986 F.3d 723
7th Cir.2021Background:
- Michael Thomas set multiple fires in a one-square-mile mobile home park and collected insurance proceeds after claims.
- Four insurance checks from the April 2013 blaze formed the four mail-fraud counts; the indictment alleged a scheme spanning 2004–2013.
- Several intervening fires: September 2004 (Julia Drive), November 14, 2010 (four fires, two on Thomas-connected properties and two diversionary), January 2013 (Thomas property), and April 2013 (Julia Drive, the charged event).
- Magistrate judge struck references to the two 2010 diversionary fires as surplusage; the district court later admitted the 2010 and 2013 fires as part of the § 1341 scheme, excluded the 2004 fire from the scheme but admitted it as 404(b) modus operandi/identity evidence.
- A jury convicted Thomas on all counts; he was sentenced to 90 months and appealed the admission of other-fire evidence under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Nov. 2010 & Jan. 2013 fires (Thomas-owned properties): whether they are part of the § 1341 scheme or improper 404(b) other-acts | Thomas: those fires are discrete events separated by years and unique participants; only April 2013 relates to charged mailings | Govt: scheme may be a continuing course of conduct; similar acts close in time, method, location, and motive are part of the scheme | Court: Affirmed — 2010 & Jan. 2013 fires are direct evidence of the scheme, not 404(b) evidence |
| Admissibility of Nov. 14, 2010 diversionary fires (abandoned units) | Thomas: diversionary fires are separate bad acts and prejudicial propensity evidence | Govt: diversionary burns were done to conceal/divert suspicion and thus part of the fraudulent scheme | Court: Affirmed — diversionary fires admissible as part of the scheme and highly probative |
| Admissibility of Sept. 2004 Julia Drive fire (remote in time) | Thomas: too temporally remote and generic; admission invites impermissible propensity inference; Huddleston requires a pretrial finding | Govt: admissible as modus operandi/identity/evidence of intent given distinctive similarities (timing of policy, location) | Court: Affirmed — excluded from the charged scheme but admissible under Rule 404(b) as distinctive modus operandi/identity; any error harmless |
| Preservation/plain-error and Rule 403 balancing | Thomas: district court failed to make required findings and should have excluded as unfairly prejudicial | Govt: objections not preserved in full; evidence was highly probative and 403 balance favors admission | Court: No plain error; district court did not abuse discretion on 403; probative value outweighed prejudice, and conviction stands |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014) (articulates streamlined framework for analyzing Rule 404(b) evidence)
- United States v. Gorman, 613 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2010) (direct evidence of a crime is generally admissible and not Rule 404(b) other-act evidence)
- United States v. Bradford, 905 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2018) (preservation and plain-error review for evidentiary objections)
- United States v. Seidling, 737 F.3d 1155 (7th Cir. 2013) (elements of mail fraud under § 1341)
- United States v. Lanas, 324 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 2003) (discrete acts that share time and manner can be part of a wider scheme)
- Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) (standard for admitting prior-act evidence; no requirement of a pretrial finding that defendant committed prior act)
- United States v. Boone, 628 F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2010) (temporal gaps can make other-act evidence less likely to be part of a scheme)
- United States v. Anzaldi, 800 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2015) (efforts to conceal can be intrinsic to a fraudulent scheme)