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United States v. Iris Collette Jackson Dwight Dean Jackson
213 F.3d 1269
10th Cir.
2000
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Docket

*1 Bornfield, crime.” 1129 Mans that he didn’t know if of the someone omitted). (internal ellipses would meet him at the quotations train station or phone him at All home. this indicates in most to the light Viewed favorable “high probability” existed that Defendant Government, case, in this con- the evidence drugs despite knew his suitcase contained the infer- entirety, supports sidered its attempt Defendant’s deliberate refrain to deliberately that Defendant acted to ence acquiring knowledge from affirmative knowledge methamphetamine avoid Francisco-Lopez, that fact. See de in his the three men first suitcase. When F.2d at 1418. they going place Defendant were to told suitcase, detergent box in which he his The facts of this case the infer before, just purchased day had Defen- drug ence that Defendant knew he was a they challenged dant said no. When De- courier, yet intentionally eyes he closed his fendant, acquiesced. Certainly, he to it. The district court’s igno deliberate supports the inference that Defendant be- properly rance instruction informed the engaged in criminal lieved the men were jury that it could “look at the charade of shower, activity. Defendant While ignorance proof as circumstantial knowl pack men to his suitcase with allowed the edge.” United v. Manriquez Arbi dirty his and lock it. Given the (10th Cir.1987) (not clothes zo, contents, of a personal nature suitcase’s ing ignorance that a deliberate instruction failure his own pack Defendant’s suit- “nothing more that a circum refined open case and it after his shower infers properly stantial evidence instruction tai deliberately avoiding that he was knowl- case”). lored to the facts of [the] edge about the contents of his suitcase. instruction did not authorize Defendant’s fact, open Defendant didn’t his suitcase jury conviction unless concluded he departed Angeles until he had on the Los knowledge satisfy had sufficient finally opened train. When he his suit- 841(a)(l)’s scienter element. Based on case, he “all detergent spilling saw over” evidence, jury was entitled to so Still, kept of it. Defendant the inside Accordingly, judgment conclude. suitcase, dispose in his than box rather the district court is it. This an supports too inference De- AFFIRMED. Barbee, “guilty knowledge.” fendant’s See foregoing,

968 F.2d at 1033. Based on the jury readily despite could conclude that so, opportunity

clear to do Defendant more

“purposely” declined to learn about Hanzlicek, suitcase’s contents. his See America, UNITED STATES of F.3d at 1233-34. Plaintiff-Appellee, during Defendant’s statements his inter- Mans, Agent light view with viewed Government, most favorable to the JACKSON; Dwight Iris Collette Dean rise an give guilty inference of knowl- Jackson, Defendants-Appellants.

edge. implied Defendant first some- 98-6487, Nos. 99-6090. may key one on the train have used his Appeals, place in his United States Court drugs suitcase while it was Tenth Circuit. luggage the common area. He then provided conflicting statements about June men, where he had first met the three first Angeles, he said in Los then he said in

Dodge City. Finally, when about the asked destination,

drugs’ Agent Defendant told *7 (Patrick Ryan, M. Farber

Jay M. briefs; him on Attorney, with States Richmond, Assistant Sue Tuck on the brief in Attorney, him with States Heaton, 98-6487; Assistant Joe No. Case him on the Attorney, with United States 99-6090), Unit- Assistant in No. Case brief Oklahoma, for Plain- Attorney, ed tiff-Appellee. Wells, City, Okla- L. Oklahoma

Joseph Col- Iris homa, Defendant-Appellant for lette Jackson. Federal Earley, P. Assistant

William Defender, City, Okla- Oklahoma Public Dwight homa, Defendant-Appellant Dean Jackson. BALDOCK, and ing

Before McKAY Ms. Bromlow after her on arrest BRORBY, Judges. charges possession Circuit of cocaine. Elk The City FBI Agent Police contacted Nicholas

BRORBY, Judge. Circuit Manns after Ms. expressed Bromlow her Jackson and desire talk to FBI Dwight Iris Collette Dean about her knowl- edge of the appeal arising drug Jackson their convictions distribution in network Elk City. agreed a crack cocaine Ms. Bromlow in from distribution endeavor assist City, investigation by Elk making based in Oklahoma. Ms. Jack- controlled buys issues on of crack cocaine son raises six and Mr. for the FBI and appeal three. record her thorough Jackson raises After conversations with the dealers. arguments exchange assistance, for her study appeal, Agent of their we on merit, none have Manns to call promised determine affirm. the district attor- Texas,

ney where Ms. Bromlow also Background I. faced charges, and tell the attorney district had been helpful Bromlow to their and federal law Local enforcement offi- investigation. Investigators paid Ms. began investigating cials distribution for her Bromlow assistance and reim- City crack cocaine in Elk part 1997. As expenses bursed her for the she incurred investigation, of this agents of the Federal investigation. connection with the (FBI) Investigation Bureau of and the Elk City Department Police up decided to set 17, 1997, On November Ms. Bromlow they video surveillance at two residences purchased crack cocaine from Defendant were at suspected the center of a crack Dwight Jackson, Ms. Jackson’s uncle. system. Agents distribution had identified During transaction, which was record- numerous individuals and two ed, dominant Bromlow, Mr. Jackson told Ms. “Iris organizations Wilson and the Jackson you will up.” hook Mr. Jackson stat- —the organizations being responsible ap- ed, “Iris, she got quarters,” meaning Ms. —as proximately ninety-five percent sale, Jackson quarter would sell a ounce of transportation and distribution crack co- crack or an amount valued at Be- $250.00. City caine the Elk area. agents cause Jackson did not have the crack organizations the two suspected had loose cocaine inquired when Ms. Bromlow about ties to one another and utilized the same making purchase, Mr. Jackson and his local individuals to distribute the crack girlfriend, Warren, Sheree went to Ms. The FBI cocaine. installed video cameras get Jackson’s house to the crack. When tops telephone on poles overlooking they returned, Ms. Bromlow bought an the residences of Ms. Regina amount crack worth $100.00. suspected

Evans—the orga- leaders of the day, Later that FBI agents gave Ms. Although nizations. both of these cameras Bromlow pick $300.00 directed her adjusted by could be police officers up Regina buy Evans and to crack from station, and could zoom in enough close to Vicky Edmondson or Ms. Jackson. Ms. *8 plate, read license neither capac- had the picked up Bromlow Ms. Evans and drove ity sound, record to and neither could view to Ms. Jackson’s house in the FBI “video the inside of the houses. The officers also car.” speaking After to Ms. Bromlow for utilized a “video car” equipped with three while, a short Ms. Evans left the car and cameras, two hidden VCRs and a transmit- entered Ms. Jackson’s house obtain to ter that allowed officers to record and crack cocaine. Ms. Evans returned with listen to conversations in and around the gave of crack and $300.00 worth it to Ms. they car as occurring. were Ms. explained Bromlow. Evans Ms. Jack-

During investigation, their home, the FBI en- son was not at Boy” but “Old had help listed the crack, Gina Bromlow an given her the referring to Ms. Jack- informant. City The Elk Police were hold- son’s father. The FBI recorded the con- handed later, and Ms. Leonard returned and Ms. Bromlow Ms. between' versation of crack cocaine. worth Bromlow $300.00 Evans. January pur- Ms. Bromlow On place buy took controlled The next crack co- worth of another $300.00 chased Agent Manns when early December of the FBI. The under the direction caine and directed Bromlow gave $100.00 Ms. in the car revealed camera installed video Mr. from crack cocaine purchase her to Ms. Jackson’s car sitting in Mr. Jackson The FBI Ms. Warren. Jackson and/or di- Ms. Mr. Jackson talking to Bromlow. tape. on video transaction captured this go to to Ms. Jackson’s Ms. Bromlow rected acquiring Bromlow Ms. tape showed Ms. Jack- they arrived at When house. Ms. War- and Mr. Jackson drugs from house, upon Bromlow insisted Ms. son’s transaction, Mr. Jackson this During ren. Jackson because served before Mr. being Ms. Warren he and Ms. Bromlow told crack money spend to on had more she Jackson money for Ms. a lot of made (Id. 311.) Mr. at did Mr. Jackson. than selling crack for her. only worth buy wanted to $10.00 Jackson later, on December week One Ms. cocaine from Ms. Jackson. of crack controlled made another Bromlow then Ms. bedroom and went into her Jackson from Ms. Jack- crack cocaine crack living area with the purchase to the returned Jackson, Dwight Jack- Ms. and Leonard it Bromlow. son handed to Ms. and uncle. and Ms. Jackson’s Ms. Jackson. brother to Bromlow handed cash son’s gave Ms. Bromlow $320.00 Manns Agent 10, 1998, FBI instruct- February On Bromlow drove Ms. transaction. Ms. Jackson Bromlow to contact Ms. ed where Ms. Jackson house to Ms. Jackson’s of crack. of one ounce price and discuss working if she was Ms. Bromlow asked Agent reported to Ms. Bromlow After working denied Ms. Bromlow the police. with concerning her conversation Manns wanted she explained and police for the Jackson, with her gave he $900.00 Ms. and the extra of crack worth $800.00 Bromlow crack. Ms. purchase which previous for a payment was $20.00 with residence Ms. Jackson’s returned gave Leonard Ms. Bromlow transaction. $900.00, one purchasing discussed and re- Jackson Ms. $320.00. Jackson Ms. from Jackson. of crack cocaine ounce crack from her bedroom trieved not have a full However, did Ms. Jackson Leonard, gave then it who it to handed time, asked Ms. so she that ounce asked Ms. Ms. Bromlow Bromlow. Ms. Mr. Jackson return later. Bromlow to co- more crack if would have she Jackson negotiations. When during these present later, indicated she Ms. Jackson caine day, Ms. later returned Bromlow Ms. would. discussed but she present, was not Jackson Jackson, urged who with purchase Bromlow Ms. December On Jackson from Ms. buy the one ounce her Although buy. controlled made another to be claimed Mr. Jackson himself. or this transaction tape of is no video there Ms. Jack- while “holding] down fort” malfunctioned, Ms. equipment because was out. son went to Ms. at trial she testified Bromlow Jackson, Judy Wise- day, Ms. That same saw Leonard Jackson house Jackson’s Hicks, Randall man, Nequita and Wanitha stated Bromlow porch. front Ms. on the house. at Ms. Jackson’s into Ms. Jack- were and Leonard walked she house, and re- left the $300.00, page, a- and received house, gave Leonard she son’s *9 Shortly there- while a short later. Ms. bedroom. turned into the back went Leonard go” to the “Let’s after, said Ms. Jackson Ms. tell could hear Leonard Bromlow car. they got Ms. Jackson’s and into group, worth of she wanted $300.00 Jackson Oklahoma, Hobart, drove to Jackson Ms. heard Ms. Jackson Bromlow crack. Ms. store, pulled then stopped she minutes A few where the crack. had say she road, parked, over to the side of the and or to being strip station, searched at the asked Ms. Wiseman to large remove a sum pulled Ms. Wiseman out the crack she had money glove compartment. from the hidden between legs her and claimed it gave After Ms. Wiseman her the money, was hers. When Ms. Jackson was asked got Ms. Jackson out of the car and walked to consent to a person, search of her she to a Perry, vehicle driven Charles who “you might stated something find you and stopped had behind them. When she re- might not.” drugs No during were found car, turned to her Jackson had a large Ms. However, the search. the officers did not cocaine, amount of crack longer but no had body cavity conduct a search. The officers the money. Ms. examined the Jackson released Ms. search, Jackson after the gave crack and it to Ms. Wiseman to cut in she bragged later about her method half. Ms. Jackson put then the crack be- concealing drugs from the police. legs. tween her day, The next as Ms. Bromlow was driv- Upon City, their return to Elk Officer ing in City, Elk she encountered Ms. Jack- Joey Elk City Bales Police Depart- son, who was in her vehicle along with Mr. stopped ment Officer car. Bales had Jackson person and a known to Ms. Brom- received a tip anonymous from an caller only low as “Anita.” Ms. Jackson accused who told him Ms. Jackson was bringing Ms. “setting Bromlow of up” her and being back a large of crack amount cocaine from responsible stop for the that occurred the Lawton, Oklahoma. Before stopped she night before. Ms. Bromlow any denied car, gave Ms. Jackson Ms. Wiseman involvement. Ms. Jackson claimed Regina half the crack and her told to hide it. Ms. Evans told Ms. Jackson that Ms: Bromlow put Wiseman the crack between her legs. knew stop. about the Ms. Ms. Jackson hid half of Bromlow her the crack denied suggested they it inserting vagina. go into her ask Officer Ms. Bales Evans interviewed each of the women about it. Ms. Jackson separately. then told Ms. Ms. Jackson told Bales Officer she Bromlow to had follow her to Ms. Evans’ resi- Clinton, Oklahoma, been to play bingo. dence, and that Mr. Jackson would ride Ms. Wiseman told they Officer Bales had with Ms. Bromlow. When Ms. Bromlow been driving through Holbert, the towns of arrived at residence, Ms. Evans’ Ms. Ev- Clinton, and Cordell. talking While to Ms. ans room, was in a back but would not Wiseman, Officer Bales noticed Ms. Jack- come out speak to Ms. Bromlow. Ms. son turning around in the car to talk to the Bromlow, Mr. Jackson Ms. Jackson passengers in the Ms. back. Hicks and then went to Ms. Jackson’s house. Mr. Ms. Randall told they Officer Bales had again once rode with Ms. Brom- been playing bingo. Officer Bales called low. Ms. was Bromlow scared and felt she assistance, and when other officers ar- could not leave. Ms. Jackson told Ms. rived, they dog sniff conducted of the Bromlow to strip so that she could if see vehicle. dog The alerted to the ashtray Ms. Bromlow wearing was a wire. Mr. which contained in cash. The $275.00 dog Jackson left the room while Ms. Bromlow purses, alerted to two one in the front being finding searched. After no evi- seat and one in the back seat of the car. wire, dence of a Ms. Jackson allowed Ms. Officer Bales found a pipe used crack get Bromlow to dressed. Ms. Jackson told one of purses. Officer Bales then took Ms. Bromlow if she had “set up,” her the occupants of car to the Elk City Ms. Bromlow would not live to see the police station, Agent where Manns was next day.

waiting. Because he knew Ms. Bromlow negotiated

had the purchase of one May On ounce a search of Ms. Jack- of crack Jackson, from Agent residence, son’s Manns pursuant conducted ato expected Ms. Jackson warrant, to return to Elk revealed an address book bearing City with the ounce of crack cocaine. Pri- Ms. Jackson’s name. address book *10 base); cocaine to distribute (conspiracy and Judy of Wiseman names contained of 21 violation U.S.C. a por- found Count Officers also Johnson. Maxine base); (distribution 841(a)(1) of cocaine § in the purse in a book an address tions of of U.S.C. a violation contained pages Count These bedroom. base) 841(a)(1) (distribution of Judy § Wise- cocaine Perry and of Charles names abetting); search, (aiding § found and police and 18 U.S.C. During the man. kitchen, 9, a of 21 U.S.C. violation in Ms. Jackson’s and scanner Count a police 841(a)(1) listing Charles to dis- order with intent money (possession § a transfer and base) § 2 Ms. Jack- and 18 in a U.S.C. briefcase cocaine Perry payee tribute However, no Mr. illegal jury found closet. (aiding abetting).The and son’s bedroom 2, violation a guilty found. on Count drugs were Jackson place for (maintaining § a of 21 U.S.C. a executed day, same officers On of a controlled and use distribution Perry’s apart- Charles on warrant search § (aiding and substance), and U.S.C. The search Lawton, Oklahoma. ment hearing contested Id. After abetting). awith covered plate a dinner revealed issues, court sen- district sentencing substance, razor blades two powdery white to a total of tenced Jackson telephone address and a plate, lying on prison. months name and Ms. Jackson’s containing book Ms. arrested Officers numbers. phone her based on 28 jurisdiction exercise partic- their for and Mr. Jackson Jackson 3742(a) § and § and 18 U.S.C. U.S.C. the crack of in the distribution ipation of district judgments affirm all the ultimately re- investigation The cocaine. cases. court in both buys of seventy-two controlled sulted thirty-four cocaine, of the arrest and crack Appeal II. Jackson’s Ms. two Jacksons. to the in addition people erred trial court asserts the Ms. Jackson were tried Mr. Jackson and Ms. Jackson 1) suppress motion to denying her by: of Ms. Jackson juryA convicted together. and video through audio obtained evidence multi-count counts on a following six 2) in li- surveillance; her denying motion Count violation indictment: testimony given suppress mine to distribute co- (conspiracy § U.S.C. 3) Bromlow; her motion denying Ms. base); a violation caine Count based on insufficien- acquittal judgment place (maintaining § 856 U.S.C. conviction; sustain cy of the evidence a controlled sub- use of and distribution presen- 4) objections to the overruling her (aiding § 2 stance), U.S.C. and 18 amounts drug regarding report tence of 21 violations 5 and abetting); Counts 5) role; denying her leadership and her 841(a)(1) (distribution of cocaine § U.S.C. 6) form; and verdict special motion for base) § 2 and abet- (aiding and 18 U.S.C. Brain- Ms. suppress motion to her denying U.S.C. a violation ting); Count unlawfully was it testimony because low’s base); (distribution 841(a)(1) cocaine § of 18 in violation induced 21 U.S.C. violation and Count 201(c)(2). § 841(a)(1) intent to with dis- (possession base). district The cocaine tribute Informa- Suppress Motion A. The impris- terms Jackson to Ms. sentenced Through Video Obtained tion 5,1, 7, 8 months on of 360 Counts onment n (cid:127) Surveillance Audio 2, all to run on Count months & concurrently. district contends first Ms. Jackson sup- motion her by denying court erred in five counts charged Mr. Jackson through the obtained information press the jury found Mr. indictment. n telephone on the installed cameras counts: video following on the guilty Evans’ and her residence poles outside of 21 U.S.C. 1, a violation Count

1280 house, and the information obtained Koyomejian, 1438. See also 970 F.2d at through recording the video and audio de- 541-42. in the FBI

vices installed “video car.” Ms. Ms. Jackson states the use of the argues tape the video recordings telephone video cameras installed on the recordings and audio were made viola- poles violated the Fourth Amendment be tion I of Title of the Electronic Communi- they cause were installed without war (Title I), Privacy cation Act of 1986 codi- rant. The Fourth protects Amendment 2510-22,1 §§ fied at 18 U.S.C. and the persons against unreasonable searches and Fourth Amendment the United States Const, seizures. U.S. amend. IV. Wheth Constitution. er Ms. Jackson can claim the FBI violated her Fourth by Amendment rights using We review the district court’s these activity video cameras to observe findings supporting factual denial its occurring outside the houses depends on Ms. Jackson’s motion to suppress clear whether Ms. Jackson had a reasonable error, viewing light the evidence expectation privacy in the area viewed government. most favorable to the See by the cameras. See United States v. Lambert, 1064, United States 46 F.3d Gordon, (10th 1222, 168 F.3d 1225-26 (10th Cir.1995). However, 1067 we review Cir.), denied, 1030, cert. 527 U.S. 119 S.Ct. de novo the district court’s conclusions as 2384, (1999) 144 L.Ed.2d (quoting 786 to the ultimate reasonableness of a search Carter, 83, 87, Minnesota v. 525 U.S. 119 or seizure. Id. 469, (1998)). S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 373 See States, 347, Katz v. United 389 U.S. Title I prohibits the intentional 353, 507, (1967). 88 S.Ct. 19 L.Ed.2d 576 interception, eavesdropping intercept, or procurement any person other equipment use of video intercept or endeavor to intercept “any cameras to record activity visible to the wire, oral, or electronic communication.” naked eye does not ordinarily violate the 2511(l)(a). .§ Although Ms. Fourth Amendment. See Dow Chem. Co. States, Jackson seems to have 227, abandoned the ar v. United 476 U.S. 106 S.Ct. gument that I applies 1819, (1986) Title to silent video 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (holding the surveillance, we note the use of photography district aerial did not violate concluding correct in I regu Title does not expectations defendant’s pri reasonable late activity.2 See vacy); Ciraolo, 18 U.S.C. 2510. 207, 476 U.S. California However, 213, 1809, use of silent (1986) video surveil 106 S.Ct. 90 L.Ed.2d 210 lance comply must still with the Fourth (holding aerial observation of a fenced-in Mesa-Rincon, Amendment. See 911 F.2d yard back within curtilage of a home 1. Title III of the requirements Omnibus Crime Control and granting a warrant to install 1968, 90-351, Safe Streets Act of Pub.L. No. a video building, camera inside a and noted 212, 82 Stat. was amended and retitled that Title prohibit I does not video surveil Title I of the Electronic Communications Pri lance, although provides guidelines it for es 1986, 99-508, vacy Act of Pub.L. No. tablishing video surveillance under the Fourth (Title I). Stat. 1851 See Koy United States v. Furthermore, Amendment. Id. at 1437-38. 536, omejian, banc), (9th Cir.) (en 970 F.2d 539 n. 1 the other circuits that have addressed this denied, 1005, cert. 506 U.S. 113 S.Ct. issue have also determined Title I does not 617, (1992). 121 L.Ed.2d 550 regulate silent video surveillance. See United Falls, 674, States v. 34 F.3d 679-80 Cir. Although directly we did not address this 1994); Koyomejian, 538-41; 970 F.2d at issue, Mesa-Rincon, in United States v. Biasucci, 504, United States v. (10th Cir.1990), 786 F.2d 508- holding modified (2nd Cir.), denied, cert. grounds, on U.S. other United States v. Castillo- 104, 107, Garda, (1986); (10th Cir.), S.Ct. 93 L.Ed.2d 1186-87 Torres, U.S. 880-81 Cir.1984), 139 L.Ed.2d (1997), L.Ed.2d we discussed 85 L.Ed.2d 150 recordings the audio court determined not violate a warrant does without in the equipment stating: “The made the audiovisual Amendment Fourth *12 of the home contravene the Fourth protection FBI car did not Amendment Fourth law enforce- at require I evidence to or Title because has never extended Amendment eyes when to shield their officers con- Ms. Bromlow hearing ment the established thorough- public home on by a passing recording conversa- of her to the sented fares.”). addition, activity person In I does not recognizing Title tions. While is public not the knowingly exposes to when audio surveillance the use of prohibit protection, Fourth Amendment subject of conversation participants of the one the constitutionally protected thus, is not Ms. Jackson recording, to the consents Katz, at See U.S. observation. from to insufficient evidence there was argues (1967). also United See S.Ct. present- the evidence find consent because 1179, 1182 F.3d Longoria, 177 v. States hearsay.4 was inadmissible ed on the issue — U.S. -, (10th Cir.), cert. (1999). The Ms. Brom Agent L.Ed.2d 182 Manns testified hearing supports record the conver suppression of the consent to gave record low her the video finding court’s cam- Al district FBI car. the within the occurring sations poles telephone on the were installed eras undeniably hearsay evidence though houses, and the viewing inside of incapable Evi Federal Rule of by it is defined any only what observing of capable were 801(c), hear it was not inadmissible dence to been able easily have would passerby that, from apart say. It is well established had no rea- Ms. Jackson observe. Rules Federal privilege, questions of the privacy that of expectation sonable apply suppression do not of Evidence cameras. the by video upon intruded Matlock, v. States hearings. See United Therefore, Ms. Jackson’s we conclude 172-74, Amendment were under the Fourth rights (1974). Fed.R.Evid. See also L.Ed.2d 242 no there was need implicated, and 104(a) not bound (stating the court is war- to obtain a search officers police the deciding prelimi when rules of evidence vid- utilizing the installing and before rant admissibility concerning the nary matters eo cameras.3 1101(d)(1) (stat evidence); Fed.R.Evid. of to inapplicable are rules ing evidence the also contends Ms. Jackson of fact of questions determination “[t]he by denying her motion erred court district admissibility of evidence preliminary the gleaned from suppress the evidence by the determined the issue is to be when installed equipment of the use audio/video 104.”). Furthermore, we rule court under FBI car. The district undercover the 2511(2)(c); Unit U.S.C. parties. See 18 Tor- Mesa-Rincon and Jackson cites the 3. Ms. Davis, argument. 1 F.3d v. her How- ed cases in of States res ever, distinguishable. 1993) ("Although statute forbids [the] these cases are Cir. of the installation intercepted telephone we dealt with con Mesa-Rincon of warrantless use a business. inside video camera investigations, silent in law enforcement versations dealt with at 1443. The Torres F.2d lawfully may personnel law enforcement private in a camera video installation the con with or record conversations monitor places These are F.2d at residence. parties to the conversa of one sent expec- had a reasonable the defendants where Furthermore, govern tion.”). "[w]hen the Fourth privacy. Because tation with conversation a defendant’s ment records implicated was not use Amendment party’s con pursuant party, another case, present video silent cameras sent, nor Fourth Amendment neither obtaining prerequisites warrant 2511(2)(c) is violated.” require- based on a video camera install McKneely, States Compare inapplicable. Title I are ments Mesa-Rincon, 1995). F.3d at Longoria, 177 See Cir. at 1436-38. (the provides no Amendment Fourth 1182-83 illegal activi who discusses protection for one recordings con- apply to I does not 4. Title informant). undercover an ties with the consent one made with versations hearsay have held evidence is pressed admissible because it was obtained in viola- suppression hearings. See United tion of law when the did not Merritt, 1269-70 withhold pay. taxes from her The dis- (10th Cir.1982), trict court summarily motion, denied the L.Ed.2d 286 it finding to be without legal authority. also note question Ms. Jackson did not agree. the We voluntariness of Ms. Bromlow’s consent at if Even the FBI violated Okla suppression hearing, nor did she ob statutes, homa and tax sup federal

ject hearsay to the repeated statements by pression of Ms. *13 testimony Bromlow’s was Agent hearing. Manns the There is inappropriate under these circumstances. in nothing the record to indicate Ms. The primary purpose of the exclusionary Bromlow’s consent was voluntary. police rule is to deter See misconduct. Thus, the was not required Williams, 431, Nix v. 442-43, 467 U.S. provide further evidence of Ms. Bromlow’s 2501, (1984); S.Ct. 81 L.Ed.2d 377 voluntary consent and the district court Calandra, 338, 414 U.S. by did not err denying Ms. Jackson’s mo (1974). S.Ct. 38 L.Ed.2d 561 The suppress tion to the recorded conversa e application of th exclusionary rule “has McKneely, 1073-74; tions. See 69 F.3d at been restricted to those where instances Axselle, see also United States v. 604 F.2d its objectives remedial are thought most 1330, 1338 Cir.1979). efficaciously only served” and is warranted conclude the evidence obtained from when it will in “appreciable result deter video the cameras installed on the tele- rence” police misconduct. Arizona phone poles and the recordings made in Evans, 1, 11, U.S. the undercover FBI car were not intro- (1995) L.Ed.2d 34 (quotation marks and in duced violation of Title I or the Fourth omitted). citations Accordingly, in order Amendment. We affirm the district justify implementing the exclusionary denying court’s order Ms. Jackson’s mo- rule, the challenged evidence must in some suppress. tion to sense product be the illegal government Nix, conduct. See 467 U.S. at

B. Motion in Limine Concerning Ms. S.Ct. case, 2501. In the present the al Bromlow’s Testimony leged illegality failure to withhold —the Ms. Jackson contends the dis taxes money from paid to Ms. Bromlow— by trict erred denying her motion was too far attenuated from the procure suppress limine to Ms. Bromlow’s tes ment of the against evidence Ms. timony. Specifically, Ms. Jackson claims to justify application of exclusionary the because Ms. paid Bromlow was fact, her rule. In we see no connection what informant,5 services as a confidential soever, she nor do we believe Ms. Jackson’s an “employee,” such, was and as rights any were in way violated FBI required to withhold alleged taxes from illegal conduct. Consequently, any pay her pursuant 26 U.S.C. deterrence that would arise from suppress 3402(a)(1) Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. ing Ms. testimony Bromlow’s be far would Thus, 2385.2. argues she Ms. Brom outweighed by society’s interest bring testimony low’s should have sup- been ing the guilty justice. See United given Of the amount to Ms. designated rendered,” $2,000 Bromlow in as for "services services, $1,866.63 exchange for her was for was used to assist Ms. Bromlow in reloca- her rent, expenses consisting costs, pager tele- tion from Western Oklahoma. Ms. Bromlow phone calling expenses cards "and other ac- paid by was also the Oklahoma Second Dis- during crued investigation.” course of the Drug trict Task Force. The record does not balance paid amount Ms. Bromlow disclose paid amount she was Okla- was for services conducting rendered in homa authorities. purchases controlled crack. Of the funds jury could find a reasonable government, n. Payner, States (not- (1980) beyond a reasonable guilty the defendant 65 L.Ed.2d and citation (quotation marks did not vio- Id. illegal conduct doubt.” ing “where omitted). this conducting In review we the interest rights, respondent’s late the conflicting evidence weigh in deter- integrity “may neither judicial preserving outweighed by credibility of witnesses.” consider the conduct nor ring such presenting probative v. Pappert, interest societal fact.”) short, (10th Cir.1997) marks (quotation trier of to the evidence omitted). statutory jury, violation type It is for the this is not citations finder, suppression conflicting mandate testi would fact to resolve affirm testimony.6 we and draw Bromlow’s infer mony, weigh evidence determination on court’s presented. the district the facts See Unit ences from Nieto, 1464, 1469 issue. ed States v. Cir.1995), Sufficiency of the Evidence C. L.Ed.2d 742 When *14 judg a motion for argues reviewing the district the denial of also Ms. Jackson motion for a on insufficient evi by denying acquittal her of based ment court erred dence, analy the evidence the same acquittal because this court conducts judgment of of sis, conviction of the district reviewing judgment to sustain her the was insufficient crack cocaine Ails to distribute States v. conspiracy de novo. See United (10th Cir.), Specifically, worth, § 843, 21 846. violation of U.S.C. 846 138 F.3d 1) 221, was insuffi- denied, evidence 142 asserts: the 119 she 525 S.Ct. U.S. finding Ms. Jackson support (1998); v. cient to United States U.Ed.2d (10th others to agreement with Hooks, into an entered 1531 & n. 780 F.2d 2) cocaine, govern- the crack and distribute Cir.), that to introduce evidence

ment failed 90 L.Ed.2d type of cocaine base. was a crack cocaine Jackson is unclear It is whether on all the her convictions challenging to Sufficiency of the evidence challenging her conviction only or counts is legal is a issue jury’s verdict support § 846. of 21 U.S.C. Nev- for the violation United de novo. See reviewed ertheless, reviewing the carefully Hanzlicek, after F.3d v. there was we conclude Cir.1999). appeal, record on (10th only we “ask appeal, On support to Ms. Jackson’s ample evidence direct taking evidence—both whether We find her all counts. on circumstantial, the rea together with convictions and of sufficiency concerning the arguments drawn there inferences be sonable merit, and af- to be without to the the evidence light most favorable from—in Bromlow to make Agenl Manns directed Ms. was question Bromlow whether Ms. 6. equipment gave “employee," buys and therefore her FBI even an controlled provisions so, subject to the the FBI was in the record is no evidence whether to do there requiring law and Oklahoma specified Agent federal support Manns an assertion wages. As a confi- withholding of taxes from per- buys were to be how these controlled informant, appear Ms. it dential does States, Slagle 612 F.2d v. United formed. C.f. sufficiently control of was under Bromlow the FBI Cir.1980) (where plaintiff sued employee qualify as an in order to Act, U.S.C. Claims under the Federal Tort incorporat- common law standards under when ac- injuries he sustained § 31.3121(d) 1(c) § and as im- ed 26 C.F.R. — informant, drug companying federal tit. language Okla. Stat. Ann. plied by not an was informant court determined the (listing Rui. 87-41 § See also Rev. 2385.1. (Sec- employee the Restatement as defined law rules twenty under the common factors 220(2) (1958) ond) and noted Agency, § the nature of the determining when consider employment details of [the over the extent of control ‘‘[t]he relationship emphasizing the special agent] FBI work [the informant’s] putative em- by the degree control exerted 1160-61.) extremely small.” Id. Although employee). putative ployer over the reliability.” mo- cient indicia of United States court’s denial her firm the district Ruiz-Castro, acquittal. judgment tion for a Cir.1996) (quotation marks and citations Sentencing D. comment, (n.12). omitted); 2D1.1, USSG may be sentenced defendant next contends the

Ms. Jackson upon drugs the total amount of she based by failing to court erred sustain district or which fell within “reasonably foresaw objections presentence report. to the her scope particular agreement objected [her] the amount of Ms. Jackson conspirators.” her with the court attributed to drugs the district (10th Cir.) (quota Ivy, was a leader of the finding and to its she omitted), cert. de “We review tion marks and citations drug operation. distribution nied, findings factual the district court’s (1996); ap interpretation error and its L.Ed.2d USSG clear comment, (n.2). lB1.3(a)(l)(B), sentencing guidelines de In mak

plication of the determinations, sentencing Gigley, ing its factual novo.” United States Cir.2000). 1212, 1221(10th may the district court consider relevant regard to its information without admissi Quantity Drug bility applica under the of evidence rules at trial long ble “so the information argues the court in Ms. Jackson upon relied has some basis of 6,243.86 correctly grams attributed of co particular the facts of the case and bears (crack) in determining caine base to her reliability.” indicia of sufficient her base offense level of 38. Ms. Jackson *15 (10th Wacker, 1453, 72 F.3d States only contends the court should have con Cir.1995) (quotation marks and citations in grams sidered 451.59 of crack calculat omitted). ing her base offense level. The balance of (5896.8 grams) the crack attributed to her of argu The thrust Ms. Jackson’s testimony Judy based on the of Wise- is that testimony ment Ms. Wiseman’s man. Ms. Jackson states Ms. Wiseman’s credibility simply lacked because she was testimony lacked a “sufficient indicia of coconspirator testifying anticipation the reliability support probable to its accura However, leniency. credibility of the of a cy” not have been and thus should consid at sentencing witness is for the district by ered the district court its calculation Sloan, court to evaluate. United States quantity of the of crack to Ms. attributable (10th 861, Cir.1995), 65 F.3d cert. de Jackson. nied, 1097, 824, 516 U.S. S.Ct. The district court’s calculation (1996); L.Ed.2d 767 States v. United drug is a of fact quantity finding that we (10th 752, Browning, 61 F.3d 754-55 Cir. only. review for clear error See United 1995). defer to the district court’s Vaziri, (10th 556, States v. 164 F.3d credibility determination of as the district Cir.1999). government prove “The must position court is in a judge better to the quantities drugs sentencing pur credibility witness’ than are we. We con evidence, poses by preponderance the- by clude the district court did not err upon possess and the evidence relied must holding Ms. Jackson accountable for a to reliability.” a minimum indicia of grams tal of 6243.86 crack cocaine. Camacho, 1220, 137 F.3d Cruz (10th Cir.1998). When actual Leadership Role drugs underlying drug quantity determi seized,

nation may rely are not the court Ms. Jackson next finds fault upon guideline an finding estimate establish with the district court’s she was level, if ring offense the estimate is the leader of a crack supported distribution by the by facts in the suffi- applying case and “bears a four-level enhancement pursuant operation. her base offense level to USSG tion The by cases cited 3Bl.l(a). § the district We review court’s Jackson in of her argument on this a point distinguishable. determination Ms. Jackson was are we con- drug or of the organizer leader distribu clude the district by court did not err 3Bl.l(a) § operation tion under .USSG increasing Ms. Jackson’s base offense 3Bl.l(a). Tagore, clear error. United States v. pursuant § See four levels to USSG (10th Cir.1998). 158 F.3d The

Sentencing provide Guidelines for a four- E. Jury Instructions level increase the offense level “[i]f Ms. Jackson claims the court was an or leader organizer defendant of a erred denying requesting her motion activity criminal that involved five or more special submission of a verdict form to participants or was otherwise extensive.” jury. jury the event the found her 3Bl.l(a). USSG bears crimes, guilty drug Ms. Jackson of proving by preponderance the burden require jury wanted to to determine applicability of the evidence the of this whether the controlled substance was enhancement. v. Tor See “crack” cocaine or some other form of res, Cir.), 53 F.3d cocaine, and to determine quantity 516 U.S. the substance attributable Ms. Jackson. S.Ct. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Because verdict in essentially forms are (1995). 133 L.Ed.2d 150 Factors the court jury, structions to the our review of a determining should consider when whether special verdict governed by form applies the enhancement are “the exercise same abuse of ap discretion standard we making authority, of decision nature ply jury instructions. See Webb v. ABF participation in the commission of the of Inc., Freight Sys., fense, accomplices, the recruitment of ... (10th Cir.1998) (citing United States v. degree participation planning or Cir.1998)), Reed, 1180-81 offense, organizing degree ... and the rt. ce authority of control and exercised over 143 L.Ed.2d 350 “We 3Bl.l(a), *16 others.” USSG comment. give review the district decision court’s (n.4). The guidelines require do not each particular jury a instruction for abuse of every factor to be satisfied order discretion and consider instructions as the enhancement to be applied. See Unit a whole de novo to determine whether 858, ed v. Bernaugh, States 969 F.2d they accurately jury informed the (10th Cir.1992). gravamen “[T]he of-this governing law.” v. United States Cerrato- control, organization, enhancement is (10th Cir.1999). 1253, Reyes, 176 F.3d responsibility for the actions of other indi Accordingly, Court reviews the dis “[t]his Albers, viduals.” United States v. 93 F.3d trict requested court’s refusal to submit a (10th Cir.1996) (quotation jury instruction to the for abuse of discre omitted). marks and citations A tion. district court does not abuse its argues Ms. Jackson there long charge is no discretion so as the as a whole evidence in the adequately record indicate she di states law.” United States rected, (10th Cir.) Starnes, organized controlled or v. her cocon 109 F.3d 650-51 omitted), spirators. We find (quotation this contention to be marks and citations denied, without replete merit. The record is with cert. 117 S.Ct. (1997).

examples of exercising Ms. Jackson control an 138 L.Ed.2d 1029 Whether is directing the activities of the cocon sue concerned a matter of law for the trial Furthermore, spirators. question it is clear Ms. court to determine or a of fact simply determination, was not drug properly jury’s a dealer en left to the transactions, gaging in separate wholly question but was at of law over which we organized drug the center of an distribu- exercise de novo review. United See (10th Pena, guide to determine the sentencing 930 F.2d v. States v. Cir.1991). range). See also United States line (2d 538, 542 Boonphakdee, 40 F.3d Cir. Requir- Form Proposed 1. The Verdict 1994) 841(a)(1) § does (holding 21 U.S.C. Type Jury Determine ing the proof particular amount of require not Controlled Substance offense); narcotics as an element of the dis Jackson contends Ms. Pena, (holding at 1492 factual 930 F.2d to instruct the by failing trict court erred punish degree issues relevant to the whether the co jury it must determine court). by the trial ment are to be decided cocaine base was in the form of caine base Frederick, v. 897 F.2d United States Cf. However, “crack.” Ms. Jackson known as (10th Cir.) (holding sentencing 492-93 this circuit has re appeal on admits proven jury not be to the factors need whether or cently the issue of addressed denied, doubt), beyond a reasonable jury to a right has defendant 171, 112 L.Ed.2d U.S. the con concerning whether determination did not err The district court 841(a)(1) in a at issue trolled substance jury by denying requested Ms. Jackson’s form of “crack” or some other conviction is instructions. v. John States cocaine base. (10th Cir.1997), son, cert 130 F.3d F. of the Paid Informant’s Suppression 78, 142 U.S. Testimony (1998), we held the distinction L.Ed.2d 61 and other forms of between cocaine base Finally, argues Ms. Jackson the district strictly for the court to cocaine is an issue by failing to the testi suppress court erred sentencing a defendant con determine Bromlow, in mony of Ms. the confidential 841(a)(1). (rely Id. at 1428 victed under formant, based on our decision United reasoning of the Fifth Circuit ing on the (10th Singleton, 165 F.3d Deisch, v. United States Cir.) (en banc), (5th Cir.1994)). Ms. Jackson invites us (1999) 144 L.Ed.2d 775 jury must reconsider and hold Johnson II”). (“Singleton Ms. Jackson moved to nature of the controlled sub determine the suppress testimony Bromlow’s based Ms. However, three-judge' panel stance. decision, Singleton on the first disregard court cannot or overrule Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 circuit See United States precedent. banc, Cir.1998), hearing on en vacated Foster, 1228, 1229 Cir. (10th Cir.1999) I). (Singleton 1997). Therefore, argument Jackson’s made her motion after this court va She point *17 on this must fail. I, Singleton we cated but before issued our Singleton in II. opinion en banc The dis 2. Re- Proposed Jury The Instruction rejected argu trict court Ms. Jackson’s garding the Controlled Quantity the of ment, refusing rely I. upon Singleton to Substance Although recognizes Single Ms. Jackson the court argues Ms. Jackson also vacated, I was she contends it retains ton by allowing jury erred the to deter not vitality reading some based on her of our to mine the amount of crack attributable in II. opinion Singleton authority her. offers no to Ms. Jackson I, jury, Singleton rath In panel her contention that the the concluded the court, testimony er than the should make of a codefendant was introduced sentencing 201(c)(2), § reject this Ms. in violation of 18 U.S.C. which determination. We Jack argument. provides: son’s This has determination clearly sentencing

been the court. left-to Whoever— § (setting See USSG forth the rele 1B1.3

vant by may factors which used be our argument, offers or Jackson draws atten- directly indirectly, gives, or any per- to anything following language Singleton of value tion to the of promises testimony son, or because of II: given to affirmation or be

under oath or way permits in no an Our conclusion upon person as witness given such government step beyond agent trial, proceeding, or be- hearing, other the limits his or her office to make an by the any court ... authorized fore to a witness other than one offer tradi- to hear evi- of the laws tionally A sovereign. exercised testimony ... dence or take prosecutor something who offers other normally granted by

than concession in government exchange for testimo- impris- this title or be fined under shall ny longer ego is no the alter of the or years, than two oned for not more sovereign protec- and is divested of the both. government. tive mantle of the 201(c)(2). panel § deter- The permit our decision would improp- fears attorney had violat- prosecuting mined the abuse of prosecutorial er use or authori- 201(c)(2) by promising § ed U.S.C. ty simply have foundation. It is no leniency exchange for his testi- witness then, noteworthy, that defendant’s 1350-51, I, Singleton 144 F.3d at mony. upon the “the premise relies shibboleth concluded the codefend- panel 1358. government is not above the law.” sup- have been testimony ant’s should notion, with we agree While we that to do so was not pressed and failure particular statute simply believe this pan- Id. at 1359-61. The harmless error. government. not exist for the does accordingly reversed the defendant’s el this issue re 165 F.3d at 1302. Because for a new trial. conviction and remanded law, II, however, questions us resolve our quires Singleton Id. at 1361. Greene, 201(c)(2) review is de novo. See Ho v. does sitting en banc held (10th Cir.2000) (“The in an Assis- apply to the United States or not ques a federal statute is a terpretation of Attorney functioning tant United States de tion of law which this court reviews scope official of office. 165 F.3d within the Coleman, novo.”); United States v. the term “whoev- at 1298. We concluded (10th Cir.1993) (the determina apply to the in the statute does er” statute has been violat tion that federal acting when its officials are government interpretation court’s ed based on the scope practices within the of traditional in that statute is language contained n. 2. We Id. at 1302 & sovereign. novo), cert. conclusion we review de legal prosecutor reasoned such cases 1234, 127 ego” sovereign an “alter acting as L.Ed.2d 578 have Congress could not intended sovereign strip representative made it clear Although this court ex- prerogatives without these traditional 201(c)(2) ap II does not Singleton to do so. Id. at plicitly stating its intent attorneys they when ply testimony, leniency exchange offer *18 the addressed whether brib the we have not attempts distinguish Ms. Jackson government ery applies statute when the Singleton by II assert- present case from testimony. for Other pays offered a witness simply was not ing Ms. Bromlow I Singleton the in courts that have addressed payments cash leniency but was offered context an have done so in the of testimony. argument She asserts exchange for her testimony, exchange leniency for testimony is not a traditional offer payment for that, cir have under those argues thus and concluded sovereign, of the and practice cumstances, exist for the statute does not testimony in vio- given Bromlow’s was See, 201(c)(2). e.g., attorneys. Unit government § of her lation 1288 (1st. 183, test, by Lara, Id. This as noted 197 at 1302. 181 F.3d v.

ed States — concurrence, denied, U.S. -, messy conceptually 120 “creates a Cir.1999), cert. — (1999), of the 432, 145 legal regime handling for the case L.Ed.2d 338 U.S. S.Ct. 842, Attorney ‘who offers -, L.Ed.2d 708 errant United States 145 120 S.Ct. (2000); something other than a concession normal- Ramsey, v. 165 F.3d United States ” 986-87, (D.C.Cir.), by government.’ Id. at 980, ly granted cert. de 990 — (Lucero, J., -, 223, concurring) (quoting ma- nied, 145 1307 U.S. 120 S.Ct. 1302). argument (1999); jority v. Ms. Jackson’s United States L.Ed.2d 187 (5th Cir.1998), Haese, 359, squarely messy us into that area brings 162 F.3d 366 1795, denied, 1138, interesting ques-' raises a number of 119 S.Ct. and 526 U.S. tions, (1999); v. as who bears the burden 1022 United States such L.Ed.2d 143 Cir.1998), (6th 414, 418, Ware, proof government 421 to show the committed 161 F.3d 201(c)(2), 1045, 119 § 526 violation 18 U.S.C. rt. U.S. ce (1999); 1348, paying a witness for her testimo- 511 see also whether 143 L.Ed.2d 86, ny may a violation of 18 U.S.C. Bidloff, F.Supp.2d constitute (W.D.N.Y.2000). 201(c)(2) § 93-94, a matter of law. None of our whether out sister circuits has addressed First, we conclude the defen gov testimony by right payment showing prima dant the burden of bears may considered a violation of ernment be facie of a violation of 18 U.S.C. case v. the statute. But see United States 201(c)(2). § suppress, In motions to (D.Mass. Medina, F.Supp.2d 51-52 usually defendant bears the burden of 1999) pay (holding there is no tradition of Madrid, proof. v. See United States testimony, ment of a witness for (10th Cir.) (“The propo F.3d could a violation payment of witnesses be suppress nent of a motion bears facts). 201(c)(2)depending § on the proof.”), cert. de burden urges Although government us nied, Singleton R foreclosed

hold our decision (1994); v. L.Ed.2d 431 United States arguments concerning a violation of 18 Moore, (10th Cir.) all (same), 22 F.3d 201(c)(2) by government § attor- 130 L.Ed.2d ney, Singleton Crocker, R. As (1994); we did so hold United States out, (10th Cir.1975) (“It points Ms. Jackson we held the stat- fun ute not exist for attor- does suppress damental on a motion to they traditionally are neys exercising when must a foundation in for the there be fact sovereign, recognized prerogatives legal Logic pre-trial result. dictates that a leniency specifically they offer in Motion to an Suppress when filed accused testimony. in fact exchange upon 165.F.3d at 1302 does cast the burden attorneys may present necessary n. 2. come movant to facts to sus & Government 201(c)(2) (Quotation § they position.” under the if tain his marks and auspices omitted.)).7 “step beyond the limits of to citations see no reason [their office] defendant, why claiming make offer to a witness other than one a violation of an 201(c)(2), traditionally sovereign.” exercised 18 U.S.C. should not be re- Maestas, affiant, supported by proof.”); 7. See 2 F.3d an offer of Ax also United States selle, 1993) ("We ("The prov 604 F.2d at Cir. believe that burden of proving ing interception 'willfully’ the defendant bears the burden of that the done 2511(l)(a)] legally that a basis asserted as a violation of 18 U.S.C. rested [in sufficient justification party seeking sup pre- on the defendant as the for a search or seizure was evidence.”); textual.”); press no, v. One Hundred For United States v. Villa (10th Cir.) ("The ty-Nine Forty-Two Thousand Four Hundred Currency, Dollars in U.S. initial burden to show that an unlawful sur 43/ioo defendants.”), ("[T]he 1992) burden is on veillance occurred rested on the Cir. *19 falsity the U.S. movants to demonstrate deliberate t. cer by or disregard reckless for truth the 49 L.Ed.2d 1193 the by paid the infor alleged contemplated testimony actions demonstrate the quired to Persico, were not those by prosecution the mant. States v. taken See United by sovereign and normally (2d Cir.1987) the exercised (testimony Thus, the common law. recognized under jury FBI informant was for the paid violation of 18 asserting a defendant evaluate, listing cases and quoting United 201(c)(2) showing § make a must Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310 witness promised the government the Cir.1987) (en banc)), exchange in for the “something of value” 98 L.Ed.2d 762 U.S. by making such a testimony, and that Jones, (1988); United States stepped out of the promise, (6th Cir.1978) (holding 85-86 it is not gov- sovereign i.e., of the the the shoes — necessary testimony to exclude the of an promise something ernment made leading for information to a paid informant normally offered and this action value not contingency fee ar conviction under prose- the role of the inconsistent with was Ms. rangement). Consequently, Jackson Medina, F.Supp.2d at 53 cutor. See has failed to show even debatable viola govern- to the (holding the burden shifts 201(c)(2). § tion of 18 U.S.C. Because we pri- has made a ment after the defendant have Jackson failed to show concluded Ms. of a violation of showing ma facie paid exchange was in for her Ms. Bromlow 201(c)(2)). testimony, we not decide need whether case, there is no present the paying testimony a witness for her at trial indicating Ms. in the record evidence brings prosecutor is an act which the out exchange in for her paid Bromlow was thus sovereign, side of the role of the may have testimony. Although parties 201(c)(2). subject making him or her testify would contemplated Bromlow Ms. note, however, that in order to We do investigation, upon completion of the showing facie of a violation prima make not Ms. Bromlow Ms. Jackson has shown government, bribery statute exchange testimony. her paid in for simply do more than the defendant must paid reveals Ms. Bromlow was The record exchange was not one tradition insist the services and reim investigative for her government, as did ally extended expenses she incurred bursed for the Thus, we con Ms. Jackson in this case.8 investigation prior to connection with the on argument based clude Ms. Jackson’s of a confi Payment trial. for the services affirm all the Singleton II must fail. We a long-established dential informant is rulings in Ms. district court’s orders a violation and cannot constitute practice case. bribery parties even if the Jackson’s of the statute paid authority cerning testimony of the confiden- citing any legal than

8. Rather Bromlow, informant, payment argument Gina and should her that the tial testimony. suppressed infor- cash manpwitness the services of a confidential have her for scope beyond of tradition- statement is insufficient We conclude this merely prosecutorial practice, Ms. Jackson al of the brib- substantiate a claim of violation Furthermore, asserts: reason ery there is no statute. narrowly opinion Singleton II to read payment of a witness in cash and other above, suggests. As discussed as Ms. Jackson practice is not the traditional of the benefits prosecu- bribery apply to statute does not sovereign court, by the as delineated en banc acting ego” they as the "alter tors when are specifically which addressed Moreover, sovereign. criti- Ms. Jackson exchange granting leniency practice sup- for its failure to cizes the district court precepts testimony. Those set forth testimony our press based on Ms. Bromlow’s Singleton opinions only to the both relate However, opinion Singleton II. testimony leniency and do trade off of pending our did for a continuance not move address the trade off of cash for testi- not thus, II, such[,] Singleton did urge en banc decision in Appellant mony. would As arguments before the trial present these application court erred in its that the trial Singleton opinions to the facts con- court. *20 merely per- crack for Appeal cocaine obtain his III. Mr. Jackson’s use, and therefore could not form the sonal following on asserts Mr. Jackson specific intent to commit the crimes.10 1) by denying trial court erred appeal: have argues he the court should on dimin- jury instructions requested his given requested his instruction for Counts included of- capacity and the lesser ished 1, 3, 4 and 9. 2) the evidence simple possession; fense of finding a support was insufficient review of the denial of Our crack had the intent to distribute Jackson jury is as follows: requested instructions with the intent to possessed cocaine and 3) cocaine; and the evi- distribute crack We a court’s decision review district support was insufficient to the addi- dence in- give particular whether or not to a crack cocaine to the grams tion of for an abuse of discretion. struction sentencing guidelines drug calculation of However, conduct a de novo we review amounts. whether, whole, a to determine correctly govern- instructions stated the Capacity/Voluntary In- A. Diminished ing provided jury law and with an toxication Instruction ample understanding of the issues and requested an instruction Mr. Jackson A applicable standards. defendant jury to have allowed the deter- that'would not entitled to an instruction which lacks specific mine he lacked the intent to com- legal reasonable and factual basis. charged mit the crimes with which he was Beers, 1297, 1300 United States F.3d if jury found Mr. Jackson was under (10th Cir.1999) cita (quotation marks and the influence of a controlled substance — omitted), U.S. -, tions when he committed the crimes.9 The dis- 146 L.Ed.2d 501 trict court at trial determined evidence have “A criminal also said: defendant instruction, did not warrant denied theory is entitled to a of defense instruc request. Mr. Jackson’s Mr. Jackson as- legally justified supported tion that is sup- serts the evidence adduced at trial jury sufficient evidence for a to find in ported capacity the diminished instruction defendant’s favor. We review de novo addict, because it showed he was a crack whether a district committed revers under the influence of crack cocaine at the crimes, failing requested ible error in submit time he committed these and he theory of defense instruction.” was so driven his need to feed his habit Bindley, he was unable to impulse resist (citations Cir.1998) omitted), through crack de obtain whatever means nied, him. available to Mr. Jackson contends he (1999). Thus,

was involved in the crack distribution of L.Ed.2d 87 Mr. Jackson was requested following only 9. Mr. instruc- 10. The case Mr. Jackson cites in argument tion: Sounding of his is United States v. sides, (10th Cir.1987). may You consider evidence of the defen- 16.) (Apt. Although Soundingsides, Br. at deciding dant's mental condition in wheth- recognized this Court an instruction on di proved beyond er the has may appropriate capacity minished be where Dwight reasonable doubt that Jackson act- the evidence indicates the defendant was so ed with the intent to commit the act incapable charged intoxicated the defendant was in the indictment. forming required by specific Voluntary the mens rea intoxication and use of con- crime, provide trolled substances alone will intent 820 F.2d at we do not find never legal particularly helpful excuse this case for the commission of a to Mr. Jackson’s However, person argument. crime. Soundingsides, the fact that a we determined properly under the influence jury of controlled sub- the court instructed the voluntary stances at the time of the commission of the was not a intoxication defense for may negate specific general degree crime the existence of a intent crimes of second voluntary manslaughter. intent. murder and

1291 crime capaci general to the diminished a intent is one which an only entitled if the ty/voluntary voluntarily intoxication instruction act and was done intentional- theory the facts in supported law his and ly, not because of and mistake or acci- jury to find sufficient a short, evidence were In specific dent. a intent crime is See United States Mr. Jackson’s favor. only one in which the defendant acts (10th Martinez, 1424, 979 F.2d 1432 v. knowledge doing, with of what he is but denied, 1022, Cir.1992), 507 509 cert. U.S. objective does so with the of completing 3019, 913, 1824, 113 S.Ct. 113 S.Ct. U.S. some unlawful act. (1993). 454, L.Ed.2d 708 123 L.Ed.2d 125 Blair, 639, United v. 54 States F.3d 642 issues, examining keep In these we (10th Cir.) marks, (quotation citations and capacity mind test for diminished “[t]he omitted), parenthetical information cert. ... whether the defendant had defense denied, 883, 220, 516 U.S. 116 133 S.Ct. capacity specific the mental form (1995). Thus, L.Ed.2d in “specific 151 at to commit the crime issue.” intent “unique tent” refers to the state of mind Vazquez-Pulido, v. 155 F.3d United States beyond any mental required state with (10th denied, 1213, Cir.), 525 1218 n. 8 cert. respect to the actus reus of the crime.” 978, 437, 142 L.Ed.2d U.S. Rodriguez, Admissibility Vivian M. (1998). of Crimes, Wrongs or Acts Under the Other 1 and 9 Counts Intent Provision Rule Federal Evi guilty spe A defendant is not of a k0h(b): The Weighing dence Incremen voluntary offense if intoxication intent cific Prejudice, Probity tal and 48 U. Unfair forming the prevented the defendant from (1993).11 Miami L.Rev. required rea for that crime. specific mens begin analysis by our fo Sands, 968 F.2d See United (10th cusing on and 9 because the Counts Cir.1992), charged “specif crimes in these counts are L.Ed.2d 139 1242; (1993); charged ic intent crimes.” Soundingsides, Count 820 F.2d “knowingly intentionally pos and Boyles, also United States v. see (7th Cir.1995); quanti intent sessed] United States with to distribute (crack), Echeverry, ty Cir. of cocaine base a schedule II 1985). ... controlled substance violation of Code, Title United States Section

A intent crime is one in which an specific 841(a)(1) Code, States and Title voluntarily pur- act was committed and [aiding abetting].” Posses to do Section and posely specific with the intent contrast, specific with to distribute is a something the law forbids. sion intent (footnotes specific intent Id. at 460-61 and citations omit- 11. The distinction between Comment, ted). general fully Layton, crimes and intent crimes is more See Chad J. No explained Closing as follows: Door on the Volun- More Excuses: Defense, tary J. Marshall Intoxication requires proof specific Where a crime (1997) (noting L.Rev. the distinc- 553-54 intent, prosecution prove must that the general specific and tion between intent in- (or knowingly failed to accused commit) committed by crimes was created the common law tent act, purposely intend- an unlawful specifically with the- mens courts to contend Court, Burger ing to violate the law. The by problem criminal rea created intoxicated attempt defining in an to set a standard for actors, defining general intent crimes as crimes, intent element of stated that "those crimes where the definition describes sense, corresponds general ‘purpose’ "[i]n particular referring act without to an intent loosely concept with the common-law consequence” spe- intent, and a to achieve a further ‘knowledge’ specific while corre- requiring than a intent crime as "more loosely concept general cific sponds with the perform an The actor mere intention to act. view intent.” Consistent is that a with mind intend- charge knowingly intentionally must have an additional state of or com- ing consequences his alleged that further result from mitting acts does not unlawful omitted.)). (Footnotes and specific intent crime. act.” citations create of the offense the commission gov both “requires it crime because intent aiding abetting defendants and the to establish someone ernment with the drug defendant.”), knowingly possessed it.” to distribute intent specific 2306, 141 L.Ed.2d 165 Wood, abetting is a aiding crime of *22 Reece, v. Cir.1995). also States See United it requires crime because intent specific Cir.1996). (10th 994, Mr. 996 F.3d 86 willfully by participat to act the defendant aiding an charged under also was the requires and also ing the venture theory in Count 9. “Whoever abetting and specific the intent to defendant to have commands, counsels, abets, in aids, ... or through his make the venture succeed a [of commission [the] procures or duces Therefore, voluntary intoxi her acts. principal.” as a 18 punishable is crime] aiding an defense for potential cation is a 2(a). and guilty aiding § “To be U.S.C. v. abetting charge. See United States and crime, the abetting the commission Cir.1998) (7th Nacotee, 1073, 1076 159 F.3d himself willfully associate must defendant abetting aiding and (holding the crime seek and to the criminal with venture to aid in the specific “the intent requires through some succeed the venture make doing of the crime whatever commission States v. his own.” United action of its to facilitate commis defendant] did [the Anderson, 1201, 1207 Cir. 189 F.3d therefore, “vol and the defendant’s sion” Smith, v. 1999). also States See United intoxication, negate if to untary sufficient (“To (10th Cir.1997) 737, be 742 133 F.3d abet, aid and required to would the intent under abettor 18 as an aider and liable defense.”); with a defendant] provide [the 2, must establish the evidence U.S.C. Sayetsitty, v. F.3d United States 107 a crimi himself with associated defendant (9th Cir.1997) aiding (holding because 1412 venture; in the venture as participated nal specif an element of abetting requires and about; bring wished to something he intent, refusing to by the erred ic to make the venture by his sought actions instruction).12 voluntary intoxication succeed; give a the must establish and evidence offense; (4) assisting participating and or explicitly an Although has not stat this circuit (Quota abetting aiding and to be a of the offense.” in the commission ed we consider denied, crime, omitted.)), specific intent United Ha cert. and citations tion marks L,Ed.2d (10th Cir.1997), tatley, U.S.-, we indi 130 F.3d 1399 - by majority the rule approval of cated our (1999); Pipola, v. F.3d United States 69 556, process rights due concluding the defendant's (2d Cir.) (stating that under allowing by the court the were not violated 2(a), government ... ”[t]he must abetting drop aiding government to an and by prove underlying crime was committed the by that charge. Id. at 1404-05. reasoned the that someone other than defendant and proceed against allowing government to the either acted or to the defendant himself failed only principal on the theo the defendant advancing specific act with the intent manslaughter voluntary and second ries of degree underlying To of the crime. commission murder, expert testimony on the de prosecution must specific show intent voluntary dur state of intoxication fendant’s proposed prove knew of the the defendant ing was rendered irrelevant be the crimes suspicion might occur is not that it crime— enough general are intent crimes for cause these furthering it.” an interest in had —-and voluntary is not a defense. which intoxication omitted.)), (Citations aiding Other circuits consider Id. at 1405. (1996); 136 L.Ed.2d specific abetting intent crime. to be and Head, v. 927 F.2d United States Garth, See, e.g. States United Cir.) ("We agree that it be must Cir.1999) ("Thus, (3d liability aiding act appellant acted or failed to shown that abetting in the else commission someone specific intent to facilitate the com with the specific requires intent of facili of a crime another.”), of a Wilson, mission crime crime.”); tating United States v. 116 L.Ed.2d (D.C.Cir.1998) ("Aiding Eagle, But see States Roan abetting requires (8th Cir.) (indicating aiding (1) prove: specific to facilitate intent another; (2) abetting specific intent crime is not guilty of a commission crime only required (3) committing because defendant knowledge other charged Mr. Jackson agreed Count to show Mr. Jackson to facilitate conspiring possess with “to with intent to distribution of the crack cocaine with coconspirators. his id. [conspiring] distribute and distribute co See order to prove (crack), a II Mr. Jackson committed conspiracy caine base Schedule controlled substance, possess with intent to distribute a in violation of Title substance, 841(a)(1).” Code, prosecution controlled need- Section All con prove ed to specific Jackson had the spiracy specific crimes are intent crimes. intent to further Blair, coconspirator’s pos- his specific 54 F.3d at 642. “The See session the crack with intent to distrib- required conspiracy intent for the crime of ute. id. at 1441 (holding pos- because is in fact the intent to or further advance Cf. session with intent to distribute was the object conspiracy.” the unlawful of the Id. object alleged unlawful omitted). conspiracy, (quotation marks and citations’ *23 the defendant be could deemed to have Thus, conspiracy to distribute a controlled possessed the controlled substance conspiracy possess substance and to with through coconspirator’s possession). his intent to a controlled distribute substance specific are intent crimes. See United The record contains evidence that Merriweather, States v. 1078 Mr. habitually Jackson used crack cocaine. (6th Cir.1996) (holding conspiracy to dis Thus, may he have been the influ under a specific tribute controlled substance is a drugs during ence of certain transactions. crime). intent However, we agree with the district court that the evidence did not guilty conspiracy To find defendant of a finding 841(a)(1) §§ in Mr. Jackson was specif violation of U.S.C. and unable to form the find, ic mental jury beyond required by the must rea- state the crimes (1) doubt, charged in 1 and agreement sonable an with Counts 9. As the district (2) noted, law, witnesses person another to violate the the who testified objectives concerning participation Mr. Jackson’s in knowledge of the essential (3) conspiracy the described his conspiracy, knowing and volun- (4) involvement, tary interdepen- and dealing in speaking and terms of among alleged conspirators. dence amounts, money payments, traveling to source, facilitating and from to the Carter, cocaine, purchase arranging or sale (10th Cir.1997), denied, cert. U.S. transportation, for his own rides 140 L.Ed.2d 1104 S.Ct. tending to the details of the transac (1998). “The essence of the crime con tions, in single not a instance ... spiracy agreement is an to commit an un any appearance any was there dimin Peveto, lawful act.” United capacity things ished to do those which (10th Cir.) (quotation marks about and saw him do. we heard omitted), and citation (1989). 107 L.Ed.2d 336 court was to Mr. able observe Jack- jury permissible during “It is for the to infer an son’s demeanor some of these agreement constituting conspiracy tapes from transactions on the video taken from parties tapes the acts of the and other circum FBI undercover car. While court, indicating they part ac not a played stantial evidence concert of were are accomplishment appeal. tion for the of a common the record on we defer to Carter, purpose.” (quo interpretation court’s of Mr. 130 F.3d at 1439 district omitted). Thus, lucidity during tation marks and citation Jackson’s demeanor Furthermore, al- prove conspired in order to Mr. to these transactions. Jackson crack, admitted though distribute the had some of the codefendants underlying share the intent of the offense and required specific is not to have the intent to 104 L.Ed.2d 199 crime), aid and abet the commission of the 3 and 2. Counts crack cocaine to addicted

they been had effects concerning the and testified contends the dis Mr. Jackson processes, mental their give on by failing crack cocaine erred trict court Mr. Jack for Counts testimony indicated instruction capacity diminished none of 4, Mr. Jackson 3 and Counts specific intent 3 and form the was unable son crack co distributing charged with was crack intent to distribute possess with 841(a)(1). § 21of caine in violation of the distribution cocaine, in the to aid 841(a)(1) shall be provides: “[I]t 21 USC Ms. Jackson crack, to assist agree or to knomngly or in any person unlawful it is drugs. While the distribution distribute, manufacture, ... tentionally heavy user was clear to man intent possess or with dispense, or conspiracies during the crack cocaine distribute, a con ufacture, dispense, or likely highly and it is charged Count added.) (Emphasis substance.” trolled co influence of crack was under he above, of a controlled possession As noted un of the transactions during some caine distribute it the intent to with substance 9, none of in Count charges derlying 841(a)(1) specific 21 USC under men Mr. Jackson’s witnesses testified mens of two requiring proof crime intent he was impaired that so capacity tal 1) pos intent to knowledge or rea: either *24 assist agree to Jackson unable to 2) sess; distribute. the to and intent to was unable or criminal endeavors her However, simple distribution charge a Mr. transactions. While facilitate the prove to only requires par intentionally to dis motivated or may knowingly have been Jackson defendant See substance. the controlled to distribute tributed conspiracy in the ticipate (“ Torres, essential ‘[T]he at 1135 53 F.3d for to crack in order obtain crack cocaine case of distribu of a facie prima elements to of his addiction because personal his use (1) are: substance tion of a controlled a cocaine, Mr. status crack Jackson’s (2) distribution; intentional; or knowing his put is not sufficient drug addict (3) (Quoting a controlled substance.’” at issue. See capacity mental Santistevan, 250, 39 F.3d v. States 960, F.2d Coffman, 567 Cir.1994).). also United See Cir.1977) (“[A]n reasoned element 1420, Johnson, 130 F.3d States knowingly an addict yet when choice exists (10th Cir.1997), using acquiring in and law violates the 142 L.Ed.2d offending for is. not excused drugs. One Therefore, possession charge unlike a very, very he wanted simply because distribute, charge of sim with intent to States, (Quoting Bailey v. United badly.”) intent crime. general is a ple distribution (5th Cir.1967), 386 F.2d Manganellis, See United L.Ed.2d (7th Cir.1988). Volun F.2d 533-39 (1968).). evi Because there was no a defense to tary intoxication is not ca Mr. Jackson’s mental suggesting dence Hatatley, general intent crime. See voluntary impaired his pacity was so Sands, (citing at 1405 that was un cocaine he ingestion of crack 1064)). Therefore, proposed instruc necessary specific intent able to form the to the crimes inapplicable tion was Counts charge crimes in to commit the court did not err and the district charged, did the district court jury and we conclude on dimin declining to instruct the voluntary intoxi proffered due to by declining give capacity not err ished and 4.13 for Counts 3 cation instruction. princi- abetted the he had aided or if it found

13. also asserts the diminished Mr. Jackson For the perpetration the crimes. pal given capacity have been instruction should above, argu- reject this we set forth it reasons jury for Count instructed because guilty on counts ment. could find those Included Offense Instruction a controlled 3. Lesser substance includes at least one element, possession, required proof Mr. Jackson next contends the distribution, conspiracy or the offenses by failing court erred to instruct district charged Counts jury simple possession of a con (21 844) trolled substance was a We first address the govern charges

lesser included offense of argument ment’s that an instruction on In Counts 3 and 4. order a defendant simple possession would have been incor to be entitled to a lesser included offense rect instruction, because it is not a lesser included present: four factors must be offense of conspiracy possess (1) (2) with intent proper request; there was a to distribute possession or the offense of lesser included offense includes some with intent to A distribute.16 criminal de but not all of the elements of the offense (3) fendant is entitled to an instruction on a charged; differentiating the elements (4) lesser purported included offense if the dispute; the two offenses are in jury rationally lesser included offense is “an could convict the defen offense nec essarily acquit dant the lesser offense and him included in the charged.” offense 31(c). greater offense. Fed.R.Crim.P. Interpreting language, Supreme Court has set forth Moore, United States v. an “elements” test to determine whether (10th Cir.1997). denying Mr. Jackson’s “necessarily an offense is included” an 1, 3, request for the instruction on Counts test, other. Under the elements “one of the district court focused on the fense is not ‘necessarily included’ in anoth final element described in Moore and con- er unless the elements of the lesser offense cluded evidence could not are subset of the elements of charged determination that guilty Mr. Jackson was *25 possession, of mere offense. Where the lesser guilty but not of distri- offense re quires bution of crack cocaine.14 an element required not for the greater offense, no instruction is to be appeal, Mr. On Jackson contends the 31(c).” given under Rule Schmuck v. evidence was sufficient to a find- States, 705, 716, United 489 U.S. ing only guilty simple pos- that he was (1989). 103 L.Ed.2d 734 to session, § of 21 violation U.S.C. 844.15 determine whether an offense is a lesser argues Mr. Jackson the evidence of his charged, included offense of the crime addiction to crack cocaine could have led compare we particular elements of the jury reasonably to in- infer he lacked crimes to if the see asserted lesser offense tent to distribute the crack because his charged. is a subset of the crime only motivation was to for obtain crack his personal government use. The contends 1 charged Count Mr. Jackson correctly

the district court determined the conspiracy possess with to with intent to evidence was not sufficient to warrant the instruction. distribute and to distribute crack cocaine. government The further as- Horn, serts the instruction United States v. was not warranted 738 (10th Cir.1991), applied because the second factor we set forth under elements present. Moore was not simple test outlined Schmuck and held argues simple possession the offense of of possession is not a lesser included offense gave 16.Although specifi 14. The district court a lesser included the district court did not 9, possession issue, instruction on Count with intent cally may this we address affirm to distribute. any sup district court’s decision on basis record, ported by upon even if not relied provides pertinent part: § 15. 21 U.S.C. 844 by the district court. United States v. Win any person knowing- "It be shall unlawful for ningham, 140 F.3d Cir. ly intentionally possess or to a controlled sub- 1998). stance.” it. haveWe intent to distribute sub- with the a controlled possess conspiracy is a simple possession held previously con- or of to distribute with intent stance of a possession offense included lesser sub- a controlled to distribute spiracy intent substance with controlled reached at 744. We Id. stance. 841(a)(1). § 21 U.S.C. under distribute of a con- possession because conclusion Lacey, 86 F.3d See an element includes substance trolled (10th Cir.), offenses— conspiracy by these required (1996). L.Ed.2d . at 744^15. Id. possession. element simple However, follow that it does not way, possible it is another “Stated offense of included possession is a lesser offenses these drug conspire to commit 841(a)(1). § under U.S.C. distribution to dis- with intent possession [possession, (other than means “to deliver Distribution actually without distribution] tribute dispensing) a con- administering or themselves; offenses committing a listed chemical.” or (cid:127) substance trolled thus, to commit impossible it is not 802(11). “deliver” § The term 21 .U.S.C. com- without (conspiracy) greater offense constructive, actual, or “the defined offenses.” suggested lesser mitting the sub- a controlled attempted transfer Therefore, we conclude Id. at 745. chemical, or whether a listed or stance refusing to err did not district relationship.” agency exists an not there instruction simple possession give the added). 802(8) Al- § (emphasis 21 U.S.C. to Count regards with actual may involve the though distribution applicability to the turn nowWe of a controlled possession or constructive instruction to included the lesser substance, the term courts have construed charged 3 and and 4. Counts Counts “include other broadly to “distribution” “knowingly inten with of a in furtherance perpetrated acts quantity of co distributing] tionally sale, arranging or su or such as transfer (crack), II con a Schedule base caine delivery, negotiating pervising or substance,” in violation trolled receiving price.” United purchase or earlier, 841(a)(1). As stated U.S.C. Brunty, States 841(a)(1) shall be provides: “[I]t cases), Cir.) (collecting knowingly or in any person unlawful 155, 78 L.Ed.2d distribute, manufacture, or tentionally Se See *26 manu with intent to possess dispense, (1st or 1313, 1317 Cir. 102 F.3d pulveda, distribute, a con facture, dispense, or 1996); Pungitore, 910 States v. added.) (Emphasis (defen (3d Cir.1990) trolled substance.” 1084, F.2d 1133-34 21 clear, reading of plain It is from arrange authorizes another dant who 841(a)(1), Congress intend distribution), cert. guilty is drug deal separate 2010, crimes with 915, create denied, ed to several 114 S.Ct. 500 U.S. 111 States v. Go See United (1991); in the statute. States v. L.Ed.2d 98 (3d Cir.), 210, mez, Cir.) (4th 213 & n. 5 Crockett, 1310, 593 F.2d 1316 813 F.2d 2172, 948, denied, (“distribution! 99 physical cert. U.S. S.Ct. requires 441 either ] (1979). See also United 60 L.Ed.2d acts fur drug 1052 or other transfer (4th Randall, 195, denied, transfer.”), 171 F.3d 206 v. cert. therance of the Cir.1999) (“ 112, 834, 98 L.Ed.2d 71 possession ‘Distribution 108 484 U.S. S.Ct. separate (1987); are 505 Oquendo, two with intent to distribute United States Cir.1975) (5th offenses, separate 1307, two n. 1 trafficking F.2d 1310 & (where ”) v. Wil the defendant convicted (Quoting crimes.’ United States was Cir.1994).). (7th never although he heroin distribution loughby, F.3d sale, 841(a)(1) arranged the Therefore, drugs, but prohibits the distri touched accepted negotiations, and as in the as well assisted bution of a controlled substance “partner,” of his payment on behalf substance possession of a controlled “the drugs.”); Stevens, the court noted definition of ‘distrib United States v. d

ute’ contained in the statute is (6th broad Cir.1975) (“[T]he 337 n. 2 F.2 to include acts that- enough traditionally charge distribution can conceivably be perhaps would have been defined as mere proved proof without of possession.”). aiding abetting.”). may it Although Therefore, simple possession is not a less unusual for person be to distribute er included offense of distribution under controlled substance without at least mo the “elements test” outlined in Schmuck. mentarily possessing controlled sub Randall, See 171 F.3d at (“possession stance, impossible. it is not See United with intent to requires distribute an ele Gore, (2d States v. 154 F.3d Cir. ment that is necessarily not an element of 1998) (noting other circuits have held possession.”); United States distribution — “proof necessarily of distribution does not (1st Cir.1989) Tejada, 886 F.2d possession” include the element of and a (holding possession with intent to distrib charge “distribution can conceivably be ute was not a lesser included offense of proved proof possession” without (quo distribution because distribution does omitted)); tation marks and citations Se necessarily include the element of posses (in pulveda, 102 discussing F.3d sion); Barrientos, United States v. whether the offense of simple possession (7th Cir.1985) F.2d (©holding distribution, merges with offense of possession is not a necessary element of “It possible stated: un —albeit distribution), usual—to guilty be of distribution of a (1986).17 88 L.Ed.2d 785 drug without possessing it with in Consequently, the district court did not tent to distribute. partici Someone who err denying pates drug e.g., request Jackson’s as' a broker transfer — or armed guard be the lesser liable for distri included instruction for distri —can bution without ever possessing bution Counts 3 and 4.18 Burns, opinion United States v. grounds. the thermore, rested on other Fur 17. (10th Cir.), we did not address whether the el (1980), appel 66 L.Ed.2d 219 “possession” ement of necessarily was in charged lants were with distribution as well cluded within the offense of "distribution.” possession Therefore, with intent to distribute. Id. at we language do not consider the However, jury only given was an binding precedent contained in Bums to be possession instruction on with intent to dis Finally, in this Eighth circuit. we note the Although jury tribute. Id. given simple possession Circuit held has is a lesser indictment, explicitly entire the court did not included offense of distribution. See United jury disregard instruct the the distribution Campbell, 762 n. 3 charge. 1981); Id. We Howard, concluded this was not re Cir. United States v. jury prop versible error because the 1974). However, received 561 n. Cir. possession er instructions on with intent appears minority position. to be the However, charge. Id. we went on to con reasoning find the of the circuits in the cases clude the trial court did not commit revers persuasive. cited above to be more by failing jury ible error to instruct *27 disregard charge Having the distribution because determined district court did 18. possession by refusing is lesser included give offense of dis not err the lesser included (citing Id. tribution. at 105 simple possession United States v. instruction because anot , Klugman, 506 F.2d charges Cir. lesser included offense of the 1974)). stated, "Because the offense of Counts 3 and we note district court 'knowingly 'distribution' must occur or inten determining did not abuse its discretion (21 841(a)), tionally’ 'possession jury the evidence would not allow a rational with intent to distribute' simple possession, is also a lesser in to convict Mr. Jackson of acquit original cluded offense of ac charges. distribution. but him the See finding ("The analysis, Hatatley, cordance with our earlier judge 130 F.3d at 1403 trial guilt necessarily to distribution estab refusing does not abuse [its] discretion jury’s appellants lishes the pos belief that instruct on a lesser offense included when the sessed the provides cocaine with an intent to distribute.” evidence before no rational basis [it] ns, However, upon Bur 624 F.2d at jury 105. which could find the defendant language offense.”). holding this guilty was dicta in that the of the lesser The evidence Sufficiency Mr. Jackson also contends the evi B. of the Evidence dence was insufficient to establish he was a Mr. Jackson also asserts the evidencE single conspiracy. sup member of a port presented sup- at trial was insufficient to argument, of his Mr. Jackson relies port making argu- his convictions. In opon McIntyre, United States v. 836 F.2d ment, high Mr. Jackson faces a hurdle: (10th Cir.1987), where we stated: reviewing sufficiency [Tin of the evi- finding single conspiracy, To make a of a jury verdict, dence to thit jury beyond must be convinced court must review the record cle novc alleged reasonable doubt that the cocon- only whether, taking and ask the evi- spirators possessed common, illicit dence-both direct and circumstantial. goal. satisfy objective To this common together with the reasonable inferencet test . . . the essential element of interde- light to be drawn therefrom-in pendence alleged must be met-each co- government, most favorable to the a rea- conspirator depend must on the success- jury sonable could find the defendant operation ful of each link in the chain to guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. goal. impor- achieve the common The Voss, United States v. 82 F.3d 1524- question drug tant in a transaction is (10th Cir.) (quotation separate marks and cita whether the transactions con- omitted), integral steps tions stituted essential and to- (1996), common, 136 L.Ed.2d 158 ward the realization of a illicit examining record, goal. After we conclude support Mr, the evidence was sufficient to (quotation marks, brackets, ~d. at 471 1, 3, Jackson's convictions on Counts omitted). and citation Mr. Jackson con and 9. government prove tends the failed to 1, conspiracy pos interdependence As to Count Blement of because the conspira op- sess with intent to distribute and evidence did not show Ms. Jackson's cy (crack), 3ration would have failed without his as- to distribute cocaine base iii However, violation of 21 U.S.C. the evidence 3istance. did agreed prove indicated Mr. Jackson with Ms. riot need to Mr. Jackson was an in law, dispensable conspiracy. Jackson to violate the knew the essen link in the only required objectives conspiracy, ~overnmentwas to demon- tial was volun tarily conspirators upon involved in the distribution of the 3trate the relied one cocaine, performed another to achieve a shared criminal oh- crack tasks for Ms. ective, conspiracy. their actions were "interconnected Jackson in furtherance of the Carter, way," See 130 F.3d at 1439. As dis n some and Mr. Jackson facilitated ;he above, venture as a whole or furthered the cussed Mr. Jackson's status as a alleged conspira prevent mdeavors of the other crack addict did not him from Evans, forming tors. United States v. the intent to commit these crimeE (10th Cir.1992), and did not excuse his acts. Furthermore 670-71 the evidence indicated Mr. Jackson war 122 L.Ed.2d buyer-he See also United States v. more than a mere was intimate Slater, (10th Cir.1992). ly aspects involved in various of the distri Fiere, bution of the crack cocaine. the evidence showed Ms. Jackson negotia- aiding abetting Although showed Mr. Jackson facilitated the the Jackson did not statute. by acting directly aiding *28 tions Jackson. Mr.Jackson's motivated as a "middle man" for Ms. address the argument abettingcharge that he was and also concludethe instruction was not neces- containedin Count we only by a desire to obtain craclc personal inapposite. sary simplepossession cocaine for Coffman, use is Se~ because is also not a addition, 567F.2d at 963. In Count aiding abetting lesser includedoffenseof the distributionof crack cocaine. and charged distributing Mr. Jackson with 2,§ crack cocaine in violation of 18 U.S.C. n depended upon perform Mr. Jackson to cocaine with the intent to distribute on 10,1998.19 in drug various roles distribution con February runner, spiracy acting such as Slater, rejected we argu- same guard. middleman and a These im were by ment Mr. raised pointed Jackson and portant steps toward the realization of out one goal the common of crack cocaine distri “may ‘abet’ the crime of possession with Fox, bution. See United States intent by to distribute procuring the cus- (10th Cir.) (holding 1514-16 tomers and maintaining the market in government proved interdependence possession which the is profitable, even where the defendant traveled with a co- though you do nothing else to help the conspirator purchase to cocaine from possessor get or possession. retain supplier, their buy contributed funds to Middlemen aid and abet the offense of wholesale, cocaine and attended a meet possession with intent to distribute.” ing where the distribution scheme was 971 F.2d at 632 (quoting approval discussed and the with defendant offered to Wesson, cocaine), United States v. purchase large amount of (7th Cir.1989)). Furthermore, if we were to hold one cannot L.Ed.2d 161 be convicted of aiding the element of abetting possession and interdependence sufficiently of controlled estab substance with the intent to lished. distribute proving without possession, this would be As to 9 (possession Count with holding tantamount to one cannot be con distribute), intent to Mr. Jackson contends aiding victed of and abetting without com the evidence was to support insufficient his mitting the principal offense. Such a re conviction because the failed d sult woul dismantle the crime of aiding possessed establish he crack cocaine on abetting. and at Id. 632-33. The evi 10, 1998, February charged date in the dence showed Mr. Jackson assisted Ms. However, indictment. he was charged in By Jackson her undertaking. giving an aiding abetting under theory purposeful endeavor, support to that Mr. Count 9. “[A]cts committed furtherance Jackson violated 18 2. Conse of the commission of a crime another ” quently, Mr. argument Jackson’s concern Slater, ‘abetting.’ constitute 971 F.2d at ing sufficiency sup the evidence to (citation omitted). “Participation port jury’s finding on Count 9 fails. may the criminal venture be established circumstantial evidence and the argument level of Mr. concerning Jackson’s participation may ‘relatively slight sufficiency be of of the evidence to support his ” moment.’ United v. Leos-Quija conviction of distribution of a controlled da, (10th Cir.1997). (Counts 4), repetition substance 3 and is a conclude the evidence was sufficient to of his that drug assertion his status as a aiding convict Mr. Jackson of abetting negated addict the mens rea for the possession Ms.' Jackson her of crack knowing and intentional distribu- crime— February date 1998 was the Ms. Jack- low testified Mr. Jackson told her he was returning son. was arrested when from her "holding down fort” Ms. Jackson's resi- supplier with crack cocaine. The evidence acquire dence while Ms. went to 10, 1998, February established that on Mr. supplier. way crack from her back On by attempting Jackson assisted Ms. Jackson supplier, from her Ms. Jackson was arrested arrange a sale of one ounce of crack to Ms. searched, but was released the offi- when Bromlow. Ms. Because Jackson did not have cers failed to discover the crack cocaine hand, quantity of crack cocaine on where she had hidden it. After Ms. Jackson Jackson maintained contact with Brom- crack, returned with the Mr. Jackson tried to they low and assured her would soon have the convince Bromlow to return to Ms. Jack- Ms.. drugs, and go asked Ms. Bromlow not buy son’s residence' to the ounce of cocaine. competitors their for the crack. Ms. Brom- *29 1300 the punishment, appropriate the mining above, reject this we discussed As

tion.20 reliable may consider sentencing court suffi- was the evidence hold and argument Roach, at 576. The F.2d hearsay. 978 committed Mr. Jackson to establish cient drug of upon estimates may rely also court of distribution intentional knowing the information are based on they “if quantity cocaine. crack ” reliability.’ indicia of a ‘minimum that has Shewmaker, 936 F.2d Sentencing v. States C. United Cir.1991) (10th (quoting United 1130 finally contends Mr. Jackson (10th 1210, 1214 Davis, 912 F.2d v. States the erroneously included court district the omitted), (further cert. Cir.1990)) citations ob allegedly of crack cocaine grams 224 116 112 denied, 502 U.S. Oklahoma, Lawton, during trips to tained (1992). Mr. Jackson Because 788 L.Ed.2d of his calculation the with Ms. Jackson court was conspiracy, the of was convicted the dis review sentence.21 guidelines only on not its sentence to base allowed quantities drug of calculation court’s trict handled, personally he of crack amount the clear sentencing for of purpose the “any to consider was also allowed but Vaziri, F.3d v. error. reasonably foresaw or he which amounts Cir.1999). (10th re will “[We] 556, 568 scope particular of his the which fell within finding court’s the only if district verse Vaziri, conspirators.” the with agreement record the factual was without and cita (quotation at 568 marks F.3d firm definite the left with or we are omitted). tion made.” has been a mistake conviction Roach, F.2d v. hearing, Agent sentencing United States At the Cir.1992). bears (10th The fre the regarding both testified Manns necessary establishing the took to trips Mr. Jackson burden quency hearing by sentencing at with Jackson and factors cocaine Ms. crack obtain they procured of the evidence. preponderance cocaine amount crack 1177, 1182 n. Beaulieu, sup F.2d they Ms. Jackson’s time visited each (10th Cir.), testimony was based Agent Manns’ plier. L.Ed.2d and Mr. of Ms. Warren on the statements com need not sentencing Manns interviewed Ms. Agent Nunn. The evidence John crack co Rules Evidence. times about the Federal several ply with Warren Jimenez, Agent operation. distribution caine United States to be found Ms. Warren Cir.), testified he Manns (1991); Ms. remembered L.Ed.2d The truthful. trials and 1101(d)(3). require testimony previous only Warren’s Fed.R.Evid. Manns’ Agent hearings with upon agreed relied ment is information credibility. of Ms. Warren’s indicia sufficient assessment sentencing court “has Manns that Mr. Agent Warren told Cody, reliability.” United States to ob- Cir.1993). accompanied Ms. Jackson Thus, in deter- Jackson 1523, 1527 did twenty years. he brief, Jackson admits Mr. Count includes Mr. Jackson In his 20. object the 21 U.S.C. 851 enhancement maintaining place the distribution substances, argument con- felony. prior in his Mr. was on controlled cerning based ultimately on sufficiency of the evidence guidelines under sentenced acquitted Counts 3 and 4. Mr. Jackson (twenty-one years and ten months regard his inclusion of and we Count count months). guidelines sentence is When concerning the dis- argument his under sentence, statutory than minimum greater typographical er- a mere counts as tribution imposed. See guidelines sentence ror. 5Gl.l(b). variety of rea- for a USSG sons, argu- we do not address Jackson’s argues, apparently for the Mr. Jackson also statutory sen- concerning minimum ment attributing the full appeal, that first on time tence. result- him grams crack cocaine to statutory higher minimum sentence— ed in *30 . supplier tain crack from her four least be dicta I write separately only to em times during relevant time frame. phasize that the question of cash payment Agent Manns also interviewed Mr. Nunn by government for testimony remains concerning the distribution scheme. Ac- open Singleton. Also, under question Nunn, cording to Mr. Mr. Jackson claimed of who has the burden that show such accompanied have often Ms. Jackson payments are “traditional” remains open. weekly she trip procure when made her Medina, F.Supp.2d supplier. crack cocaine her Agent from (D.Mass.1999). 51-52 in Medina fact Manns testified he believed Mr. Nunn to holds that they are I not. would follow a credible nothing be witness. There is in Medina, including its burden-shifting the record to indicate the statements of government, The mechanism. unlike an these witnesses were unreliable. we person, accused inis a unique position to conclude the by court did not err finding prove its if “tradition” one exists. The responsible for the crack co- always “we have done it way” re caine in trips obtained four to Ms. Jack- sponse to what is a violation of the plain supplier. son’s language of the statute is a confession and avoidance response-in words, other an af testimony The concerning the amount of firmative defense. crack cocaine obtained each of the four

trips conflicting. was Ms. Wiseman told I began. end where I These issues re- Agent Manns the amount of crack cocaine main open, and these any comments and Jackson acquired as a result each suggestion in the opinion' court’s which trip supplier to her varied from one two appear to foreclose them remain dicta. hand, ounces. On other Mr. Nunn told Agent Manns that Mr. Jackson had

claimed Ms. Jackson obtained two ounces crack cocaine each time she went to her addition,

supplier. Agent Manns testi- he

fied was told Ms. by Warren had she

seen in possession Ms. Jackson of two of crack ounces cocaine. Ms. Edmondson MORGANROTH, MORGANROTH & Agent told Manns she saw Ms. Jack- Michigan partnership, Mayer with multiple son Keep- ounces of crack. Morganroth, Plaintiffs-Appellees. ing review, mind our standard of we conclude district court did not err estimating the amount of crack cocaine DeLOREAN, Zachary John Z. T. DeLo attributable to Mr. Jackson. The evidence rean, Kathryn DeLorean, Zachary A. offered was not without Kathryn T. DeLorean as custodian for support. factual The court did not err DeLorean, A. 9:10-11-12, Ecclesiastes concluding Agent Manns’ testimony, al- (formerly Logan INC. known as Man though based on the out of court state- ufacturing Logan Manufacturing or others, ments of reliable. For the Company), Defendants-Appellants. reasons, foregoing affirm all we the district No. 98-4125. rulings court’s Mr. Jackson’s case. Appeals, States Court of judgments district court in Tenth Circuit.

cases 98-6487 99-6090 are AF- FIRMED. June

McKAY, Judge, Circuit concurring: join

I opinion result and its court’s

except for a brief which I consider to part

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Iris Collette Jackson Dwight Dean Jackson
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date Published: Jun 2, 2000
Citation: 213 F.3d 1269
Docket Number: 98-6487, 99-6090
Court Abbreviation: 10th Cir.
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