United States v. Mercado-Flores
872 F.3d 25
| 1st Cir. | 2017Background
- In 2013, Jorge Mercado‑Flores drove a 14‑year‑old to a beach in Puerto Rico and was charged federally; original indictment charged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (10‑year mandatory minimum).
- Mercado‑Flores pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to an information charging 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a) (no mandatory minimum); the district court accepted the plea, sentenced him to 57 months, and entered judgment on May 11, 2015.
- After sentencing, the district court sua sponte questioned whether § 2421(a) applies in Puerto Rico (concluding Puerto Rico is sui generis and not a "Territory or Possession") and, 24 days after sentencing, vacated the sentence and dismissed the case.
- The government re‑indicted under § 2423(a) and timely appealed the district court's post‑judgment vacatur and dismissal; the appeal raises the question whether the district court had jurisdiction to revisit the sentence after judgment.
- The district court acted sua sponte (no motion by defendant to withdraw plea or vacate sentence); the defendant asks to reinstate the vacatur while the government seeks reinstatement of the original sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Mercado‑Flores) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court had jurisdiction to vacate a sentence after judgment and beyond Rule 35(a)'s period | District court lacked jurisdiction to vacate sentence after judgment and after Rule 35(a) 14‑day window expired | Court may reconsider applicability of statute even post‑sentence to correct lack of jurisdiction | Court held district court lacked jurisdiction; vacatur of sentence was improper and sentence reinstated |
| Whether Rule 35(a) authorized the district court’s action | Rule 35(a) is the only plausible corrective rule but its 14‑day limit is jurisdictional and had expired | Court could correct legal error post‑sentencing under Rule 35(a) | Held Rule 35(a) did not apply; 14‑day limit had passed and Rule 35(a) was not meant to allow changing one’s mind |
| Whether other Criminal Rules (11 or 33) authorized setting aside plea or vacating judgment post‑sentence | Rule 11 and Rule 33 do not permit a district court to set aside plea or vacate judgment after sentencing except via defendant motion or collateral proceedings | District court could rely on Rule 11 or 33 to cure statutory‑applicability error | Held neither Rule 11 nor Rule 33 authorized sua sponte post‑judgment vacatur in these circumstances |
| Whether a post‑sentence reservation of a dispositive jurisdictional question is permissible | Finality requires disposition; the court cannot reserve a dispositive merits question while entering final judgment | Court may reserve a question for later decision even after sentencing | Held reservation was a nullity; court cannot sentence while reserving decision on dispositive statutory applicability |
Key Cases Cited
- Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2000) (federal courts generally may not modify a term of imprisonment once imposed)
- United States v. Griffin, 524 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2008) (Rule 35(a) 14‑day limit is jurisdictional)
- United States v. Gonzalez‑Rodriguez, 777 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2015) (failure to act within Rule 35(a) window extinguishes jurisdiction to alter sentence)
- United States v. Vinyard, 539 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 2008) (jeopardy attaches at sentencing; post‑sentence actions can raise double jeopardy concerns)
- Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987) (noting that jeopardy can attach when a defendant is sentenced on a guilty plea)
- In re Ellis, 356 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (district court lacks jurisdiction after sentence to set aside guilty plea outside collateral proceedings)
- United States v. Carrasquillo‑Peñaloza, 826 F.3d 590 (1st Cir. 2016) (statutory‑applicability challenges are nonjurisdictional and can be waived)