United States v. Mekail Jones
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 509
| 3rd Cir. | 2014Background
- On April 27, 2011, Jones, a convicted felon, fled uniformed Erie police on foot after officers approached a bar; during the chase he reached into his waistband, produced a .38 revolver (which Officer Baney saw), was tackled by Officer Onderko (who later tore his ACL), and ultimately subdued with a taser.
- Jones pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- The PSR treated two prior convictions as crimes of violence (conspiracy to commit robbery and a Pennsylvania misdemeanor for fleeing or attempting to elude, 75 Pa. C.S. § 3733), giving a base offense level of 24 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2).
- The District Court relied on plea-colloquy facts to apply the residual crime-of-violence provision and applied an additional six-level § 3A1.2(c)(1) enhancement (assault on a police officer) because Jones produced a gun while fleeing; total guideline exposure capped at 120 months statutory maximum, to which the Court sentenced Jones and denied a downward variance.
- On appeal the Third Circuit reviewed (1) whether the Pennsylvania misdemeanor vehicular-flight offense categorically qualifies as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), (2) whether the § 3A1.2(c)(1) official-victim (assault) enhancement was warranted, and (3) whether the District Court improperly presumed the Guidelines reasonable or ignored defense arguments.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Jones) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether PA misdemeanor vehicular flight (75 Pa. C.S. § 3733) is a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (residual clause) | Vehicular flight categorically presents a serious potential risk of physical injury and thus qualifies under the residual clause; prior authorities support that conclusion | The misdemeanor grade (lesser offense) and the statute’s breadth mean some convictions do not involve substantial risk and thus it cannot categorically be a crime of violence | Court held the misdemeanor vehicular-flight offense does categorically present a serious potential risk of physical injury and thus qualifies; District Court’s factual inquiry was error but harmless |
| Whether § 3A1.2(c)(1) six-level enhancement for assault on an officer applies where defendant produced a gun during flight but the complaining officer (Onderko) did not see the gun until after tackle | Producing a gun while fleeing is assaultive conduct that would reasonably cause fear and supports the enhancement | Jones argues assault requires that the victim actually (or reasonably) apprehend immediate bodily harm; Onderko did not see or fear the gun, so the enhancement is unsupported | Court held assault under § 3A1.2(c)(1) requires an objective, reasonable apprehension by the official victim; because Officer Onderko did not observe or reasonably apprehend the gun, the enhancement was improperly applied — sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing |
| Whether the District Court presumed the Guidelines reasonable or failed to address defense counsel’s arguments (3553(a) factors and concern about enhancements based on uncharged conduct) | Not directly argued by Government on appeal | Jones contends the Court’s statements showed a presumption of reasonableness and that it ignored arguments that enhancing based on uncharged conduct undermines respect for law and plea incentives | Court found no presumption of reasonableness and concluded the District Court adequately considered and responded to defense arguments; this claim is rejected |
Key Cases Cited
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (explains the categorical approach for determining whether predicate offenses qualify as violent felonies/crimes of violence)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (limits use of the modified categorical approach to divisible statutes with alternate elements)
- Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011) (held vehicular flight poses a serious risk of physical injury and can qualify under the ACCA residual clause)
- United States v. Lee, 199 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 1999) (treats "assault" in official-victim enhancement according to common-law definitions: attempted battery and menacing)
- United States v. Acosta-Sierra, 690 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (applies an objective-reasonableness standard for victim’s apprehension in assault analyses under common-law definitions)