898 F.3d 811
8th Cir.2018Background
- Shortly after midnight Garrett was found asleep in his minivan at a gas station; officers entered the unlocked van, found a handgun on the floorboard, and arrested him. A search recovered a mason jar with five baggies (total ~10g marijuana) and a digital scale with green residue.
- Garrett was tried and convicted by a jury of: felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)), possession with intent to distribute marijuana (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D)), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)).
- At trial Garrett conceded possession of the marijuana and scale but argued he lacked specific intent to distribute and lacked the specific intent/knowledge to possess the firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, attributing his condition to prescription drugs and possible recent use of a laced blunt.
- The district court refused Garrett’s proposed intoxication theory-of-defense instruction, concluding the proposed language misstated the law and the evidence of intoxication at the time he acquired the contraband was speculative and insufficient to negate intent.
- Post-trial issues raised on appeal: (1) Brady claim that the government failed to produce lab reports about pills seized in a 2013 search, (2) alleged prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, and (3) sentencing classification as a career offender under the Guidelines.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed: (1) no error in refusing the intoxication instruction, (2) Brady materiality not shown, (3) prosecutor’s remarks did not deprive Garrett of a fair trial, and (4) any career-offender error was harmless because the district court varied downward and would have imposed the same sentence based on § 3553 factors.
Issues
| Issue | Garrett's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court erred by refusing an intoxication theory-of-defense instruction | Requested instruction accurately stated law and was supported by evidence of intoxication, so jury should have been instructed that intoxication could negate specific intent to distribute and to possess firearm in furtherance of trafficking | Instruction misstated law (failed to explain intent can be proven at any time before arrest) and evidence of intoxication at relevant times was speculative; instructions as a whole allowed defense argument | Affirmed: no error — instruction misstated law, evidence speculative, and jury could consider intoxication argument from existing instructions and counsel’s argument |
| Whether government violated Brady by late production of lab reports from 2013 warrant search | Lab reports showing pills were not MDMA but mixtures would have undermined inference of distribution knowledge and supported defense that Garrett was a user, not a dealer | The 404(b) evidence of prior distribution was strong regardless of pill identity; reports were at best impeachment and not material to outcome | Affirmed: no Brady violation — no reasonable probability of a different outcome if disclosed |
| Whether prosecutor’s closing argument deprived Garrett of a fair trial | Prosecutor misstated evidence and mischaracterized defense, inflaming jury and prejudicing defendant | Remarks were within bounds of argument based on evidence; court repeatedly instructed that arguments are not evidence and sustained objections when necessary | Affirmed: no reversible prosecutorial misconduct — remarks not so prejudicial given evidentiary record and jury instructions |
| Whether sentencing as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 was erroneous | Garrett argued he lacked two qualifying prior felony convictions (rule of lenity for Missouri conviction; Kansas attempted aggravated assault not categorical match) so career-offender classification was improper | District court found two predicate crimes of violence; even if classification were erroneous, court varied downward and expressly stated it would not rely on the career-offender guideline | Affirmed: any career-offender error harmless — district court based sentence on § 3553 factors and would have imposed same sentence |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Robertson, 709 F.3d 741 (8th Cir.) (defendant entitled to theory-of-defense instruction when timely requested, supported by evidence, and legally correct)
- Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (U.S. 1988) (defendant entitled to instructions on legal theories supported by evidence)
- United States v. Kenyon, 481 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.) (intoxication instruction available when evidence shows defendant may have lacked specific intent)
- United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir.) (habitual use or intoxication does not necessarily negate intent to distribute)
- United States v. Christy, 647 F.3d 768 (8th Cir.) (no error if instructions as a whole allow defense theory to be argued and considered)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (U.S.) (prosecution must disclose materially favorable evidence)
- United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750 (8th Cir.) (standard for reversing based on prosecutorial misconduct in closing)
- United States v. McGee, 890 F.3d 730 (8th Cir.) (harmless error where district court bases sentence on § 3553 factors and would have imposed same sentence regardless of guideline calculation)
- Donnell v. United States, 765 F.3d 817 (8th Cir.) (interpretation of rule of lenity in computing criminal history under Guidelines)