |
| Whether a bill of particulars could cure any indictment deficiencies | Gov: Preferred remedy is bill of particulars to clarify theories | Miller: Bill cannot substitute for a properly alleged indictment | Held: A bill of particulars cannot cure an invalid indictment; the grand jury must present the charged essential facts |
| Whether terms like “corruptly” or naming the certification proceeding supply the missing particulars | Gov: “Corruptly” and identifying the proceeding provide limiting context | Miller: “Corruptly” speaks to mens rea not actus reus; naming the proceeding does not supply nexus to a document/object | Held: Those references do not meaningfully limit or clarify the actus reus; indictment remains too vague |
Key Cases Cited
- The Hoppet, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 389 (early articulation that reference to statute alone does not describe offense)
- Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286 (indictment must contain every element of the offense and apprise defendant of what to meet)
- United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (acts and intent must be set forth with reasonable particularity)
- United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611 (statutory language alone is insufficient when it fails to set forth all elements)
- Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (indictment must allege facts sufficient to make prima facie case)
- United States v. Conlon, 628 F.2d 150 (statutory language must be supplemented with detail to apprise accused)
- Williamson v. United States, 903 F.3d 124 (parroting statute can suffice when statute is sufficiently precise)
- Resendiz-Ponce v. United States, 549 U.S. 102 (indictment sufficient where statute precise and time/place identified)
- Hillie v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 3d 57 (bill of particulars cannot cure an invalid indictment)