United States v. Melvin Knight, 824 F.3d 1105

Background

Just after midnight on Jan. 28, 2013, D.C. police arrested Melvin Knight and Aaron Thorpe on D.C. Code charges (including kidnapping while armed) after a reported violent incident; they were held without bond.
At a Feb. 1 and continued Feb. 19 Superior Court preliminary hearing, the U.S. Attorney stated on the record that a “wired” plea offer (contingent on both defendants accepting) to one count of assault with a deadly weapon had been extended but not accepted.
In early May the U.S. Attorney dropped the D.C. Superior Court charges and obtained a federal grand jury indictment (May 7, 2013) charging a federal felon-in-possession count plus multiple D.C. Code offenses; defendants moved to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act.
The district court denied the Speedy Trial Act motion, concluding the initial arrests on D.C. Code charges did not trigger the Act’s 30-day filing requirement for federal offenses.
A July 2013 jury convicted both defendants on all counts; Thorpe was sentenced to 25 years, Knight to 22 years 4 months.
On appeal the defendants argued (1) Speedy Trial Act violation, (2) Thorpe’s sentence was unreasonable or procedurally defective, and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel in plea negotiations. The court affirmed on Speedy Trial and sentencing issues and remanded ineffective-assistance claims to the district court.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether initial D.C. Code arrest triggered Speedy Trial Act 30-day clock for federal indictment	Gov: Initial D.C. arrest is not a federal arrest, so Act not triggered	Knight/Thorpe: Prosecutor contemplated federal charges and the arrest was a ruse to evade the Act	Held: Arrest on D.C. Code charges does not trigger the Act; no ruse exception adopted and no due-process showing of deliberate parking
Whether a due-process/ruse exception applies when gov’t arrests on local charges to delay federal indictment	Gov: No such exception; prior precedent controls	Defendants: Court should recognize ruse exception where gov’t parks defendants to avoid Act	Held: Court declines a ruse exception under the Act; due-process claim possible only with proof of deliberate pre-indictment delay, which defendants did not show
Procedural reasonableness of Thorpe’s sentence (consideration of §3553(a) factors, esp. intellectual disability)	Thorpe: Court failed to adequately consider his intellectual disability	Gov: Court considered factors in argument and record; no reversible omission	Held: No plain error; sentencing record shows consideration of disability and §3553(a) factors; affirmation of sentence
Whether plea-counsel performance was ineffective regarding wired plea offers in Superior Court	Defendants: Counsel failed to explain offers; defendants would have accepted	Gov: Record shows defendants rejected plea offers; no prejudice	Held: Claims are colorable and the record is insufficient; remanded to district court for factfinding on ineffective assistance under Strickland

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Mills, 964 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (arrest on D.C. Code charges does not trigger Speedy Trial Act; discussed "parking" and due-process alternative)
United States v. Seals, 130 F.3d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (prosecutor’s contemplation of federal charges at time of arrest irrelevant to Act’s start)
United States v. Clark, 754 F.3d 401 (7th Cir. 2014) (same principle: local arrest does not trigger federal Speedy Trial clock)
United States v. Kelly, 661 F.3d 682 (1st Cir. 2011) (same conclusion regarding Act’s definition of "offense")
United States v. Locke, 664 F.3d 353 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (no requirement that court address every §3553(a) factor expressly)
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (district courts not required to discuss every argument or factor on the record)
United States v. Brinson-Scott, 714 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (sentencing-procedure precedent on consideration of arguments)
In re Sealed Case, 527 F.3d 188 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (sentencing discussion and procedural standards)
United States v. Simpson, 430 F.3d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (sentencing review principles)
United States v. Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (deferential substantive-reasonableness standard)
United States v. Cutchin, 956 F.2d 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (discretion to make federal sentence consecutive to non-Guidelines local sentences)
United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (oral pronouncement controls but written judgment may clarify ambiguity)
United States v. Solofa, 745 F.3d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Strickland standard summarized)
Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) (ineffective-assistance claims ordinarily litigated first in district court)
United States v. Mohammed, 693 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (practice of remanding colorable ineffective-assistance claims)
United States v. Pole, 741 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (affirm without remand where record conclusively shows no prejudice)