after stating the ease, delivered the opinion of the court.
In an indictment upon a statute, it is not, sufficient to set forth the offence in the words of the statute, unless those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be-punished; and the fact that the statute in question, read in the light of the common law, and of other statutes on the like matter, enables the court
*613
to infer the intent of the legislature, does not dispense with the necessity of alleging in the indictment all the facts necessary to bring the case within that intent.
United States
v.
Cruikshank,
The language of the statute on which this indictment is founded includes the'case of every person, who, with intent to defraud, utters any forged'obligation -of the United States. But the offence at which it is aimed is similar to the common-law offence of uttering a forged or counterfeit bill. In this case, as in that, knowledge that the instrument is forged and counterfeited is essential to make out the crime; and an uttering, with intent to defraud, of an instrument in fact counterfeit, but supposed by the defendant to be genuine, though within the words of the statute, would not be within its meaning and object. v
This indictment, by omitting the allegation contained in the indictment in
United States
v.
Howell
(
Answered in the negative.
