United States v. Simpson, Joseph B.

sеparate laterals as a zone and supply Natural Alabama-Tennessee service. Comm’n, FT shippers purchase 417 F.2d or IT ser- Fed. Power allow Co. v. Gas Cir.1969) (“[T]he (5th 511, Commis- vice in that new zone. See 104 F.E.R.C. at 514-15 a local authority require 61,640. Hence, has no public sion even interest for, or purchase, contract distributor in the behind Order No. 636 did policies delivery gas.”). of natural accept justify rise to the level contract would alterations, require this situation does not Mobile-Sierra, heavy “a Under policy satisfy that one be sacrificed to a customer ... must be met before burden did not abuse its discretion other. FERC his will of the deprived against can be deciding implement not to the FTW Town Nor bargain.” of his benefits plan § 5 of the under NGA. FERC, 1306, wood v. (D.C.Cir.1978).7 have Shippers Indicated VI price interest in public that the

not shown the harm of the transparency outweighs reasons, foregoing petitions For the plan that the FTW cost reallocation for review are denied. entail, FT- they argue do although So ordered. should be forced to shippers conversion they receive from the for the benefit рay The circumstances priority.

IT-Feeder allows FERC which 5 of the NGA

under that are “in the changes rate

to order such interest” include circumstances

public financial might impair

“as where utility to continue its

ability public service, an ex upon other consumers cast America, Appellee UNITED STATES burden, unduly or be discriminato cessive Pac. ry.” Fed. Power Comm’n Sierra SIMPSON, Joseph Appellant. B. Co., 368, 76 S.Ct. Power (1956). Shippers Indicated 100 L.Ed. 388 No. 04-3129. not demonstrated that one of these have Appeals, United States Court of situations, pres anything comparable, or District of Columbia Circuit. justify abrogation. contract More ent over, clearly acknowledged that FERC has 16, 2005. Argued Sept. FT implement Transco could service Decided Dec. 2005. supply requiring laterals without shippers accept FT-conversion service they have not contracted. For

for which officially could establish

example, Transco ” bargain.’ Ins. typically Morta Korea Similarly, company "is not 'enti- make bad (9th 1988) improvident tled to be relieved of its bar- Cir. Corp., 840 F.2d ” Policy Study gain.’ omitted). Access (citations Transmission Shippers Indicated While FERC, (D.C.Cir. Group v. service, purchasing IT may regret Transco's ” " Sierra, 2000) (quoting 350 U.S. at deal,’ not, a deal is a and there '[w]ise 368). "Despite cynicism, sanctity recent consequences "people by the fore must abide civilizing important of contract remains (alteration origi in the choices." Id. of their " moreover, concept"; general 'the rule of nal) omitted). (citations includes the freedom to freedom of contract

GARLAND, Judge. Circuit Jamaica, Simpson, B. a citizen of Joseph re-entering pled unlawfully having after been de- following aggra- conviction for -an ported felony. uncertainty regard- Due to vated ing validity the continued of the United Sentencing in the States Guidelines decided Supreme months after Blakely Washington, 542 U.S. (2004), 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 S.Ct. prison a 46-month district separate rationales. The term under two applying court first sentenced mandatory; the Guidelines as then sen- discretion, in tenced him as it would its advisory only. the Guidelines as treating appeals, seeking now a remand to re-sentencing light court for district 'Supreme Court’s decision United (2005). We conclude 160 L.Ed.2d sentencing methodolo- that the alternative Federal Public Wright, Lisa B. Assistant con- gy employed by the district was Defender, appellant. argued the cause with the Court’s subse- sistent Kramer, on the briefs was A.J. her With quent decision Booker and Neil H. Jaffee Defender. Federal Public must therefore be af- Simpson’s sentence Petras, Federal Mary and M. Assistant firmed. Defenders, appearances. entered Public Danello, At- H. Assistant U.S. Elizabeth I On torney, argued appellee. the cause for 6, 2000, con- Simpson was On October Wainstein, were Kenneth L. the brief of con- Virginia in federal court victed Fisher, Attorney, R. Assistant U.S. John intent to distribute spiring possess filed, time the was Attorney at the brief marijuana. As a kilograms or more McLeese, III, A. Roy Catharine and W. conviction, Simpson was de- result of that Hartzenbusch, McCord, Mary B. As- and on October from the United States ported Attorneys. sistant U.S. See U.S.C. (2)(A)(i)(II). later, months § Two GARLAND, Judge, Circuit Before: name, Simpson re-entered using a false WILLIAMS, Senior SILBERMAN Everglades, near Port the United States Judges. Circuit re-entering the month after Florida. One in the Dis- country, Simpson was arrested Opinion for the Court filed Circuit threatening to trict of kill Columbia Judge GARLAND. Fingerprints knife. wife with a kitchen true Simpson’s photographs revealed filed Senior Concurring opinion February he was identity, and on Judge Circuit SILBERMAN. sentencing hearing, re-entry by count of an indicted on one alien, convictioр following for an deported with the offense level calcu- agreed PSR’s of 8 felony, violation U.S.C. aggravated lation, history but added another criminal (b)(2). 1326(a), point re-entry because the offense was years committed less than two after agreement plead Simpson signed imprisonment. from Simpson’s release parties The guilty to the indictment. 4Al.l(e).2 resulting id. 6 crim- base offense level agreed Simpson’s history points change inal did not Sentencing under history category, en- criminal that his offense level should be which ,was defendant to 24 “because the hanced at III. Ch. Pt. A. remained See U.S.S.G. for a previously deported after conviction The combination of offense level 21 and the drug trafficking offense for which sen- yielded III history category criminal a than greater was 13 tence sentencing range Guidelines of 46-57 2; see U.S.S.G. Agreement months.” Plea imprisonment. months’ See id. 2L1.2(b)(l)(A). parties § The further Simpson’s plea In the interim between that offense level should be agreed the sentencing, the Court decid- 21, by Simpson’s levels to due to reduced case, in it Blakely ed the which invalidated acceptance responsibility. See U.S.S.G. Washington state determinate sentenc- plea agreement § The did not in- 3E1.1. ing regime Sentencing similar to the U.S. stipulation regarding Simpson’s clude Guidelines. The Court held that a sen- history category. criminal The district tencing court violates the Sixth Amend- plea hearing at a accepted the on imposes higher ment when it a sentence it June scheduled statutory than the maximum August for 25.1 “may impose solely on the basis of the entry plea, Following U.S. jury facts reflected in the verdict or ad- prepared Probation Office a Presentence Blakely, mitted the defendant.” (PSR) Report accepted parties’ Relying 2531. on Simpson’s calculation of offense level. The Blakely, Simpson’s challenged counsel placed Simpson in criminal histo- PSR also history calculation of her client’s criminal ry category III. That calculation was based category as a violation of the Sixth finding on the of a total of 5 crimi- PSR’s Amendment, arguing category history points Simpson’s nal for points: assigned on basis of had been facts marijuana conspiracy conviction and sen- Objec- Simрson had not admitted. Def.’s tence, 4Al.l(a), and addi- see U.S.S.G. particular, argued tions to PSR 2. In she re-entry points committing tional Simpson even if had admitted the (super- offense while still under sentence release) conviction, necessary assign points him marijuana for the facts vised 4Al.l(d). marijuana conviction, subsequent ‍‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‍conspiracy see id. At the those agreement ground, unnecessary plea 1. The included a waiver of tence is a sufficient it is validity Simpson's right appeal any sentence im- for us to consider the waiver. court, posed by the unless the sentence ex- statutory ceeded the maximum was the Simpson’s marijuana 2. PSR The stated that consequence upward departure of an from conviction had resulted in a sentence of 36 applicable range. Agree- imprisonment years Plea months' followed four release, government supervised Simpson 3. on this as an ment The relies and that August independent prison for affirmance. Because been released from ¶ subsequently deported. we conclude that the court’s alternative sen- PSR II, guideline category impose rаnge, him in the court or if only put would points lower yield guidelines only views the would which months). (41-51 Appellant’s range ... guidelines mandatory, and not [to] crim- that raised the The calculation Br. 4. guidelines than what less contended, III, she history category inal otherwise dictate.” to find additional required proceeded re- Simpson supervised was on facts—that under each of ap- the two re-entry unlawful at the time his lease proaches. Turning first to the that offense that he had committed and/or forth the court set the calculations outlined im- after release from years than two less above, concluding offense Simpson’s counsel asserted prisonment. history criminal cate- level was facts, admitted those that he had not III, gory resulting and that the Guide- the court Blakely therefore barred sentencing range lines was 46-57 months. him.3 Ac- them to sentence using from The court then sentenced to the sentencing judge she asked the cordingly, range, imposing of that a sentence bottom Sentencing “just your discretion.” use imprisonment, of 46 months’ followed 2004). Hr’g (August Tr. 8 years of Id. at supervised two release. hearing, August At the 46-48. parties distriсt court advised the the give Simpson light Blakely, in of would next appropri- The court addressed the if one as “alternative sentences”: ate sentence the event the Guidelines “controlling,” and one as were Guidelines controlling: not were controlling” but were “not the Guidelines I would take into account and do take to “for whatever assistance could be looked of- into account the seriousness of this might get ... be able to from court] [the fense, conscious, that it was intentional respect Id. at 25. to the them.” With follovfing a decision the defendant latter, give parties invited aggravated felony for an of- conviction like to you it “the assistance that would from deportation fense and the United sentence respect with to what give ... not confi- States and that the Court is imposed.” Simpson’s Id. at 26. should be Mr. not choose dent that objected that the court should not counsel illegally to return to the United States that announce an alternative sentence well, guide- in the future as and that the if the “automatically imposed” would be lines, using them as a reference determine that Appeals were to Court suggest appropriate that an point, would unconstitu- the Guidelines sentence was for this offense should be tional, give “it the defen- doesn’t on a of 46 to 57 based range months it is respond dant a chance to to whatever history category. criminal particular the first says wrong discretion, my I find in without then went sentence.” Id. at 27. Counsel appropriate guidelines, thought on to cite circumstances that she would, months, that at 46 that be justified sentencing Simpson “at the lowest that addresses the interests guideline range, should level of whatever offense took argued not extend to whether the instant counsel also that Blake- " prior ly exception supervised ‘the fact of a convic- release or place 's he was on while ” tion,’ (quot- at imprison- years release within two after from ing Apprendi Jersey, v. New note 8. ment. infra (2000)), did 120 S.Ct. 147 L.Ed.2d however, emphasized, that its system address- The Court justice the criminal ... premise conclusion “rests on the sentencing objec- the interests es sentencing rules are mandato- the relevant and deterrence and punishment tives оf all ry impose binding requirements on imposes that the Court is the sentence judges.” at “If the Id. 749-50. discretion, given all the facts in its currently as written could be Guidelines here. relevant circumstances advisory merely provisions read at 49. Id. recommended, required, than rather appeal September Simpson noted particular sentences re- selection January the Su- 2004. On facts,” differing sets of the Court sponse opinion issued its preme Court said, implicate “their use would not Blakely which held States v. regardless Amendment” of whether Sixth Sentencing to the U.S. Guidelines applied they a sentence that con- enhanced above mandatory of en- imposition and that plea with a or verdict. Id. at 750. sistent under the vio- sentences Guidelines hanced second, opinion, In the “remedial” at Amendment. 125 S.Ct. lated the Sixth statutory pro Court found the federal holding, the Court light 746. In making mandatory visions Guidelines statutory provisions two invalidated “incompatible with consti [Booker’s] were making the the effect of holding” tutional and had to be “severed Id. now mandatory. We consider modified,” and excised.” Id. at 756. “So wake of Simpson’s аppeal Booker. said, Sentencing thé Court “the Federal effectively ... Act makes the Guidelines II advisory.” 757. The modified stat begin with a discussion Booker We ute, explained, “requires the Court legal governing appel- of doctrines the sentencing court to consider Guidelines sentencing late error. That dis- review ranges, see U.S.C.A. analysis in guide will the the bal- cussion it the 3553(a)(4)(Supp.2004), permits but opinion. ance of this sentencing light court to tailor the in well, statutory concerns as see other A (Supp.2004).” Id.4 decision in Booker The Booker decision resolved two com- The Court’s cases, separate majority opin- panion involving one defendant consisted of two first, opinion, involving “substantive” Freddie Booker and another de- ions. disposi- fendant Ducan Fanfan. The two the Court held the Sixth Amendment a tions two kinds of imposes is violated when sen- identified Sentencing respect error. to the sentence of tence under Guidelines With Booker, “[a]ny Freddie the Court found constitu- based on its own determination (other conviction) tional error under the Amendment prior fact than which is Sixth because, necessary exceeding obeying mandatory Guide- support to regime, judge had increased by the maximum authorized the facts es- lines jury beyond the maximum by plea tablished or a Booker’s solely ....” at 756. that could have been based verdict S.Ct. however, (2005); Simpson, see id. at 765-67. 4. Booker further stated that the statute contin- ' any- provide appellate objected ues to "review sen- has not to his sentence [of] tencing other than those considered in Part decisions for unreasonableness.” 543 S.Ct. 160 L.Ed.2d 621 III. U.S. 220. 125 738. 767. Crosby, 397 jury verdict. error. See United States v. reflected in the on the facts (2d contrast, Cir.2005); the Court found F.3d Part By Id. at 769.5 infra Du- violation in defendant III.B. no constitutional sentence —which

can Fanfan’s authorized Guidelines sentence maximum B additional jury’s verdict without not time When defendant does Nonetheless, Id. 769.6 of fact. findings court, object ly to an error the district vacated Fanfan’s sentence appellate “plain is review limited permit party seek remanded to either “[Tjhere (1) er error” standard: must be set system “under the forth” resentencing (2) (3) ror, plain, that is that affect[s] opinions, the Booker rights. If all conditions substantial three had committed non-constitutional er- met, appellate may are then exer an in a manda- ror applying its er cise discretion notice a forfeited tory advisory than fashion. rather (4) ror, seriously but error Supreme Court’s conclusion that the fairness, public integrity, affect[s] the companion courts in the cases judicial reputation proceedings.” John ruling followed from the Court’s erred States, 461, 467, 117 son v. United U.S. today’s holdings apply that it “must —both (1997) (inter 5.Ct. 137 L.Ed.2d 718 holding Amendment our re Sixth omitted); quotation nal citations and marks Sentencing interpretation medial 52(b). P. see also Fed. R. CRiM. Under all cases on direct review.” Id. at Act—to standard, plain error “is the defendant Kentucky, 769; also Griffith rather than the Government who bears the 314, 328, 93 L.Ed.2d prej persuasion respect burden of (1987) rule (holding that a “new for the Olano, udice.” prosecutions of criminal to be conduct L.Ed.2d 508 113 S.Ct. ... retroactively pend all cases applied (1993). ..., ing exception review with no on direct object timely If a defendant does in which the new rule constitutes cases court, alleged error the district As a con past”). a ‘clear break’ with the appellate review is instead conducted appellate direct courts sequence, on review stan accordance with the “harmless error” any sentencing regard methodology must erred, If must we dard: the district materially was inconsistent with the that if it the defen correct the error affects just opinion not Booker remedial —and R. rights.” dant’s “substantial See of the mandatory application Guidelines— Fed. 52(a). cases[, this] P. “[I]n A most error. district court’s failure Booker CRiM. prej- must in means that the error have been factors listed consider 3553(a), have the outcome example, is a udicial: It must affected spe U.S.C. Olano, proceedings.” (statutory) of the district court of such non-constitutional cies conspiracy possessed jury 6. found him of jury found that Booker had Fanfan’s The grams possess intent to distribute at least intent to and to with distribute Booker, S.Ct. at 746. Al- cocaine base. grams pow- cocaine distribute at least 500 though the Guidelines indicated a sentence of der. the maximum Under the amount, 210-262 months jury sentence authorized verdict—with- to 360 months court increased sentence findings out fact—wаs additional -finding based on its own that Booker had months, was the the district which possessed grams of cocaine additional 566 Booker, at 747. imposed. S.Ct. justice. Id. base and had also obstructed 734, gov- 113 S.Ct. 1770. The 507 U.S. his sentence should be vacated and his proving the burden- of resentencing. ernment bears case remanded for not from the error. prejudice did result The threshold question is whether there id. Although was error at all. the district “sentences,” spoke of imposing two test for harmless error alternative, primary and an “judgment models, one for comes two non-constitu in a criminal case” filed that court and one for error of constitu tional error only single records sentence: months’ tional dimension. See United States v. imprisonment. judgment J.Á. 28-29. The (D.C.Cir.2003). Powell, 42, A - imposed states that the pursu- sentence “is if ap error is harmless constitutional Sentencing ant to the Act Reform of 1984” pears “beyond a reasonable doubt that the that, “[ajlternatively, the same sen- complained error of did not contribute to tence is by the Court its discre- Chapman obtained.” [sentence] assuming Sentencing tion 24, 87 824, 17 18, California, 386 U.S. S.Ct. apply.” not (emphasis do Id. at 28 add- (1967). contrast, By L.Ed.2d 705 a non- ed).7 constitutional error is harmless if it did not injurious have a “substantial and effect or question There is no determining” influence in the sentence. (and “sentence”) court’s first rationale States, Kotteakos United 328 U.S. error under as it was calculated (1946). 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 S.Ct. on a mandatory application based appeal Guidelines.8 But cases on “[i]n Ill court, from the district we are to review ” ‘judgments, contends that the district court opinions.’ People’s not Mo State, committed constitutional Booker error jahedin Org. Dep’t Iran v. U.S. (D.C.Cir.1999) increasing statutory maximum based 23 n. 7 (quot findings the court’s own of fact under a ing Chevron Inc. v. U.S.A. Natural Re Further, mandatory guidelines system. Council, sources 467 U.S. Def. timely objected because his trial (1984)); counsel 104 S.Ct. 81 L.Ed.2d 694 Laboratories, ground, Simpson on that contends his ‍‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‍Black v. Cutter may (1956). be affirmed the error 100 L.Ed. 1188 Finally, insisting course, was harmless. Of sentence based on an invalid harmless, error was not Simpson argues may here, rationale be erroneous. But reason, added). 7. For this we have no occasion to contends that the district appropriate disposition what сonsider court's determination that he was still under a would be if the district court had announced justice criminal at the time of the a different sentence. alternative offense, instant and that the instant offense years was committed less than two after his parties dispute 8. The whether the error in the imprisonment, release from are not within the first sentence was constitutional non-con- prior exception. "fact of a conviction” If dispute generated by stitutional. The is correct, Simpson’s this would that mean first parenthetical caveat to Booker's constitutional sentence was unlawful due to a Sixth Amend- (other holding: "Any prior fact a than convic- merely ment violation and not due to the ) necessary support tion which is a sen- mandatory application of the Guidelines. Be- exceeding by tence authorized maximum we cause conclude that court's alternative plea the facts established a or a event, requires jury affirmance in we verdict must be admitted the defen- proved jury beyond scope exception dant or to a a need not of the reаsonable determine the Booker, (emphasis appeal. doubt.” 125 S.Ct. at 756 to resolve this

1185 A two provided independent district court of 46 the same sentence rationales that Simpson’s first contention is suf- alternative rationale is months. If the imposition court’s an alternative sen- judgment, judg- that support ficient to judicial long-standing tence violated “the See, e.g., upheld. ment be United must prohibiting advisory opinions.” canon Ap- Jones, F.2d 740-41 States v. Br. pellant’s argument, At oral 8. (D.C.Cir.1991) de- (affirming Guidelines conceded was not a that this reference to permissible on both that rested parture “advisory in the Article III opinions” grounds); United impermissible sense, since was—and there continues Bowie, F.3d States v. dispute parties be—a live between the that (D.C.Cir.2000) a district court’s (upholding adjudicate. the federal courts must Cf. that evidentiary ruling on court’s alterna- Cohen, 83, 95-97, Flast ground); Lugg, States tive (1968) (noting 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (denial (D.C.Cir.1989) of re- F.2d proscription advisory opinions against banc) no (finding error hearing en is based on Ill’s limitation of Article independent to a valid decision due judicial power federal to “Cases” and ground). “Controversies”). Rather, he contends the annоuncement of an alternative appear it does not glance, first On norms. prudential violates material in the was a error there above, disagree. We As discussed on by rationale relied the dis alternative Simpson’s sentence was essen- Coles, alternative trict court. tially which the (D.C.Cir.2005), case, independent plain error judg- district court reached the same pre-Booker prescient sen “[a] we said that imprison- ment —a of 46 months’ no tencing committing error would thereby hoped to avoid ment—and just have behaved as resentencing need for if the constitutional operate: it post era will -Booker challenge expected as the court it came out advisory.” as have treated the Guidelines added). alternative provision of ratio- would. (emphasis Id. at The district judgment nales for does not vio- the same like very hypo much here looks norms; prudential contrary, late to the It court. considered thetically prescient judicial opin- component is a common point,” a “reference Guidelines as Sen in the We no error ions.9 find tencing Tr. and cited number of Hr’g merely court’s to announce an al- decision other relevant under factors well, Part, ternative sentence. In the balance see id. specific

we consider three errors B contends are re nonetheless contention second flected in district court’s alternative opinion requires that Booker’s remedial rationale. 1980s, Blakely period appellate upheld courts in the between In the expressly endorsed calcu imposition antici- several circuits of alternative sentences in pation challenge to lation of sentences order a different the constitu- alternative resentencing the Guidelines were in tionality one ulti- avoid that was States, See, e.g., States v. Dicker v. validated. United mately in Mistretta United resolved son, 251, (3d Cir.2004); 647, 381 260 n. 9 488 S.Ct. 102 714 F.3d 109 L.Ed.2d Hammond, See, (1989). 381 F.3d e.g., Draper, United v. United States 888 States (4th Cir.2004); Cir.1989); (6th United States Book F.2d 353-54 Cir.2004). er, (7th Brittman, (8th Cir.1989). 375 F.3d 872 F.2d 827 And courts to base sentences on the factors The district court made clear that it did 3553(a), § listed in and that 18 U.S.C. consider In explaining those factors. its sentence, district court did not do so Section expressly alternative the court here.. 3553(a) enumerates a number of factors addressed the nature and circumstances of imposing that a court “shall” consider in history the offense and the and character- (now sentence. These include the adviso- istics the defendant: ry) range established the Guidelines. into account [I take] seriousness 3553(a)(4). § But they 18 U.S.C. also offense, conscious, awas include such factors as “the nature and intentional decision the defendant fol- circumstances of the offense and the histo- lowing a conviction for an aggravated ry defendant,” and characteristics of the felony deportation offense and ... and 3553(a)(1); §id. the need for the sentence that the Court is not confident that Mr. offense,” to -“reflect the seriousness of the Simpson would not choose to return to law,” “promote to respect “pro- for the illegally United States in the future just punishment,” vide adequate “afford as well. deterrence,” “protect public,” and to Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 49. also needed, “provide the defendant with ... took into account “the interests of the care,” training medical [and] id. justice system” criminal and “the interests 3553(a)(2); § need to un- “avoid sentencing objectives punishment warranted sentence disparities” among Id. All and deterrence.” of this sounds similarly defendants, situated id. 3553(a), § the terms of and the court’s 3553(a)(6). § references manifest an understanding of statutory its responsibility. See United required is correct that Booker States v. Solis-Vaquera, 147 Fed.Appx. 3553(a) § courts to consider the (7th Cir.2005) (inferring that a sen- (“Without factors. 125 at 764 3553(a) tencing court § had examined the ‘mandatory’ provision, the [Federal Sen- factors from the fact that it referenced tencing] requires Act nonetheless judges them, three of statutory albeit without ci- to take account of the together tation). sentencing goals. [the] other See 18 3553(a) § U.S.C.A. (Supp.2004).”). In so It is true that the district court did not however, doing, Court did specifically refer to each factor listed in 3553(a). not create a wholly obligation. § new As But we have not required Simpson acknowledges, Appellant’s Br. courts do so. See United States v. 19, judges required (D.C.Cir.2005) have been Ayers, consider 3553(a) (“[W]e § factors “in determining ordinarily presume a district court particular sentеnce to imposed,” be imposing non-guidelines alternative 3553(a), § U.S.C. since the enactment of sentence took into account all the factors the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. See listed and accorded them the 3582; 18 U.S.C. see also Koon v. appropriate significance.”). Nor have oth- States, 116 S.Ct. Robles, er circuits. See United States v. (1996) (“The (11th 135 L.Ed.2d Cir.2005); statute re- cf. quires a court to goals consider the listed Crosby, (noting 112-13 .... in determining which sentence to Second previous Circuit’s decisions involv- given choose from a range Guideline ing “a sentencing judge’s duty to ‘consider’ from outside the range, departure is matters relevant to .... have appropriate.”). refrained from imposing any rigorous re- of the part process”); articulation United specific of quirement 3553(c) (7th pro- Section sentencing judge”). George, v. 403 F.3d 472-73 States court, at of sen- Cir.2005) the time (“Judges “[t]he vides need not rehearse on rea- open court the tencing, shall state the record all of the considerations that 18 particular of the imposition sons for its 3553(a) lists; enough § to U.S.C. is cal- 3553(c). § The dis- sentence.” 18 U.S.C. range acсurately explain culate the here, and requirement trict court met (if it) why the sentence lies outside this in the require not more the statute does less.”).11 deserves defendant more or v. See States way explanation. (D.C.Cir. 1062, 1066 Bridges, 175 F.3d C Dozier, 1999); 162 F.3d States (D.C.Cir.1998).10 a de- 124-25 When that, third contention is import asserted the fendant has not concomitantly primary and alter- imposing 3553(a) factor, nothing § particular sentences, native district violated explain the court to sua requires statute “right present at his sentencing his be factor why it did not find that sponte present to have an opportunity And discretionary to its decision. relevant under argument now-applicable Ap- law.” require- in Booker added such nothing Br. half of pellant’s 7-8. first The Robles, at 1328 408 F.3d ment. See us, contention need not detain since (“Even ], expect not [post-Booker we would Simpson present at the sentencing to conduct every case hearing (single) at which 46-month 3553(a) § ... every factor accounting imposed. question real term was played how each factor expound upon by the second half of the posed contention: decision.”); see also role in its have an opportunity Did Dean, United States hearing present argument consistent (7th Cir.2005) (rejecting the contention with the law Booker later set down? duty sentencing judge, of the that “it is the contends he did not have the de- every case and whether or not there opportunity such an were a men- any invokes of the factors fendant variety mitigating circumstances that 3553(a), an ex- in section to make tioned permitted them a were not to consider—or analysis of all of courts plicit, articulated regard Something required a district Even if we were to the district more is 11. imposes a sentence outside the Guide- imposition sentence court’s the alternative 3553(c)(2) range. provides lines Section not as erroneous because the court did ex- kind, if a "is not of the or is outside recognize obligation pressly its to consider all range" described factors, 3553(a) § an error would such specific state "the for the court must reason supra statutory, be not constitutional. from that imposition of sentence different regard it Accordingly, we would Part II.A. described, which reasons must also be stated harmless if it did not have "substantial and judg- specificity order of written Kotteakos, injurious effect” on sentence. U.S.C. commitment.” ment 90 L.Ed. 3553(c)(2) added); (emphasis see also Unit- (1946); supra Part II.B. The court’s Dean, (7th ed 3553(a) expressly fac- address the failure Cir.2005) ("[T]he judge’s farther the here, have an effect as the tors did not such ..., departs guidelines from clear would consider court made that it justification compelling the based more mitigat- thought the defense relevant factor judge must in section factors ing the sentence. appeals to offer in order to enable the court of im- assess the reasonableness of the sentence posed.”). fully mandatory who consider have been found of similar con- —under duct”). preceded regime Guidelines Booker. Simpson’s opening single brief contains a in Simpson’s general The flaw argument that, example. argues such He due to his that, although consideration of some alien, deportable status as a he faces “a (or mitigating factors was indeed barred severity fortuitous increase in the of his limited) under mandatory by which he means that he is sentence” — Koon, regime, 92-95, ineligible early community release to sentencing alternative assignment confinement or to a minimum methodology employed by his sentencing security prison. Br. Appellant’s 20. And court did not treat the Guidelines as man- that, e-Booker, Simpson notes pr some datory. Nor did the court exclude or limit courts departures had held downward its consideration of category of sen- from the Guidelines range tencing contrary, factors. To the the court ineligibility of such were not Simpson extended an ‍‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‍open-ended invita- See, re-entry available unlawful cases. tion to mitigating arguments, make re- Ebolum, e.g., United States v. gardless of they whether would have been (6th Cir.1995). 38-39 available under the Guidelines scheme. brief, Sentencing Hr’g See Tr. 25-26. And reply Simpson his cites sec Simpson responded to that invitation mitigating ond circumstance that he con citing a series of factors in support of a tends he was likewise unable to advance sentence well below range. the Guidelines that, pr argues e-Booker. He as an unlaw Sentencing See Hr’g Tr. 27-34.12 Accord- ful re-entrant arrested in the District of ingly, and contrary to his contention on Columbia, he faces a stiffer than appeal, Simpson opportunity did have an ju similar re-entrants arrested in border at his hearing present argu- risdictions with departure pro “fast-track” ment consistent with the law as later set grams. See United States v. Banuelos- forth in Booker. (9th Rodriguez, 215 F.3d Cir.

2000) that, (noting under the fast-track It is true the district court did not district, program in one California most specific address the two mitigating circum- permitted unlawful re-entrants are Simpson stances appellate cites in his plead two-year to an offense that carries a not, however, briefs. That was sentence). statutory maximum In light the court barred their consideration. 3553(a)(6), contends, he should Rather, it was because Simpson failed to have been able to ask the court to reduce suggest them. In analogy the closest under sentence, his that disparity. avoid See the mandatory Guidelines regime, this Cir- 3553(a)(6) 18 U.S.C. (requiring the sen cuit initially ruled that it could not discern tencing court to consider “the need to error at all in a court’s failure to address avoid unwarranted disparities unrеquested grounds discretionary for a among defendants with similar records sentencing departure. See United States Simpson's (1) argued Sentencing trial counsel Hr’g that: Tr. 27-35. His counsel re-entered the United light contended of these consider- States because he feared retribution from ations and the fact that he would still have to Jamaica; gang (2) Simpson members in un- Virginia answer to a federal court in for vio- again deported derstood that he would be release, lating supervised the district court he had no intent to re-enter the United States imposing should “consider a sentence of time thereafter; (3) Simpson had tried to co- served.” Id. at 34. operate government with the after his arrest. (D.C.Cir. Leandre, materially more the de- tence favorable to Coles, 1998) 767; can “the See at (holding that district fendant. F.3d Unit- Saro, failing to also sponte for sua ed States v. be faulted not (D.C.Cir.1994). deporta- defendant’s] [the whether address severity affect the would ble status Recognizing posed relying hurdle Pin sentence”); also States v. see arguments on that he could have asserted (D.C.Cir.1995). In nick, sentencing, Simpson at addеd a new twist cases, plain a error we settled on later at disparity to his “fast-track” contention review for such claims. standard of Noting argument. prior oral to Book- Draffin, F.3d have anticipated post- er he could not how (D.C.Cir.2002) (holding the failure would Booker courts treat unlawful re- sentencing departure on an unre grant a entrants, complained that he was only plain for quested ground is reviewable from pointing therefore disabled out dis- Case, error); F.3d In re Sealed parities way in the and non- that border (same). (D.C.Cir.2000) courts would such offend- border To plain find error here. cannot We short, in- after Booker. ers error, plain second element of establish not a effectively sisted he could make II.B, must appellant Part supra 3553(a)(6) argument based on fast-track that, “from the perspective show disparities post-Booker until track record court, plain claimed was so trial error disparities developed. of such judge were prosecutor that the trial argument proves This too much. it, absent countenancing even derelict prescience to its the fatе regarding Thanks timely assistance detect the defendant’s sentencing Simpson’s (internal Draffin, it.” 286 F.3d at 610 ing posi- in approximately court was the same omitted). mul marks quotation Given that of the tion as first district courts in a potentially of factors relevant titude after Yet it can- render sentences Booker. scheme, discretionary we must sentencing argued early post-Booker not be those finding plain cautious particularly be must also be vacated because sentences sug counsel failed to error when trial has not recipients opportuni- did' have the their factor, up gest lest we end particular their sen- sentences with ty compare counsel as remanding appellate whenever Indeed, even imposed tences later. predecessor her did not. serts a factor theory, no could ever Indeed, prior regime, under the Each have to await be the first. will “[o]rdinarily, [plain] held that error we there so that could be basis others lawyer fails to found where the not be course, means comparison which,— discretionary propose departure sеntencing could ever occur. ” no 610; Draffin, 286 see also .... merely not fail' Simpson’s argument does Leandre, Moreover, giv 132 F.3d at 808. It reductio absurdum. of this ad court’s of an alter adoption en the district it inconsistent with also fails because under sentencing methodology native There, Booker itself. miti willing any to consider which was resentencing of defen- remanded circumstances, Simpson cannot sat gating Fanfan, without (under dants Booker the third isfy proving his burden test) courts should suggestion district plain element of error until a track record was established reading wait had had the the court benefit Thus, courts. at 769. itself, by other there is a reasonable likeli Booker 3553(a)(6), requires sen- two which have these 18 U.S.C. hood it would considered courts to consider “the need tencing a sen- specific circumstances and avoid disparities unwarranted sentence court’s rationale, alternative sentencing among defendants with similar records there is no error in the sentence the court imposed.13 Appellate panels who have been found of similar con- in the Sixth duct,” added), (emphasis Eighth id. must be read Circuits suggestеd have analysis.14 to refer to similar disparities past pres- Other circuits have hypothetical approach, ent sentences —not with fu- taken a different assuming that ture ones. Booker in a error primary court’s sentence constitutes error in the judg- sum, In cognizable we find no error in ment, asking and then whether the court’s the alternative rationale that the district pronouncement of a lawful alternative provided sentencing its calcula- sentence renders that error harmless. tion, cognizable hence no error in the Utilizing approach, the circuits have 46-month imposed sentence that the court frequently found such error harmless be- on Simpson. yond a reasonable doubt.15 IV apply here, Were we to analysis such an opinion This proceeded has on the basis we would reach same result. that, if there is no in objection error a district Simpson’s to the district court’s that, 13. We have also determined if there ernment demonstrating has met its burden of were sentencing an error in the alternative beyond a reasonable doubt the Sixth case, employed rationale in this that error Amendment violation at issue did not contrib would be non-constitutional because the dis- received."); ute to the sentence that Cardenas regarded application trict court of the Guide- 590, Christopher, United States 415 F.3d non-mandatory. supra lines as note 11. (6th Cir.2005) ("Any 592 error in Christo harmless, pher’s sentencing was because the Chandler, 14. See United States 419 F.3d adequately district conveyed (6th Cir.2005) case, (“In 485 .'.. this would’impose the same sentence in the ab only district court not determined the Defen mandatory sentencing sence of enhance pursuant dant’s sentence to the ments."); Solis-Vaquera, United States v. 147 but [in also the alternative] treated the Guide (7th Fed.Appx. Cir.2005) ("[T]he 609 er advisory lines and sentenced the Defendant ror was harmless in this case because the pursuant sentencing to the factors outlined in district court selected an alternative sentence 3553(a). Thus, § 18 U.S.C. imposition Booker.”); in accordance with our advice in implicate Defendant's sentence does not Thompson, United States v. (footnote omitted)); the Sixth Amendment" (8th Cir.2005) ("Because Porter, (8th impose made known that it would the same Cir.2005) ("In circumstances, some an alter taking 420-month sentence after [the native sentence can render a Booker error 3553(a) .account, § ] considerations into perhaps precisely, harmless. Or more an al beyond error was harmless a reasonable ternative sentence can demonstrate that the doubt.”); Becenti, United States v. 134 Fed. imposition district court's of sentence in (10th Cir.2005) ("[T]he Appx. Sixth all, volved no error at because in one of the Amendment error here was harmless because alternatives, imposed the sentence was' consis imposed district court an sen alternative (citations omitted)). tent with Booker." tence!,] (cid:127) (cid:127) (cid:127) (cid:127) and we are therefore not in the See, Gill, e.g., speculation conjecture zone regarding United States v. 150 Fed. Appx. (4th Cir.2005) ("[B]e- at *2 whether the error affected the court's selec (internal imposed imposed.” cause the tion of the quo district court sentence an alterna- omitted)); discretionary tive pursuant tation marks States v. Ro 3553(a) bles, (11th guidelines Cir.2005) that was identical sentence, (holding the Sixth Amendment error was constitutional Booker error harm- harmless.”); Cardenas, United States v. léss on because the "district (5th ("In Fed.Appx. Cir.2005) case, this court stated its sentence would be the same judgment, based on the guidelines alternative the Gov- even if the advisory!,] were quired, mandatory application of the Guidelines that alternative is not was sufficient to calculating necessarily the same one judge objection harmless preserve that error would have compliance with But the of the alterna- existence review.16 duty all to consider of the factors sentence, imposed in manner consis- tive 3553(a).* listed section post tent with the -Booker re- at & n. 18. the judge Unlike any mystery as to what the gime, removes hypothesized in Crosby, sen- Simpson’s court would have done Booker tencing 'judge particularly prescient. the law the time been He did Booker’s anticipate opin- remedial any error in sentencing. Consequently, ion and did consider the factors beyond first sentence is harmless that he should do so on awareness doubt.17 reasonable non-mandátory basis. We are therefore conclusion, opposition confident that the alternative sentence passage our attention to a draws this case in fact “the is same one that the opinion, Circuit United States v. Second judge imposed compliance would have in (2d Cir.2005), F.3d Crosby, 397 which the duty with to consider all of the factors questions whether an alternative sentence 3553(a).” in listed section Id. at 118. can ever render Booker error harmless.18 passage, The first sentence of the and its pas- second sentence the cited footnote, accompanying reads follows: sage from Crosby continues: judge, if a to prior [EJven Booker/Fan- addition, such an alternative sentence fan, indicated an alternative not necessarily if the one that the imposed compli that would'have same been judge the imposed presen- ance with Guidelines were not re would have after tiré certainty beyond opportunity, we with present .... know reason- defendant an to “ad- mitigating what specifically able doubt the district court would do ditional evidence Hill, remand”); non-guide- see upon determining United the court’s use in also (3d Cir.2005) (hоlding at lines sentence.” Id. 315. Such evidence relevant, course, clearly "would to the "a District that have been where indicates id., 3553(a),” analysis court’s the under an alternative sentence would be identical to contrary sentencing denial was thus to the the the sentence under Here, by methodology prescribed in may Booker. any error attach to defendant's contrast, harmless”). to the district invited under Booker is wished, present mitigating any he evidence methodology court's was consistent Although parties dispute whether the prescription. with Booker's failing sentence’s was or first non-constitutional, constitutional supra note the dif- passage Crosby, 18.Although the was dicta in dispositive not we ference is recently adopted in the Second Circuit has it any error even on the stricter find harmless holding particular alternative sentence generally supra constitutional standard. See was not error. See States v. harmless II.B. Part Fuller, (2d Cir.2005). * Ayers, Although duty comply 17. In United States 428 F.3d 312 with section 3553(a) (D.C.Cir.2005), Booker/Fanfan, prior we it is followed this harmless er- existed analytic approach unlikely sentencing judge anticipating ror because it was the upon parties anticipated would have the full framework which had decision There, however, Opinion, agreed. import Remedy consid- 428 F.3d at 314. of the factors, including primary we found Booker error in ered section despite guidelines, awareness the excision of court's harmful — alternative, [that announcement of an the subsection made the Guidelines non-Guide- mandatory]. lines sentence —because the court denied aggravating agreement included the following tation the Government waiver provision: the defendant of circumstances mitigating circumstances existed Appeal: Limited Waiver of Your client not the time but were available con- is aware that law ... affords him federal mandatory Guide- sideration under right appeal his sentence.... regime. lines right ap- [T]he defendant waives the peal his sentence or the manner which Again, contrary Crosby hypo- to the ..., except it was determined to the thetical, any mitigating ‍‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‍circumstances that (a) extent that the Court sentences the existed at the time were available for con- period imprisonment defendant to a sideration under the alternative longer statutory than the maximum or by Simpson’s regime employed (b) departs upward the Court from the judge. Accordingly, there were er- applicable Sentencing range Guideline ror, beyond reasonable harmless Realizing uncertainty .... esti- doubt. mating Judge what sentence the will V ultimately impose, the defendant know- ingly willingly his right waives Although pronounced the district court sentence, appeal the to the extent noted Joseph Simpson prior sentence on to the above, exchange for the concessions restructuring Court’s substantial [government] agree- made sentencing regime federal ment. Booker, v. the court accurately pre- States By signature, Simpson acknowledged his dicted the Supreme course the Court that he had plea agreement “read [the] ultimately take. Because the dis- carefully every part reviewed of it trict court’s alternative method- attorney” “fully with un- [his] and that he ology materially consistent with that plea agreement this derstood] and volun- judgment of the court’s is tarily agree[d] Simpson’s plea to it.” At Affirmed. hearing, Simpson the court asked he opportunity “had the to read over the SILBERMAN, Judge, Senior Circuit containing letter the plea agreement care- concurring. fully” and if he had “had the chance to fully I concur opinion, the court’s but plea agreement] discuss with [the [his] separately write govern- discuss the counsel,” to which he answered the af- argument. ment’s waiver Although it is firmative. Simpson, The court also asked perfectly appropriate for the court to rest you “do understand that plea under the grounds its decision on the alternative we case, agreement you are giving up used, normally have would consider we your right appeal the sentence that I whether, contends, government first as the impose to the extent that is noted in the Simpson right appeal waived the his plea agreement,” Simpson replied, sentence on the basis he asserts. See “Yes, sir.” West, 450, United States v. 392 F.3d 458 asserts the waiver was not (D.C.Cir.2004). knowing intelligent because “it was briefs, Upon I reading the concluded based on misinformation as to the manda- knowingly intelligently tory sеntencing guidelines,” nature the waived right appeal his sentence on but im- Court has held that Simpson’s plea perfect knowledge the basis of Booker errors. developments of future

1193 under which defen misapprehension question bearing on has no in the law Ruiz, instance, v. might For United States dant labor.” validity of a waiver. States, 742, 2450, 90 122 S.Ct. 153 Brady v. United (1970), (2002). cases, 1463, L.Ed.2d these Applying L.Ed.2d 586 S.Ct. definitively upheld observed circuit courts have nine sentence-appeal waivers to with- e-Booker pr not entitled defendant [a] right to a post he discov- -Booker claims of merely against plea draw accept- plea discretionary has been sentence. See United States long after the ers (2d Cir.2005); misapprehended 135, 137 his calculus Morgan, ed that v. 406 F.3d likely or the Lockett, case State’s 406 F.3d quality v. United States courses Johnson, to alternative (3d attached penalties Cir.2005); v. States United absent particularly, (4th More Cir.2005); of action. 137, 152-53 Unit 410 F.3d impermissi- or other misrepresentation Bradley, 400 F.3d 463-64 ed States v. voluntary agents, conduct state ble Bournes, (6th Cir.2005); v. United States made guilty intelligently plea of (7th Cir.2005); United law does not applicable of the then light (8th n. 2 Killgo, 397 F.3d States judicial later vulnerable because become Cortez-Arias, Cir.2005); United States rested on plea indicate decisions (9th Cir.2005); 425 F.3d trig- plea A faulty premise. (10th Green, 1180, 1190 compe- of a expectations gered Cir.2005); Frye, States v. defendant tently counseled (11th Cir.2005).1 against him strong case will have State seemed to settle This would have attack because subject to later is not Simpson, had he not against waiver issue him correctly advised lawyer defendant’s attention Halbert v. brought to the court’s existing law as the then respect to - U.S.-, Michigan, pro- but later possible penalties (2005), 28(j) in a Rule 162 L.Ed.2d 552 courts, as in this nouncements of argument. oral day the before letter case, penalty maximum hold that the proposi for the Simpson relies on Halbert less than was question the crime can pleading guilty that a defendant tion plea at the time the reasonably assumed yet has not been right a that not waive was entered. case, right “the recognized —in (citation omitted). 90 S.Ct. 1463 ap discretionary sentence via to obtain later, Supreme years the More than 30 peal.” explained Brady and reaffirmed Court Halbert, the addressed the Court Constitution, respect to de- that “the Michigan constitu- constitutionality of a relevant circum- awareness of fendant’s appellate limiting tional amendment stances, require complete knowl- does not plead guilty defendants who rights of circumstances, but of the relevant edge amendment, contendere. Under nolo guilty plea, accept a court to permits to appeal right have no such defendants of various accompanying waiver with its state’s Appeals, Michigan Court various forms rights, despite constitutional Bond, Sahlin, v. 414 ny guilty plea”); United States also United States 1. See (5th Cir.2005) (1st Cir.2005) (delineating the (rejecting a defendant's plea invol- argument sentence-appeal that Booker rendered waiver where bounds of a observing possibility of a untary that “the broad that the waiver’s defendant conceded occurring change after a in the law errors). favorable language covered Booker accompa- plea of the normal that is one risks court. Mich. appellate guishable “[unjrecognized” jury intermediate See from the Const, I, Instead, § 20. art. defendants right suggests trial at issue Halbert’s, petition appeal the court for leave to must sweeping anti-waiver lan- cases, and, indigent in most defendants guage casts not doubt the circuit appointed-counsel are not to aid entitled cases, courts’ Booker-waiver but also on Halbert, process. during them this Brady both and Ruiz. Justice Thomas ac- 125 S.Ct. at 2588. The Court invalidated tually recognized newly this created ten- Michigan scheme and held that it cre musing sion his dissent. After an appeal ated a situation more like cryptic “[w]hat “no[t] statement” — right, California, for which Douglas unclear,” Halbert, recognized” is —“means 9 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. (Thomas, J., 125 S.Ct. at 2604 dissenting), (1963), requires appointment of coun observed, presciently, Justice Thomas sel, discretionary appeal, than a for which majority’s failure to make clear Moffitt, Ross v. which sources of law are to be consid- (1974), provides L.Ed.2d 341 in deciding right ered whether a is “no[t] appointment such is not constitutionally nonwaivable, recognized,” and hence required. The Court reasoned instance, bound to wreak havoc. For “Michigan’s appellаte intermediate suppose that a defendant waived the looks to the merits the claims made in right appeal his sentence after the application” that “indigent defen regional Appeals Court of had held that pursuing dants first-tier review principle Blakely Washington Appeals generally Court of are ill apply did not to the United States Sen- equipped represent themselves.” Hal tencing but before this Court bert, 125 S.Ct. at 2590. contrary held the in United States v. case, majority Relevant to our re- Booker. The defendant could claim sponded Michigan’s contention that circuit, in his the Sixth Amendment “even if Halbert had a constitutionally right against application guaranteed right appointed counsel for Guidelines was recognized,” “no[t] review, appellate first-level he waived that right hence that was nonwaivable. right.” Id. at 2594. response The Court’s (citations omitted). Id. at n. 2 First, independent included two grounds. stated, surprisingly, the Court that “Hal- majority’s blithe bert, in common with other defendants drive-by implicit questioning of the consid- pleas, convicted on their had no recognized courts,2 eight ered views of сircuit not to right appointed appellate counsel he speak of the it upon doubt casts its own forgo.” could elect to (emphasis add- precedent, say is to the least rather dis- ed). rejected Michigan’s The court also couraging judges. to circuit I suspect the argument waiver because “the trial court Supreme approach Court’s stems from its Halbert, did not tell simply directly, disposition to gener- decide the issues that case, there would be no access ate certiorari high interest “come hell or appointed counsel.” Id. water.” The it shame of is that the man- It is of course the first on which ner which the Court decides cases is Simpson relies. He important claims that the more than what it decides. It is “[un- jrecognized right appointed appellate the former that greatest has the influence counsel” at issue Halbert is indistin- judiciary. on the American See United sion, Cortez-Arias, Only 2. post-Halbert. the Ninth Circuit's Booker-waiver deci- was issued (D.C.Cir. Moore, 99, 102 1997) J., (Silberman, dissenting from deni banc). In rehearing acting as en

al Halbert, again once dem the Court

did primarily itself it sees

onstrated determination rather

tribunal issue and controver

than resolution of cases I have referred to it as why

sies—which “noncourt See Lederman ‍‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‍court.” (D.C.Cir. States,

2002) (Silberman, J., concurring). event, certainly leads us Halbert issue and instead pretermit the waiver set

rely grounds on the alternative forth opinion. court’s

CITIZENS INVESTMENT SERVICES

CORPORATION, Petitioner

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

BOARD, Respondent.

No. 04-1317. Appeals,

United States Court Circuit.

District of Columbia

Argued Sept. 16, 2005.

Decided Dec.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Simpson, Joseph B.

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

Date Published: Dec 13, 2005

Citation: 430 F.3d 1177

Docket Number: 04-3129

Court Abbreviation: D.C. Cir.