United States v. Miller, Criminal No. 2016-0072

Background

On March 31, 2016, MPD Gun Recovery Unit officers (in an unmarked vehicle, wearing tactical vests labeled “Police”) encountered Antoine Miller walking on a sidewalk in D.C.; Miller was later indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm.
Officers Wright (driver), Hiller (front passenger), and Detective Delpo (rear seat) testified that Wright called out from the car and asked if Miller had a gun; Miller allegedly revealed his rear waistband and acted nervously.
Officer Hiller exited the vehicle, asked to talk, and during a face-to-face exchange Miller said, “I have one…I’ve been telling you I have one. Just take it.” Hiller then used a chest-to-chest ‘‘bear hug’’ to restrain Miller; officers recovered a .40 caliber handgun from Miller’s front waistband.
Miller testified differently: he said other officers ordered him to stop, directed him to place his hands on a fence, and that he admitted possession only because he believed he was surrounded; the Court found this account not credible.
The court credited Officers Hiller and Wright, concluded no Fourth Amendment seizure occurred until Hiller physically restrained Miller after Miller’s admission, and held there was probable cause at that moment to arrest; Miller’s motion to suppress was denied.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether officers’ initial stop (calling from unmarked car and asking if Miller had a gun) was a Fourth Amendment seizure	That the unmarked car, multiple armed officers in tactical vests, and repeated questioning would make a reasonable person feel not free to leave, so it was a seizure	Officers argued mere approach and questions from inside vehicle are consensual and do not constitute a seizure	Not a seizure; consistent with circuit precedent (Gross), questioning from inside vehicle without commands, displays of weapons, or blocking movement is consensual
Whether Officer Hiller’s exit from vehicle and on-sidewalk questioning transformed encounter into a seizure	That Hiller’s approach, visible firearm in holster, tone, and repeated questioning created a coercive show of authority	Officers said Hiller asked politely, used calm tone, and Miller willingly engaged — mere questioning and approach do not by themselves seize	Not a seizure; Court credited Hiller’s calm manner and found a reasonable person would feel free to leave until physical restraint
When a seizure occurred and whether it was supported by probable cause	That seizure occurred earlier (when officers surrounded Miller) making subsequent statements and evidence involuntary and subject to suppression	Government contended seizure occurred only when Hiller physically restrained Miller after Miller admitted possessing a gun, and by then officers had probable cause	Seizure occurred when Hiller physically restrained Miller; at that moment probable cause existed based on Miller’s admission and surrounding facts, so arrest and evidence were lawful
Whether pre-arrest statements required Miranda warnings or suppression as fruits of an unlawful seizure	That repeated questioning and implied coercion made Miller in custody and his statements involuntary, so they should be suppressed	Government argued encounter was consensual and not custodial, so statements were admissible	Court found Miller not "seized" or "in custody" before physical restraint; Miranda not required; pre-arrest statements admissible

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Gross, 784 F.3d 784 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (approach from vehicle and questioning from inside car did not constitute a seizure)
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (consensual encounters fall outside Fourth Amendment seizure analysis)
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (seizure requires physical force or submission to show of authority)
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (police may approach and question individuals in public; questions alone usually do not effect a seizure)
Mendenhall v. United States, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (factors indicating seizure include threatening presence of officers, display of weapon, physical touching, or language implying compliance required)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (police stop/seizure principles and when frisk/investigatory stop justified)
United States v. Castle, 825 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (examples where officer commands and blocking supported finding of seizure)
United States v. Wood, 981 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (blocking path and commands can create a seizure)
United States v. Goddard, 491 F.3d 457 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (presence of officers in gear and weapons does not automatically mean a stop occurred)
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004) (warrantless arrest reasonable if probable cause exists for any offense)
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (definition of governmental termination of freedom of movement constituting seizure)
Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) (seizure occurs when there is governmental termination of freedom through intentionally applied means)
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (probable cause standard explained)