United States v. Michael Khoury
877 F.3d 720
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- Defendants Michael Smith and Michael Khoury were convicted under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) and sentenced to the 15-year mandatory minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on prior Illinois residential-burglary convictions under 720 ILCS 5/19-3 (1982–2001 text).
- ACCA’s definition of predicate “burglary” is federal common-law “generic burglary” as articulated in Taylor v. United States, not solely a state label.
- Illinois residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3) requires entering a house, apartment, mobile home, trailer, or other living quarters with intent to commit a theft or felony; the statutory definition of “dwelling” (720 ILCS 5/2-6) distinguishes subsection (a) (building, tent, vehicle, or other enclosed space used as habitation) from subsection (b) (for §19-3: house, apartment, mobile home, trailer, or other living quarters actually occupied or intended to be occupied).
- Defendants argued that Taylor’s phrase “building or structure” excludes tents, vehicles, trailers, and similar nonpermanent enclosures; because Illinois law arguably reaches such places, it is broader than generic burglary and cannot serve as an ACCA predicate.
- The government urged that Illinois residential burglary matches the federal generic definition (including occupied trailers/mobile homes) and so supports ACCA sentencing; both district courts relied on Dawkins, but the Seventh Circuit clarified Dawkins addressed only breaking-and-entering, not the building/structure scope.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gov't) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Illinois residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3) qualifies as federal "generic burglary" under Taylor | Illinois statute defines dwelling to include house, mobile home, trailer, and other living quarters used as habitation, which fits Taylor/Model Penal Code concept of building or occupied structure | The statute’s broader language and subsection (a)’s inclusion of tents, vehicles, and other enclosed spaces shows it criminalizes non-structures and thus is broader than generic burglary | Held: Illinois residential burglary is a generic burglary for ACCA purposes; convictions qualify as predicate offenses |
| Whether the statute’s reference to mobile homes/trailers/floating or movable places prevents it from being generic burglary | Mobile homes are statutory "structures" (UCC definition) and align with common understanding of dwellings; trailers used as dwellings are similarly covered | Trailers and other movable enclosures are not "buildings or structures" as used in Taylor, so statute is overbroad | Held: Mobile homes/trailers used as dwellings count as structures; statute’s coverage of tents and unoccupied vehicles is excluded by subsection (b), and occupied trailers are treated as structures under federal common-law analysis |
| Whether the possibility (not the actuality) that "other living quarters" could include tents, boats, or cars renders the offense indivisible and therefore non-generic | The statutory text and Illinois precedent limit §19-3 dwellings to listed living quarters actually occupied; tents/boats/ordinary motor vehicles are not covered as residential burglary | The statute’s language could cover non-structures; Taylor requires inquiry into statutory elements, not factual use | Held: Subsection (b) excludes tents and boats; unoccupied boats/ordinary vehicles are not structures under Shepard, but residential burglary as applied to occupied trailers/mobile homes is generic |
| Whether Taylor should be rigidly applied even if that reading would exclude most states’ burglary statutes | Taylor aims to capture the generic sense embodied in most state codes and the Model Penal Code; courts should interpret to implement that federal intent | A literal Taylor reading would exclude widespread state statutes and produce anomalous results; therefore Taylor should be applied to exclude non-structures only where clearly covered | Held: Taylor’s generic definition is best read to encompass statutes like Illinois §19-3 (consistent with the Model Penal Code approach) rather than to invalidate most states’ burglary statutes |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (adopts federal common-law definition of generic burglary)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limits what counts as a "structure" for record-based inquiry)
- Dawkins v. United States, 809 F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 2016) (addressed whether IL residential-burglary statute includes breaking-and-entering)
- United States v. Haney, 840 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2016) (held pre-1982 Illinois ordinary burglary did not match generic burglary)
- United States v. Stitt, 860 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (held some state statutes broader than generic burglary because they cover mobile homes, trailers, tents)
- United States v. Patterson, 561 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2009) (held state residential-burglary statutes can satisfy generic burglary despite movable dwellings)
- United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2007) (treated coverage of non-buildings as disqualifying for generic burglary)
- Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463 (2012) (waiver of procedural defenses is binding where not jurisdictional)