United States v. Michael J. Ronga
682 F. App'x 849
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- In May 2013 Deputy Michael Ronga took patron Rodolfo Lopez‑Castaneda from a bar for a courtesy ride but drove to a nearby construction site where a brief violent encounter occurred; the victim suffered a broken nose and bruised lip.
- Lopez‑Castaneda testified Ronga frisked him, took his cell phone and money, and punched him repeatedly; Ronga admitted pushing the victim twice and taking the phone but denied punching with a closed fist or taking money.
- GPS and physical evidence corroborated the encounter and the short duration of the altercation; Lopez‑Castaneda later identified Ronga and sought medical treatment.
- Ronga was indicted and convicted by a jury of (1) deprivation of civil rights under color of law (18 U.S.C. § 242) — the jury found assault and seizure of the cell phone — and (2) obstruction of justice by engaging in misleading conduct (18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3)).
- Ronga appealed arguing (a) insufficiency of evidence on the obstruction count because he ultimately told the truth, (b) entitlement to a self‑defense jury instruction, and (c) that his below‑guidelines 72‑month sentence was substantively unreasonable.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and the 72‑month sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Ronga) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence on §1512(b)(3) obstruction charge | Evidence showed Ronga gave misleading statements to obstruct communication of info about a possible federal crime and there was a reasonable likelihood such statements would reach federal officials | Ronga argued §1512(b)(3) requires an actual transfer of misleading information to federal officials and that his later truthful statements negate the charge | Court held the statute criminalizes misleading conduct done with intent to hinder communication; actual transfer is not required and eventual truth‑telling does not preclude conviction because elements were satisfied when misleading conduct and intent occurred |
| Request for self‑defense jury instruction | N/A — government opposed separate self‑defense instruction on facts presented | Ronga contended some evidence (his statements, testimony suggesting victim resisted the frisk) warranted an instruction that he acted in self‑defense | Court held defendant failed to meet burden of production for the instruction; the proffered evidence was speculative/insufficient and willfulness instruction covered the defense adequately |
| Substantive reasonableness of 72‑month sentence | Sentence was a considered downward variance from the 121–151 mo. guidelines; court balanced §3553(a) factors and avoided government’s requested maximum | Ronga argued sentence was greater than necessary and court failed adequately to consider offense circumstances and avoid unwarranted disparities | Court held the 72‑month below‑guidelines sentence was substantively reasonable; district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing §3553(a) factors |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 1998) (defines elements and federal interest underlying §1512(b)(3))
- Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668 (2011) (discusses mens rea and interpretive issues relevant to §1512(b)(3))
- United States v. LaFond, 783 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2015) (standard for whether a requested jury instruction is supported by sufficient evidence)
- United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 1996) (describes burden of production for defense instructions)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (framework for review of sentence reasonableness)