United States v. Melvin Martinez-Lopez
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13709
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Martinez-Lopez (aka Miguel Angel Rodriguez) pleaded guilty in California in 1998 to violating Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11352(a) and was deported; years later he was convicted of illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 and received a 16‑level guidelines enhancement based on the § 11352 prior, producing a 77‑month sentence.
- § 11352(a) criminalizes a range of conduct (e.g., transporting, importing, selling, furnishing, administering, giving away, or offering/threatening those acts) with respect to controlled substances identified by cross‑reference to other provisions.
- The sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) applies if a prior conviction is for a federal‑law–qualifying “drug trafficking offense.” A state statute that is categorically overbroad may still qualify if it is divisible and the modified categorical approach shows the defendant was convicted of the matching alternative.
- The Ninth Circuit previously treated § 11352 as overbroad on both the controlled‑substance and actus‑reus dimensions, but some prior Ninth Circuit panel decisions also found it divisible; the Supreme Court’s decisions in Descamps and Mathis required re‑examination of that divisibility analysis.
- The panel majority held § 11352 divisible as to both the controlled‑substance and actus‑reus requirements, applied the modified categorical approach to Martinez‑Lopez’s plea colloquy (which identified selling cocaine), and affirmed the 16‑level enhancement and the 77‑month sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Martinez‑Lopez) | Defendant's Argument (United States) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divisibility — Controlled substance requirement | § 11352 is indivisible as to the listed substances; statute is categorically overbroad | California law treats separate substances as separate offenses; therefore the substance is an element and statute is divisible | Held divisible: California Supreme Court precedent (In re Adams et al.) treats different substances as separate crimes; controlled substance is an element. |
| Divisibility — Actus reus requirement (transport, sell, furnish, etc.) | The enumerated acts are alternative means, not elements; § 11352 is indivisible on actus reus | California Supreme Court (People v. Patterson) and other authorities treat the listed acts as defining separate offenses; therefore divisible | Held divisible: Patterson examined offenses in the abstract and concluded statute defines a variety of separate crimes; actus reus alternatives are elements. |
| Application of modified categorical approach | Even if statute were divisible, plea record must show element matching federal generic offense | If divisible, Shepard/Descamps allow looking at plea colloquy to identify the specific statutory alternative convicted | Held applicable: Plea colloquy admitted Martinez‑Lopez sold cocaine; that matches federal drug‑trafficking offense, so enhancement applies. |
| Substantive reasonableness of sentence | 77 months is substantively unreasonable given nonviolent history, childhood, family ties, and age of prior conviction(s) | Within‑guidelines sentence supported by recidivism and need for deterrence; district court adequately explained its decision | Held reasonable: within‑guidelines sentence, adequately justified, not "illogical, implausible, or without support." |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (establishes categorical approach focusing on statutory elements)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limits what conviction records can be consulted under the modified categorical approach)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (clarifies when modified categorical approach may be used; elements v. means inquiry)
- In re Adams, 14 Cal.3d 629 (Cal. 1975) (California Supreme Court treating different controlled substances as separate offenses for conviction purposes)
- People v. Patterson, 49 Cal.3d 615 (Cal. 1989) (California Supreme Court applied an abstract, elements‑based inquiry in felony‑murder context and described § 11352 as creating separate offenses for listed acts)
- People v. Vidana, 1 Cal.5th 632 (Cal. 2016) (recent California decision on alternate legal theories and consolidation of offenses; discussed by concurring/dissenting judges as potentially affecting multiple‑conviction analysis)
- People v. Roberts, 40 Cal.2d 483 (Cal. 1953) (earlier California precedent on when multiple acts charged under one statutory provision may constitute only one offense; relied on in later California decisions cited in opinions)