United States v. Melvin, 628 F. App'x 774

Melvin was retried for selling ~11.5 grams of cocaine base in Feb 2010 and convicted on March 27, 2014.
PSR calculated a base offense level 20 (by quantity) but classified Melvin as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) based on two prior felony drug convictions, raising his offense level to 34.
Melvin conceded one predicate (a 2005 SDNY conviction) but disputed that a 1998 New York conviction for "Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the 3rd Degree" (N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39) qualified as a predicate controlled substance offense.
At sentencing the district court overruled the objection, applied the career-offender guideline, and imposed a below-guideline sentence of 168 months (range 262–327 months under career-offender calculation).
On appeal Melvin argued the § 220.39 conviction did not qualify as a "controlled substance offense" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b); he also raised additional pro se trial- and sentencing-related claims (jury exposure to shackles, admission of a 2007 drug conviction, double jeopardy challenge to the guideline).
The First Circuit affirmed: (1) Bryant panel precedent compelled treating § 220.39 as a predicate; (2) independently, § 220.39 categorically fits the distribution prong of § 4B1.2(b); and (3) Melvin’s pro se claims fail on the merits.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39 is a "controlled substance offense" for career-offender purposes under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b)	§ 220.39 does not qualify as a predicate under the relevant prong Melvin invokes; Bryant was wrongly decided as to reasoning	Bryant and other authority treat § 220.39 as a controlled-substance offense (possession/attempt or distribution/attempt)	Affirmed: Bryant binds the panel; independently § 220.39 categorically fits the distribution prong (and attempt/offer qualifies as substantial step)
Whether the jury saw Melvin in handcuffs such that denial of mistrial was reversible	Melvin: jury exposure to shackles (and eye contact) prejudiced trial, requiring mistrial	Government: no such event; even if it occurred, record does not show clear prejudice	Denial of mistrial not an abuse of discretion; juror recalled nothing extraordinary
Whether admission of Melvin's 2007 drug conviction on cross-examination was improper under Fed. R. Evid. 609	Melvin: admission was unduly prejudicial	Government: conviction was probative of credibility; district court balanced probative vs. prejudicial	Admission proper; no abuse of discretion
Whether applying career-offender guideline violates double jeopardy	Melvin: guideline application constitutes double punishment	Government: precedent rejects double jeopardy challenge to sentencing enhancements	Rejected; double jeopardy challenge previously decided against Melvin (Witte)

United States v. Bryant, 571 F.3d 147 (1st Cir.) (held New York Penal Law § 220.39 qualifies as a controlled substance offense under § 4B1.2(b))
United States v. Mouscardy, 722 F.3d 68 (1st Cir.) (law-of-the-circuit binding of prior panel decisions)
United States v. Holloway, 499 F.3d 114 (1st Cir.) (only Supreme Court or en banc panel can overturn panel precedent)
United States v. Pina, 844 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.) (shackling exposure does not automatically require mistrial; prejudice must be shown)
Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995) (rejecting double jeopardy challenge to sentencing enhancements)
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach for determining whether prior convictions qualify as predicate offenses)