United States v. Meigel Craddock
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 20118
| 8th Cir. | 2016Background
- On Nov. 20, 2013, Officer Prichard observed a suspicious green Pontiac, learned it was stolen, and later saw Meigel Craddock standing about 50 feet from the parked stolen car.
- Prichard approached Craddock, who appeared nervous and could not give an address; Prichard handcuffed and frisked him for weapons.
- The frisk did not reveal a weapon, but Prichard felt and removed a key fob from Craddock’s pocket, then used it to unlock the stolen Pontiac.
- After opening the car, Prichard saw a handgun on the floor; Craddock (a felon) was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and later designated an Armed Career Criminal under the ACCA.
- Craddock moved to suppress the key fob and related evidence; the district court denied the motion, a jury convicted, and he received an ACCA sentence.
- The Eighth Circuit reversed the denial of suppression, concluding the plain-feel seizure of the key fob exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry frisk, and vacated the conviction without reaching the ACCA sentencing issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the officer lawfully seized the key fob discovered during a Terry frisk | Craddock argued seizure exceeded Terry scope because the key fob’s incriminating nature was not immediately apparent on plain feel | Government argued frisk was lawful and items in plain touch may be seized; also raised expectation-of-privacy and inevitable-discovery defenses | Court held seizure violated Fourth Amendment—officer lacked probable cause from plain feel to associate the fob with the stolen car, so removal and inspection exceeded Terry frisk |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes stop-and-frisk reasonable suspicion standard)
- Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (plain-feel rule: officer may seize only items whose incriminating nature is immediately apparent without further manipulation)
- Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (probable cause requires practical probability that item is incriminating)
- Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (inevitable discovery exception to exclusionary rule)
- United States v. Janis, 387 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2004) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
- United States v. Hanlon, 401 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2005) (officers may suspect weapons when encountering suspected car thieves)
- United States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2003) (discusses suspicion of weapons in car theft contexts)
- United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935 (8th Cir. 2005) (incriminating character must be immediately identifiable on plain feel)
- United States v. Cowan, 674 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 2012) (plain-feel seizure standard and probable cause to associate property with crime)
- United States v. Bailey, 417 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 2005) (hunch is insufficient for reasonable suspicion or probable cause)
- United States v. Long, 797 F.3d 558 (8th Cir. 2015) (distinguishes expectation of privacy in vehicles vs. items on person)
- United States v. $53,082 in U.S. Currency, 985 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1993) (recognizes expectation of privacy in items carried on one’s person)
