United States v. Mendez-Sosa
782 F.3d 1061
9th Cir.2015Background
- Defendant Juan Alberto Mendez-Sosa pleaded guilty to illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326) and was sentenced to 37 months.
- District court applied a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) based on a prior New Jersey conviction for Criminal Sexual Contact (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-3(b)).
- The enhancement hinges on whether the prior offense qualified as a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines and whether the prior act counted as a "conviction" for Guidelines purposes.
- Mendez-Sosa challenged the enhancement on two grounds: (1) he was not "convicted" as defined by applicable law; (2) the New Jersey offense was not a "crime of violence."
- The plea colloquy included an admission that he "touched [the victim's] breasts ... without her consent," which the court used under the modified-categorical approach to identify the statutory alternative of lack of consent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Which law defines "conviction" for the Guidelines enhancement? | Mendez-Sosa: state law (or INA) should govern, so he wasn't "convicted." | Government: a uniform federal definition in Chapter Four of the Guidelines controls. | Held: Chapter Four of the Sentencing Guidelines provides the applicable, uniform federal definition of "conviction." |
| 2. Does the NJ Criminal Sexual Contact conviction qualify as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2? | Mendez-Sosa: the statute is divisible and may include non-forcible alternatives; his offense is not a crime of violence. | Government: applying the modified-categorical approach to plea colloquy shows the conviction was for lack of consent, a "forcible sex offense." | Held: The conviction fits the Guidelines' definition of a "forcible sex offense" (absence of victim consent); the 16-level enhancement was proper. |
Key Cases Cited
- Almanzar-Arenas v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2014) (modified-categorical approach permits using plea colloquy and comparable records to identify the specific statutory alternative of conviction)
- United States v. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2011) (interpretation of sentencing guidelines reviewed de novo; federal uniform definitions preferred over state variance)
- United States v. Cuevas, 75 F.3d 778 (1st Cir. 1996) (Chapter Four definitions govern criminal-history counting for federal sentencing)
- United States v. Pimentel-Flores, 339 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2003) (guideline definitions govern in sentencing when different from statutory definitions)
- United States v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2009) (de novo review of whether prior conviction is a crime of violence under the Guidelines)
- United States v. Gallegos-Galindo, 704 F.3d 1269 (9th Cir. 2013) (a "forcible sex offense" includes any sex offense involving absence of the victim's consent)
- United States v. Ruiz-Apolonio, 657 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 2011) (treats lack-of-consent offenses as forcible sex offenses under Guidelines)
- United States v. Quintero-Junco, 754 F.3d 746 (9th Cir. 2014) (applies modified-categorical approach to divisible state statutes)
