United States v. Melvin Morris
885 F.3d 405
6th Cir.2018Background
- Melvin Morris pled guilty to distribution of cocaine base; plea contemplated 24–30 months but he withdrew plea after district court found he qualified as a career offender.
- Morris had two prior Michigan convictions under M.C.L. § 750.81(2) (domestic assault) that were elevated from misdemeanors to felonies based on prior convictions under M.C.L. § 750.81(5).
- Probation officer and district court treated those convictions as "crimes of violence" under the career-offender provision, USSG § 4B1.1, producing a Guidelines range of 210–262 months; district court varied to 180 months.
- Morris appealed, arguing Michigan § 750.81 does not qualify as a "crime of violence" under USSG § 4B1.2(a).
- The central legal question: whether § 750.81 qualifies under the elements clause (use of "physical force") or the Guidelines’ residual clause (conduct presenting a serious potential risk of physical injury).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether M.C.L. § 750.81(2) is a "crime of violence" under the elements clause (USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1)) | Morris: Michigan battery allows mere offensive touching and thus lacks "physical force" (violent force) required by the elements clause | Government: Castleman supports reading "physical force" to include offensive touching for domestic violence convictions | Held: Not a crime of violence under the elements clause; Michigan battery can be satisfied by offensive touching and lacks "violent force" as defined in Johnson |
| Whether the modified categorical approach could be applied to § 750.81 | Morris: statute is indivisible so modified categorical approach is inappropriate | Government: district court applied modified categorical approach to guilty-plea transcripts | Held: Statute is not divisible; use of modified categorical approach was erroneous (government concedes error) |
| Whether § 750.81(2) is a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines’ residual clause | Morris: residual clause not applicable because elements do not necessarily present serious risk | Government: domestic-facing, face-to-face incidents escalate and present serious potential risk akin to burglary or other predicates | Held: § 750.81(2) qualifies under the residual clause as its ordinary conduct presents a serious potential risk of physical injury |
| Whether career-offender designation was proper given above | Morris: challenges career-offender enhancement based on predicate invalidity | Government: enhancement justified because § 750.81 is a crime of violence under residual clause | Held: Career-offender designation affirmed because § 750.81 qualifies under the residual clause |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ("physical force" in ACCA means "violent force")
- Castleman v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (common-law offensive touching qualifies as "force" for § 922(g)(9) domestic-violence context)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (advisory Guidelines not subject to vagueness challenge)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (divisible vs. indivisible statutes; limits on modified categorical approach)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (residual clause analysis: ordinary-case, probabilistic inquiry about risk)
- United States v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2016) (residual-clause vagueness in Guidelines; later abrogated by Beckles)
- United States v. Ford, 560 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2009) (treating career-offender "crime of violence" definition like ACCA's "violent felony")